

**COURSE**  
**IS003.08**

**EDITION**  
**B**



**Defense Security Service Academy**

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Use the following At-A-Glance lists to identify your inquiry type. Once you have done this, follow the directions below and email or phone.

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- Course Reissue
- Enrollment Extension

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- Enrollment
- Incorrect SSN
- Incorrect RYE Date

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- Example
- Organization
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- Illustration
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# NOTICE

We have made every effort to ensure that the content of this course accords with the requirements of the edition of the *National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPO)* in effect at the time the course went to the printer. However, changes to the *NISPO* may occur after that time; therefore, the technical accuracy of a given edition of the course cannot be guaranteed in all particulars. Questions regarding technical accuracy should be directed to your DSS Field Office. However, you should base your responses to the questions in the course examination solely on the information provided in the course and not on any other source.

This course does not address requirements for TOP SECRET, COMSEC (includes CRYPTO), DOE, NATO, or other information or programs having special requirements.

This course contains no classified information. All security markings used in this course are for illustration and training purposes only.

**September 1997**

**DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE ACADEMY  
LINTHICUM, MD 21090**

Welcome to *Protecting SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL Documents (PSCD)*!

PSCD is intended as follow-on to *Essentials of Industrial Security Management (EISM)*. *EISM* took you through the baseline requirements for all cleared facilities, both possessing and non-possessing, in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP). *PSCD* focuses on the additional requirements for facilities that possess classified documents to the SECRET level. Together, *EISM* and *PSCD* cover about all that an FSO of a SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL possessing facility needs to do in order to supervise its security program.

We've designed PSCD mainly for FSO's at the "small possessors," most of which handle classified information to the SECRET level. The odds are that your company is one of these. About 6,700 facilities-approximately half of all cleared facilities in the NISP-possess classified information. Of these, about 6,400 possess SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information only. And of these, about 6,000 are small possessors.

We know that an FSO of a small possessor usually has other major duties besides security. So security tasks must be carried out efficiently. At the same time, these tasks may be performed only once in a while, making it difficult to master them. To help you work both quickly and accurately, we've consolidated all of the requirements for a given task. For most tasks, we've also prepared step-by-step job aids. So even if you only do the task once in a blue moon, you can do it right.

Doing it right is essential. We are always in greater danger from those we trust than from those whom we do not, and strict adherence to sound security procedures is the best safeguard not only against others but against our own partiality as well.

Since, as FSO of a possessing facility, you are responsible for guarding a part of our nation's security, much depends on your success. I hope you will find that *Protecting SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL Documents* prepares you to succeed.

Kevin Jones  
Director

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## General Information

### PURPOSE



This course is designed to orient Facility Security Officers (FSOs) of cleared facilities within the DoD implementation of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) that are authorized to possess SECRET and/or CONFIDENTIAL material in their basic safeguarding responsibilities. Members of the FSO's security staff are also encouraged to enroll, as are members of the Defense Investigative Service and of the User Agencies who wish to gain a better understanding of the role of the FSO within the NISP.

### ADMINISTRATION

The Defense Security Service Academy (DSSA) administers DSSA courses.

### ENROLLMENT ASSISTANCE

On any matter concerning your enrollment, (a change in your mailing address, non-receipt of materials, your exam score, etc.) communicate with DSSA.

- Commercial: **410-865-2295/2732**
- DSN: **283-7295/7732**
- Send comment to **dss.academy@mail.dss.mil**

## ADDITIONAL DSSA COURSES

For our catalog, write to DSSA, ATTN: Registrar. Course descriptions are also provided at our home page at <http://www.dss.mil/training>

## STUDYING THE LESSONS

To get the most out of each lesson we urge you to follow this procedure:

- Note the lesson objectives and refer to them from time to time as you go through the lesson text.
- Complete the review exercises for the lesson. Refer to the lesson text to check your answers.

## CONTENT ASSISTANCE

If you have a question about the content of this course or if you have a correction or suggestion to make to improve its content, contact the DSSA Industrial Security Team. To phone us, use one of these numbers:

• Commercial: **(410) 865-2295/2732**

• DSN: **283-7295/7732**

To e-mail us:

• **Send comments** to [dssa.is@mail.dss.mil](mailto:dssa.is@mail.dss.mil)

**To write us:**

• Send a letter to:

**Defense Security Service Academy  
ATTN: Industrial Security Team  
938 Elkridge Landing Rd.  
Linthicum, MD 21090**

## TIME LIMIT

DSSA allows you up to one year to complete this course. If the Defense Security Service employs you and your enrollment in this course has been directed by a super-visor, then the course may be completed during duty hours.

## COURSE OBJECTIVES

When you have completed this course, you should be able to carry out the following duties and responsibilities of a facility security officer (FSO) at a facility that possesses SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents.

- Ensure that material required to be stored is properly stored, and that measures to control and restrict access to the stored material are enforced.
- Supervise the receipt of classified material and its distribution within the facility.
- Ensure that classified material is properly controlled during use and that classified visits to the facility are properly arranged and conducted.
- Ensure that adequate classification guidance is received, understood, applied, and challenged if necessary; ensure that documents are accurately marked by appropriate personnel, and that documents are downgraded and declassified as authorized.
- Limit and control reproduction of classified material.
- Supervise the transmission and release of classified material outside the facility.
- Ensure that classified material is destroyed as soon as practical according to an established program and that classified waste is handled properly until destroyed.
- Supervise the disposition of classified material associated with pre-contract and end-of-contract activity and of other material as required.
- Supervise the creation, maintenance, retention, and disposition of records necessary for the security program.
- Prepare and submit timely, accurate reports as required.
- Conduct self-inspections of the facility's security program.

## EXAMINATION



When you feel confident that you can meet the objectives for the entire course, do the following:

- Access the ENROL web site:  
<https://enrol.dss.mil/enrol/default.asp>
- Go to this course
- And click on the exam URL.

The examination is an open book test; passing score is 76 percent (at least 76 items correct out of 100). If you score less than 76 percent, take the test again.

## CERTIFICATE

**When you have successfully completed the exam, you an online Certificate of Completion will be available for printing.**

## Acronyms & Abbreviations

ACCP	Army Correspondence Course Program
AF	Air Force
AFCOMCOM	Air Force Communications Command (fictional)
AIPD	Army Institute for Professional Development
AIS	Automated Information System
BLOS	Beyond Line-of-Sight
CI(C)I-Q	CONFIDENTIAL
CDR	Commander
CDRL	Contract Data Requirements List
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONUS	Continental United States
COTR	Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
CR	Communication Reports (fictional)
CRYPTO	CRYPTOGRAPHIC (refers to encoded information)
CSA	Cognizant Security Agency
CSO	Cognizant Security Office
DA	Department of the Army
DD	Department of Defense
DSS	Defense Security Service
DoD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOHA	Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
EISM	Essentials of Industrial Security Management
EMP	electromagnetic pulse(s)
E.O.	Executive Order
EWC	Electric Widget Company (fictional)
FCL	Facility Security Clearance
FFP	Firm Fixed Price
FO	(DSS) Field Office
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FRD	FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
FSO	Facility Security Officer
FSS	Federal Supply Schedule

GSA	General Services Administration
IFB	Invitation for Bids
ISL	Industrial Security Letter
I.S. Rep	Industrial Security Representative
KMP	Key Management Personnel
MFO	Multiple Facility Organization
N	Navy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NESC	Naval Electronic Systems Command
NISP	National Industrial Security Program
NISPOM	National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual
PCL	Personnel Security Clearance
PIC-CVA	Personnel Investigations Center – Central Verifications Activity
RD	RESTRICTED DATA
R&D	Research and Development
RFP	Request for Proposals
RFQ	Request for Quotes
S, (S),	SECRET
SCG	Security Classification Guide
S&G	Sargent & Greenleaf
sow	Statement of Work
SPID	Standard Practice Procedure(s)
TS, (TS), TS	TOP SECRET
TSC	(Army) Training Support Command
U I (U),	UNCLASSIFIED
UA	User Agency
USPS	United States Postal System


# Introduction ...

In this course, besides reviewing security requirements, we'll explore applications of the requirements by looking in on the fictitious offices of the Electric Widget Company (EWC) in Corinth, New York. EWC is a small firm that possesses SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents. We'll meet several of EWC's employees as they go about their work on EWC's classified contract with the Navy. You should find that most of the security matters that arise at EWC, at least the routine ones, mirror those at your facility. Some rather extraordinary situations also crop up though, and we'll see how the EWC personnel cope with them.

All of EWC's "KMPs" are shown below, but we'll be seeing Harold Huxtable, EWC's FSO, the most. J. Digby Wilbersnoot appears in a cameo role, and the others do not appear at all. Instead we'll be meeting several EWC employees. Also, at the end of almost all of the lessons we have provided summary charts. If you wear several "hats" at your company, we think these job aids will help you to carry out your role as FSO both quickly and accurately.

*Remember, though, EWC's practices and procedures are by no means the only acceptable ones. Your facility may well have different ones. If you have questions about any security practice, discuss it with your LS. Rep.*

Now let's look at storage.



# LESSON 1


## Storage

**S**torage comes first. The NISPOM puts it this way: "Contractors are eligible for possession of classified material, if they have an FCL and capability approved by the CSA" (2-100, NISPOM). Storage is basically a matter of having a secure place to put classified materials when authorized persons are not using them. The higher the classification of the materials, the more secure the place must be. And, of course, the place must be large enough to hold all of the classified materials on hand. These few, clear, common-sense principles underlie the rather complicated array of rules that govern storage within the DoD) implementation of the National Industrial Security Program (NISP).


### OBJECTIVES

When you have completed this lesson, you should be able to do the following:

- Distinguish between the level of a facility's security clearance (FCL) and the level of its safeguarding capability.
- List the three types of material to be stored.
- Identify the types of containers that are authorized for storage of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material and related authorized padlocks.






- Identify which containers require "supplemental protection" (extra safeguards) when SECRET material is stored in them during nonworking hours and the supplemental protection required.
- Describe basic features of a GSA-approved cabinet.
- Apply rules governing container access and the combinations of security containers.
- Make appropriate reports regarding storage.



"... AND, OF COURSE, THE PLACE MUST BE LARGE ENOUGH TO HOLD ALL OF THE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL ON HAND".

# FACILITY CLEARANCE LEVEL VS. LEVEL OF SAFEGUARDING CAPABILITY




Let's first make clear the important Distinction between the level of a facility's security clearance (FCL) and the level of its safeguarding capability. An FCL indicates the highest level of classified information to which that facility *is eligible for access*. For example, a facility cleared at the SECRET level is eligible for access to SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information. By itself, an FCL does *not* permit the facility to receive or possess classified information. Often facilities have no need to possess classified material. Instead their employees have access to classified information at possessing facilities or at User Agency installations.

Other cleared contractors, however, do need to *possess classified material* at one or more of their facilities. When a given facility will need to possess classified material, the Field Office for that facility is notified of the level of classified material that the facility will need to store. The Field Office then works with the facility to see that it acquires the appropriate *equipment* and establishes appropriate *procedures* to safeguard the classified material it is to possess. When the facility's measures are satisfactory the Field Office approves its *safeguarding capability*.

While the level of a facility's safeguarding capability can never be higher than the level of its FCL, it is often lower. The Electric Widget Company (EWC), for example, has a TOP SECRET FCL, but its safeguarding capability is a the SECRET level, EWC has access to TOP SECRET material at an installation of User Agency, the Navy, but EWC is not authorized to possess TOP SECRET material.

## WHAT NEEDS TO BE STORED?

### SECRET STORAGE :



For a facility with SECRET safeguarding capability, there are three types of material that, if on hand, must be stored in an authorized security container:

- *SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material* when not in use,
- *Classified waste*, until it is destroyed, and
- Classification-pending material, such as an unsolicited proposal that contains information that seems to require safeguarding (see **NISPOM, 4-105b**).

## CONTAINERS AUTHORIZED FOR CLASSIFIED STORAGE

Contractors must use the storage measures in **NISPOM, 5-302** and **303. 5-303** gives the particulars of most of the approved containers; here we're just trying to identify them. The seven types of containers authorized for storage of classified material are the following:

1. GSA-approved security cabinet
2. Approved vault
3. Closed Area
4. Safe with automatic unit locking mechanism
5. Steel file cabinet with automatic unit locking mechanism
6. Safe-type steel file container with automatic unit locking mechanism
7. Steel file cabinet with bar and padlock

While any of these containers may be used, 3 - 7 require supplemental protection when **SECRET** material is stored in them during nonworking hours.

*The cost of supplemental protection should be weighed carefully before you purchase any of these five types of containers.*

## PADLOCKS



S & G 8077A/AB Series

Before we get into supplemental protection, let's look at padlock requirements. You will have noticed that one of the containers (7) is always secured with a padlock. Padlocks for this use must meet Federal Specification FF-P-110. The only padlocks that meet this specification are those in the 8077A and 8077B series manufactured by Sargent & Greenleaf (S & G). The S & G 8077AB is the latest model and is recommended.

## SUPPLEMENTAL PROTECTION

Any of the seven containers can be used to store CONFIDENTIAL material during both working and nonworking hours. These same containers may be used to store SECRET material during working hours. The NISPOM defines "working hours" as follows:


**Working Hours.** The period of time when (i) there is present in the specific area where classified material is located a work force on a regularly scheduled shift as contrasted with employees working within an area on an overtime basis outside of the scheduled work shift; and (ii) the number of employees in the scheduled work force is sufficient in number and so positioned to be able to detect and challenge the presence of unauthorized personnel. This would therefore exclude janitorial maintenance personnel and other individuals whose duties require movement throughout the facility.

During nonworking hours, the first two containers (GSA-approved cabinet and approved vault) require no supplemental protection (additional safeguards) when material classified to the SECRET level only is stored in them. The remaining containers (3 - 7) do require supplemental protection when they hold SECRET material during nonworking hours.

The following chart summarizes the main storage rules:

<b>STORAGE: SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL</b>	
<b>CONTAINERS</b> <i>All are sufficient to store SECRET during working hours and CONFIDENTIAL at any time.</i>	<b>SUPPLEMENTAL PROTECTION</b> <i>Used when SECRET is stored during nonworking hours</i>
1. GSA-approved security cabinet 2. Approved Vault	None required
3. Closed Area*	Container(s) alarmed  or  Located in an alarmed area  Security guards approved prior to NISPOM publication may still be used. Patrol schedule: Every 4 hours
4. Safe with automatic unit locking mechanism	
5. Steel file cabinet with automatic unit locking mechanism	
6. Safe-type steel file container with automatic unit locking mechanism	
7. Steel file cabinet with bar and padlock. (Padlock must be S&G 8077A series or S&G 8077AB series.)	

\*NOTE: If classified documents are to be stored on open shelves or in bins, the Closed Area must be alarmed with an approved intrusion detection system and approved by the Field Office.



**Complete the following exercises for review and practice.**  
*Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

**1.** Mark the following statements true or false:

a. A facility with a SECRET FCL is authorized to store SECRET material.

( ) True ( ) False

b. A facility with SECRET safeguarding capability is authorized to store SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information.

( ) True ( ) False

c. A facility with a TOP SECRET FCL is authorized to store SECRET material.

( ) True ( ) False

d. A facility with a SECRET FCL is authorized access to SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information.

( ) True ( ) False

**2.** For a facility with SECRET safeguarding capability, the three types of material that, if on hand, must be stored in an authorized container are:

a. S \_\_\_\_\_ and C \_\_\_\_\_ material, when not in use,

b. c \_\_\_\_\_ w, \_\_\_\_\_ until it is destroyed, and

c. c \_\_\_\_\_ - p \_\_\_\_\_ material, such as an unsolicited proposal that contains information that may be classified.

**3.** Given a contractor authorized to use the types of containers listed below and that the containers meet all NISPOM requirements, mark each type of container as follows:

**C** - if the container may be used to store Confidential material during both working and nonworking hours.

**S** - if the container may be used to store SECRET material during both working and nonworking hours without supplemental protection.

**SS** - if the container requires supplemental protection when SECRET material is stored in it during nonworking hours.

NOTE: Markings may be used more than once per container.

\_\_\_a. Approved vault.

\_\_\_b. Steel file cabinet with bar and padlock.

\_\_\_c. Safe with automatic unit locking mechanism.

\_\_\_d. Closed Area.

\_\_\_e. Safe-type steel file container with automatic unit locking mechanism,

\_\_\_f. GSA-approved security cabinet.

\_\_\_g. Steel file cabinet with automatic unit locking mechanism.

**4.** The only padlocks that meet Federal Specification FF-P-110, the standard for the National Industrial Security Program, are those in the S & G \_\_\_\_\_ and \_\_\_\_\_ series.

**5.** Supplemental protection policy for SECRET material stored during nonworking hours requires that the container or containers be \_\_\_\_\_ or they be located in an \_\_\_\_\_.

**6.** S \_\_\_\_\_ g \_\_\_\_\_ approved prior to the publication of the NISPOM may still be used to provide supplemental protection during nonworking hours. The patrol schedule for SECRET is every \_\_\_\_\_ hours.

**7.** If classified documents are to be stored on open shelves or in bins in a C \_\_\_\_\_ A \_\_\_\_\_, it must be protected by an approved i \_\_\_\_\_ d \_\_\_\_\_ s \_\_\_\_\_ (IDS) and approved by the DSS F \_\_\_\_\_ O \_\_\_\_\_.



1. a. False.  
b. True.  
c. False.  
d. True. (p. 1-3)
2. a. SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL  
b. Classified waste.  
c. Classification-pending. (p. 1-4)
3. a. C, S.  
b. C, SS.  
c. C, SS.  
d. C, SS.  
e. C, SS.  
f. C, S.  
g. C, SS. (pp. 1-5-6)
4. 8077A, 8077B.(p. 1-5)
5. alarmed, alarmed area.(p. 1-6)
6. security guards, 4. (p. 1-6)
7. Closed Area, intrusion detection system, Field Office. (p. 1-6)

## GSA-APPROVED CABINETS

Let's see how Harold Huxtable, the FSO of the Electric Widget Company, set up its storage. He did not want to get involved with supplemental protection, and structural storage seemed too spacious for the modest amount of classified material that EWC would be storing. That appeared to leave the GSA-approved cabinet. Harold decided to call his I.S. Rep, Harley Sanders, and explore the matter with him.




"Harley, what is a 'GSA-approved security filing cabinet,' anyway?"

"Basically, Harold, it's a steel file cabinet with a built-in combination lock. But what sets it apart is that it is specifically constructed to withstand certain hazards for specified lengths of time, as certified by the General Services Administration. That's why it's 'GSA-approved.' For example, it can hold out for 20 man-hours against manipulation of its lock. It's one tough cabinet, Harold. What type are you looking for?"

"Type?"

"Sure. There are all kinds. Two-drawer, four drawer, and five-drawer cabinets. Legal size and letter size. Single lock, dual lock, and multilock. Even map and plan cabinets. How much classified material are we talking about, Harold?"

Harold and Harley talked for a while and figured out that EWC would be storing less than one cubic foot of SECRET documents and about one and a half cubic feet of CONFIDENTIAL documents. Harley said they should allow another two cubic feet to store classified waste.





"It looks like the two-drawer, legal size, single-lock model will suit you, Harold," Harley concluded

"About buying one. The NISPOM says cabinets; manufacturers and prices are in the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) catalog. Does that mean I need to buy a new cabinet?"

"Not necessarily. The *first* purchaser of the cabinet must have bought it new from a manufacturer listed in the Federal Supply Schedule. Suppliers change.

Right now there are only two suppliers of *two-drawer* models on the FSS. That's Mosler, Inc. and Hamilton Safe. Their two-drawer models sell new for about \$1,000. But other companies, such as, Diebold, Inc., have been on the list, Harold, and it's perfectly all right to purchase a 'previously owned' cabinet. You could find a bargain. Just be sure that the used cabinet has its GSA Test Certification label on the inside of the locking drawer and its 'General Services Administration Approved Security Container' label on the outside of the top drawer. Even more important, I would have the seller provide a written statement from a locksmith certifying that the cabinet's integrity hasn't been impaired."

Harold thanked Harley for all the information and, after some shopping around, obtained the GSA approved security filing cabinet that EWC has used ever since.

## CONTROL OF STORAGE CONTAINERS

By the time the cabinet was delivered to EWC, Harold had given a lot of thought to controlling its use.

### RESTRICTING ACCESS

Harold's first concern was restricting access. He knew from the NISPOM that "only a minimum number of authorized persons" could be permitted to know the combination to a container or to have

access to its contents. He decided that the minimum number at EWC would be two: himself and Zelda Hobbs. Zelda Hobbs had just been hired as EWC's classified document custodian. Between them, he and Zelda could cover each other's absences, handle any emergencies, and remind each other of the current combination to the cabinet if need be.

Harold also knew that a record must be kept of the names of those knowing the combination to a container. The combination hadn't been thought up yet, but he made the record anyway. Though it is not required, he wrote in the telephone numbers, too.

The following persons know the combination to EWC's security container:	
Name	Telephone No.
Harold Huxtable	375-4269
Zelda Hobbs	373-8931

Though not required either, Harold planned to tape the unclassified record to the inside of the container so that he or Zelda could be contacted during nonworking hours in an emergency where the container was found opened.

### **WHEN MUST COMBINATIONS BE CHANGED?**

Harold knew that combinations used in safeguarding classified information (except COMSEC and NATO) must be changed upon:

- **Initial Classified Use.** His GSA-approved cabinet had arrived today, and he would start storing EWC's classified material in it right away.

- **Changed Personnel Status.** The combination would also have to be changed if he or Zelda, as the persons knowing the combination, terminated employment, or if he or she ever had his or her PCL withdrawn, suspended, or revoked.
- **Compromise or Suspected Compromise.** He hoped it would never happen, but he knew that if there were a known or suspected compromise of the cabinet itself, or of its combination, the combination would have to be changed.
- **Container Unlocked and Unattended.** Woe to anyone if he ever had to change the combination because someone had left the cabinet unlocked and unattended!
- **Other Times When Considered Necessary.**


Whenever Harold, as FSO, or the DSS Field Office decided the combination needed to be changed, it would be changed.

### CLASSIFYING COMBINATIONS (& 'CODE WORDS')

Harold went to see Zelda in her office. Zelda was admiring the newly arrived GSA-approved cabinet. They chatted for a bit, then Harold said, "By the way, Zelda, what's your favorite six-letter word?" Zelda was taken aback. What sort of game was Harold playing? She decided to play along. She thought for a moment, then said, "Dragon." Harold swallowed hard. "Dragon?" "Yes," said Zelda with a demure smile. I've always like the way dragons devote themselves to guarding precious things." Harold caught on. "Well, then 'dragon' will be the new combination," Harold announced. Zelda was puzzled.



ZELDA'S FAVORITE 6-LETTER WORD



Then Harold pointed to the buttons on her telephone. "Look here," he said. "D goes with 3, and R goes with 7, so DR stands for 37. AG is 24, and ON is 66. So that's our combination: 37-24-66. 'DRAGON' will be our way to look up the numbers on the telephone if we forget them." Zelda thought this was a clever precaution, but wholly unnecessary. 37-24-66 was printed on her memory already. She would not forget.


Harold informed Zelda that a combination used in safeguarding classified information and, if used, a 'code word' for the combination are classified information; the classification level is the same as the highest level of information stored in the container. "So '37-24-66' and 'DRAGON' as it relates to 37-24-66 are both SECRET information," he said.

As a final precaution, Harold checked the manufacturer's instructions to be sure that the combination they had selected would not cause problems. He knew that using certain numbers in the first or last set of numbers could lead to the lock not opening sometimes. It turned out that 'DRAGON' was O.K.

### **WHO MAY CHANGE COMBINATIONS?**

It was time to change the combination. Harold knew that only certain persons were authorized to change combinations used in safeguarding classified information:

- A person authorized access to the container's contents,
- The FSO, and
- The FSO's designee.



HAROLD FOLLOWS THE SIMPLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR CHANGING THE COMBINATION.

For the Electric Widget Company, this came down to Harold (as FSO) and Zelda (as all of the rest).

Harold showed Zelda how to change the combination to the cabinet, and Zelda entered 37-24-66 as the new combination. He told her that no one but he or she was ever to change the combination, and she was never to change it unless he asked her to. He stressed that she must never permit an outside locksmith or subcontractor employee to change the combination. Zelda gladly accepted the admonition.

### One-Person Facilities

**NISPOM 1-203** requires that "a facility at which only one person is assigned shall establish procedures for CSA [Field Office] notification after death or incapacitation of that person. The current combination of the facility's security container shall be provided to the CSA [Field Office], or in the case of a multiple facility organization, to the home office."

## SUPERVISION OF CONTAINERS

Harold knew that under **NISPOM 5-308b** when the cabinet held classified material it would have to be *either*

- Under the direct supervision of an authorized person entrusted with the contents\*

*or*

- Locked.

He told Zelda that it would be mainly up to her to supervise the container when it was unlocked, but that if she needed to be away from it for a short time and didn't want to lock it up, she should call him to keep an eye on it.

*\* To prevent substitution of a padlock used to secure a cabinet, place it inside the open container or lock it to a hasp, drawer, or handle.*

Then he showed her how to lock the cabinet and said that it was a good security practice to rotate the dial at least four times in the same direction. As he turned the dial he chanted a rhyme:

One is pretty safe,  
Two is pretty sure,  
Three is almost certain  
But *four is quite secure.*

And five is closing time, thought Zelda, as she questioned Harold's mental stability.

Harold then produced a sheet of paper and taped it to the side of the cabinet.

<b>ELECTRIC WIDGET COMPANY</b>			
<b>SECURITY CONTAINER RECORD</b>			
<b>DATE</b>	<b>OPENED BY/TIME</b>	<b>CLOSED BY/TIME</b>	<b>CHECKED BY/TIME</b>

He said that she would usually be filling in the first three columns and that he would drop by at the end of the day to double-check that the cabinet was secured.

Then Harold showed her a small sign that read OPEN on one side and CLOSED on the other. He held it near the cabinet and let it go. TING. It had jumped to the cabinet and clung there. "Magnetized," Harold said. He told Zelda the sign would be a helpful reminder for them both.

Zelda was beginning to wonder how many helpful reminders Harold thought she needed. She had already done considerable manual-reading herself. She knew that *a container record was never required*. And *OPEN/CLOSED signs were never required*. Still she approved of Harold's belt-and-suspenders approach to security and did not mind these extras.



### SHOULD YOU RECORD THE COMBINATION?


Harold knew that he did not have to keep a record of the container's combination, and he had decided not to keep one. Why? For one thing, it would require a lot of paperwork. He would have to classify the record and mark it according to the highest level of material stored in the container. He would have to update the record whenever the combination was changed. Then, since the recorded combination would be a classified document, he would have to store it in a suitable container. And since he had only one such container (the GSA-approved cabinet), the record would have to go in it.

So what earthly use would the record be? If he and Zelda both forgot the SECRET combination (and he couldn't believe that they would both forget 'DRAGON')

or whatever word they chose later on), where would the record that would remind them be? Locked inside the container, that's where! So Harold concluded that keeping such a record was probably a good idea for a company that had several security containers. But for EWC? No way.


**REPORTS ABOUT STORAGE**

We'll leave Harold and Zelda contemplating their new arrival and turn to our last topic: reports. As circumstances make necessary, you will need to make certain storage-related reports as shown in the chart. For example, Harold will be submitting a **1-302I** report to the DSS Field Office to notify them of EWC's initial acquisition of an approved storage container.

 <b>REPORTS ON STORAGE</b>				
<b>NISPOM</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>When to Send</b>	<b>Form of Report</b>	<b>To</b>
<b>1-302I</b>	<b>"Change in Storage Capability"</b>	There has been a change in storage capability that would raise or lower the level of classification that the contractor is able to safeguard.	Letter	DIS Field
<b>1-302J</b>	<b>"Inability to Safeguard Classified Material"</b>	There is an emergency that makes the facility incapable of safeguarding classified material.	Fastest means, with follow-up letter	Office

## SUMMARY

To be eligible to receive or possess classified material, a facility, in addition to having an appropriate FCL, must also have its safeguarding capability approved by its Field Office. For a facility with SECRET safeguarding capability, three types of material require storage: SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents, classified waste, and classification pending material. Facilities within the NISP may use seven types of containers to store SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material; five of these require supplemental protection when SECRET material is stored in them during nonworking hours. Containers secured by padlocks must be equipped with authorized padlocks. Containers must always be under the direct supervision of an authorized person entrusted with the contents or locked. A combination used in safeguarding classified information and, if used, a 'code word' as it relates to the combination is classified at the highest level of the information stored in the container. Persons knowing the combination of a container or having access to its contents must be kept to a minimum; a record must be kept of their names. If made, the record of a SECRET combination must be safeguarded as a classified document. Combinations must be changed upon initial classified use of the container, change in the employment or clearance status of those knowing the combination, compromise or suspected compromise of the combination or container, Discovery of the container unlocked or unattended, and at other times as deemed necessary by the FSO or Field Office. Only designated employees of the facility may change them. Change in storage capability and inability to safeguard classified material must be reported to the Field Office.



**Complete the following exercises for review and practice.**  
*Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

1. Which of the following apply to a GSA-approved cabinet?
  - a. The General Services Administration has certified it to withstand certain hazards for specified periods.
  - b. Types include two-drawer, four-drawer and five-drawer.
  - c. It requires no supplemental protection of any kind to store SECRET materials during working hours.
  - d. For use within the NISP, it must be bought new by the using contractor.
  - e. It has a built-in combination lock.
  
2. "Only a m\_\_\_\_\_ number of a \_\_\_\_\_persons" can be permitted to know the combination to a container or to have access to its contents.
  
3. Which of the following must the record of persons knowing the combination to a container show?
  - a. Name.
  - b. Address.
  - c. Telephone number.
  - d. Date combination was disclosed to the person.
  
4. When not under the direct supervision of an authorized person entrusted with the combination and contents, a storage container must be \_\_\_\_\_.

5. You must keep a record of the combination to the lock of any container in which classified information is stored.

( ) True ( ) False

6. A record of a combination to a lock of a container in which classified information is stored must be

- ( ) a. classified and marked according to the highest category of material stored in the container.
- ( ) b. entered into accountability, if classified SECRET.
- ( ) c. stored in a container authorized for the record's classification category.
- ( ) d. entered into a receipt and dispatch record, if classified CONFIDENTIAL.
- ( ) e. updated whenever the combination is changed.

7. An unrecorded 'code word' (a word chosen or made up as an aid in recalling the numbers of a combination) as it relates to the combination is classified at the same level as the combination itself.

( ) True ( ) False

8. The combinations to all locks and locking devices used to safeguard classified information must be changed at least once per year.

( ) True ( ) False

9. The combination to the lock for a container must be changed upon


- a. the initial classified use of the container.
- b. the termination of employment or the withdrawal, suspension, or revocation of clearance of a person knowing the combination.
- c. the compromise or suspected compromise of the container or the combination.
- d. the container's being left and unlocked and unattended.
- e. the FSO's or Field Office's decision that the combination needs to be changed.

10. Which of the following are authorized to change the combinations to locks and locking devices used to store classified information?

- a. the FSO.
- b. a locksmith from outside the facility.
- c. a person authorized access to the container's contents.
- d. the FSO's designee.
- e. a subcontractor employee.

11. In which of these cases would you need to make a report to the Field Office?


- a. You will need to store several cubic feet of CONFIDENTIAL documents and have decided to convert a room in the basement of your facility for this purpose.
- b. You currently store SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents in a two-drawer GSA-approved cabinet. You need more storage space, so you have decided to replace the two-drawer model with a four-drawer model.
- c. The subcontractor guards who provide supplemental protection for your SECRET storage during nonworking hours have gone out on strike.
- d. An afternoon thunderstorm has knocked out the electrical power in your area. As a result, the alarm system that provides supplemental protection for your SECRET storage during nonworking hours is not operating. You are told by the power company that service may not be restored before morning.



1. a, b, c, and e. (pp. 1-11-12)
2. minimum, authorized. (p. 1-12)
3. a. (pp. 1-13)
4. locked. (p. 1-16)
5. False. (p. 1-18)
6. a, c, and e. (p. 1-18)
7. True. (p. 1-15)
8. False. (p. 1-13-14)
9. a, b, c, d, and e. (p. 1-13-14)
10. a, c, and d. (p. 1-15)
11. a, and maybe c and d. For the emergencies described in c and d you would safeguard your classified information according to your emergency procedures. Only if you still could not adequately protect your classified material would you need to report to your Field Office. (p. 1-19)

## LESSON 2

### Receipt and Distribution



OBJECTIVES

Let's say that your safeguarding capability has been approved by your Field Office at the SECRET level. You're all set to possess classified information. Where do all of the container-filling documents come from? There are three basic ways in which a facility comes to possess classified information: *receiving it*, *generating it*, and *reproducing it*. You get it, you make it, or you make a copy of it. In this lesson we'll go over the rules for receiving SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents from somewhere else (the Government, another contractor, or another facility of your company). We'll also go over distribution, making classified information available for access by the people at your facility who are authorized to use the information. Along the way, we'll meet some other people at EWC.

### OBJECTIVES

When you have completed this lesson, you should be able to do the following:

- Ensure that deliveries of classified material are made to a designated (or authorized) person in an approved way.
- Check for various irregularities with a classified delivery.

- Take appropriate actions for various kinds of correct deliveries.
- Prepare and submit accurate reports for various problems with a classified delivery and take appropriate related actions.
- Enter required information regarding classified deliveries in appropriate records; retain records for required periods.
- Make proper in-house distribution of classified material.
- Handle classified material received for or from a visitor.

## INITIAL RECEIPT AND DELIVERY




"ENSURE THAT THE RECEIVER IS APPROPRIATELY CLEARED".

The first concern in receiving classified material is to ensure that the *receiver is appropriately cleared*. If all postal deliveries that could contain classified material are made directly to appropriately cleared, designated personnel, this is a pretty simple matter. Often, though, this is not the case. Instead, postal deliveries that could contain classified material are initially received by someone else, a mailroom clerk, for instance, or a receptionist. Let's see how this works.

### HOW DOES A CLASSIFIED SHIPMENT ARRIVE?

The NISPOM authorizes quite a few transmission methods, but we'll focus on only the usual ones. For most facilities within the NISP, receiving classified material consists of receiving SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents. In most cases these documents are sent through the U.S. *Postal System* or by *messenger*. The mailing methods authorized for SECRET documents are U.S. *Express Mail* and U.S. *Registered Mail*. These methods may also be used for CONFIDENTIAL documents. But since U.S. *Certified Mail* is also authorized for CONFIDENTIAL documents, and since U.S. *Certified Mail* costs less than the other two methods, most CONFIDENTIAL shipments will arrive in this way.

MAILING METHODS 	
SECRET	CONFIDENTIAL
U.S. Express Mail	U.S. Express Mail
U.S. Registered Mail	U.S. Registered Mail
	U.S. Certified Mail

When messengers are used, they may be commercial messengers or, more likely, "couriers" - that is, appropriately cleared and specially briefed employees of the sender.

### WHAT DOES A CLASSIFIED

A classified shipment looks like any other shipment. The difference is that classified material comes *double-wrapped*. The outer container (envelope, carton) is the plain, run-of-the-mill disguise for an inner container that is stamped with the classification of the sensitive information inside it.

### CLEARANCES OF RECEIVERS

Since it should be impossible to tell from the outer container whether a particular mail delivery contains classified material, what's to prevent its being compromised? The NISP's solution is to require that all employees who are authorized to receive (sign for) U.S. Registered Mail or U.S. Express Mail have SECRET clearances, and that all employees who are authorized to receive U.S. Certified Mail have CONFIDENTIAL clearances.

### AN ALTERNATIVE DEDICATED MAILING ADDRESS

Clearing all potential receivers of classified information may not be practicable in every case. For one thing, it



Employee who signs for:	Must have:
U.S. Express Mail/ U.S. Registered Mail	SECRET PCL
U.S. Certified Mail	CONFIDENTIAL PCL

requires more personnel to be cleared at a time when the NISP is striving to cut down on the number of clearances. And if there is a high turnover in authorized receivers, the clearance situation rapidly gets out of hand. One way around these problems is to establish a *dedicated mailing address for classified material*. Usually this is a post office box to which all classified material for the facility is sent. A designated and thoroughly briefed employee goes to the post office, unlocks the box, signs for its contents, and brings it back to the facility.

## INITIAL EXAMINATION OF SHIPMENT

Let's take the case where the delivery is *not* made directly to a designated document custodian or to a dedicated mailing address. At EWC, deliveries are made to the mailroom where Milo Mertz, the shipping clerk, signs for all U.S. Registered, U.S. Express, and U.S. Certified Mail. Milo has a SECRET PCL. How does he handle these deliveries?



- **Sign Postal Receipt.** Milo always looks forward to receiving these three kinds of mail, since he never knows when there will be a classified package inside. The first thing Milo does is sign the postal service *U.S. Rera, 57-ERC-p PA(:kA4C*. receipt and set his copy of it to one side. Today, the mailman had brought an envelope by U.S. Registered Mail.
- **Check (Outer) Container.** Since there might be classified material inside, he always checks the package for signs of tampering. Tampering is a deliberate attempt to gain illegal access to the contents of a shipment. This rules out, Milo knew, the case where a



MILO EXAMINES THE PACKAGE CAREFULLY FOR TAMPERING.

delivery arrives battered and taped-up with a notice from the U.S. Postal Service: "Damaged in Transit." Milo has been instructed to inform Harold Huxtable, the FSO at EWC if, for a classified shipment, there is any evidence of tampering with the outer container. Today's envelope looked untouched.

- **Open (Outer) Container.** Milo opens the package. Usually there's nothing special inside. But sometimes there is an inner package stamped with a classification. Today he opened the envelope and, yes, there was a SECRET-stamped envelope inside!
- **Check for Approved Method.** Milo knew that **CONFIDENTIAL material** could come by U.S. Registered Mail or U.S. Express Mail, but that **SECRET** material should never come by U.S. Certified Mail. Today's delivery was O.K.; the **SECRET** information had come by U.S. Registered Mail.



MURRAY FINALLY GETS HIS PACKAGE.

Harold had mentioned to Milo that the most common sending error had to do with first-class mail. It seemed that the User Agencies were allowed to send **CONFIDENTIAL** material by first-class mail among themselves, but not to contractors. Sometimes, though, they slipped up. Harold had told Milo that so far the Navy, EWC's User Agency, had never made this mistake.

Harold had given Milo a chart of the approved transmission methods (see **NISPOM, 5-403** and 404) and Milo had framed it and hung it up. (Milo wondered whether EWC would ever have a **COMSEC** circuit; he hoped so.)

# SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL TRANSMISSION

## OUTSIDE THE FACILITY

Within and between U.S., Puerto Rico, or U.S. possession or trust territory

### SECRET

◆ Means approved for TOP SECRET:

—*Defense Courier Service* (requires special approval and instructions from the contracting activity)

—TOP SECRET cleared, specifically designated *courier, escort, or handcarrier* (may use U.S. Gov't employee of contractor employee)

—Approved *COMSEC circuits*

◆ U.S. Express Mail/  
U.S. Registered Mail

◆ Cleared commercial carriers (only when other methods impractical)

◆ Commercial messenger service (has SECRET FCL, local service, same day delivery)

◆ Commercial delivery company (DoD approved, has nation-wide, overnight service with computer tracing and reporting. May be unclassified.)

◆ Other methods directed by the User Agency

### CONFIDENTIAL

◆ Means approved for SECRET

◆ U.S. Certified Mail\*

◆ Commercial carrier (only when other methods impractical)

\*Use U.S. Registered Mail between CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, U.S. possession or trust territory.

## EXAMINATION BY DESIGNATED DOCUMENT CUSTODIAN

The address on the inner envelope included "ATTN: Buzz Meyerhofsens, Chief Engineer," but Milo knew that all classified deliveries went to Zelda, EWC's designated document custodian. He told her that the envelope had come by registered mail and gave her the postal receipt. He said the outer envelope had shown no signs of tampering. Zelda said, "Thank you, Milo. Very thorough." He wanted to stay and see what was inside, but Zelda gave him a rather sharp look and, reluctantly, he departed.

- **Check Inner Container.** Zelda inspected the inner envelope for evidence of tampering. She looked for rough spots where tape might have been pulled off and not exactly covered by replacement tape. She looked for slits or cuts that might have been sealed over. She looked for unusually limp, frayed, or wrinkled material (an indication, perhaps, that the container had been steamed open). Her scrutiny did not turn up any tampering.
- **Open Inner Container and Process Receipt.** Zelda slit open the envelope. Since it was a SECRET delivery, she looked for a receipt inside. (For a CONFIDENTIAL shipment, no receipt is required, but in special cases the sender may include one.)

Zelda knew that Harold would have to report *to the sender*:

- any difference between the contents of a delivery and the contents as shown on the receipt, and
- the absence of a receipt for SECRET material.

The document from ACME jibed with the receipt, so she signed it and typed in her name, though the NISPOM only requires the signing.


0034791

**RECEIPT FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL**

TO: Electric Widget Company      FROM: ACME Aeronautics  
232 Widget Way                      8739 Gyro Lane  
Corinth, NY 12822                      Paterson, NJ 07512

UNCLASSIFIED TITLE/DESCRIPTION: Copy #7 of report,  
Laser Widget Guidance Device (U), dated 17 Oct 95.  
Classification: SECRET

I acknowledge receipt of the classified material identified above.

  
Signature

Zelda R. Hobbs  
Printed, stamped, or typed name

Zelda noted that ACME's receipt form conformed to **NISPOM 5-401a**: it identified the sender, the addressee and the document, but contained no classified information. Though it was not required, ACME had provided a copy of the receipt for EWC. Zelda detached this from the original. She stapled the copy to the postal receipt and placed them in a fresh file folder, labeling it "ACME Aeronautics - SECRET Report." She addressed an envelope to ACME, inserted the original of the receipt, and set it aside for the required return mailing to ACME.

Zelda knew that Harold would have to report to the Field Office the receipt or discovery of any classified material that EWC was not authorized to have. EWC did not have a classified contract with ACME. But ACME was also performing on a classified contract for the Navy's Laser Widget Project, and the Navy had directed ACME to send a copy of the report to EWC for use by EWC's engineers. The Navy had notified Harold to expect the report, and Harold had alerted Zelda that the report would be coming.

## SHIPMENT BY COMMERCIAL CARRIER

Let's leave Zelda for a moment and talk about commercial carriers. A few additional procedures apply if you will be receiving a shipment by a commercial carrier (usually a trucking firm). The sender notifies you in advance as to when to expect the shipment and provides other details about it. This gives you time to prepare to receive and protect the shipment. If you have not received the shipment *within 48 hours* after the expected time of arrival, report the matter immediately to the sender.

## REPORTS ABOUT RECEIVING

The following chart summarizes the reporting requirements we have gone over in this lesson.

 <b>REPORTS ON RECEIVING</b>				
NISPOM	Report Title	When to Send	Form of Report	To
1-302I	"Unauthorized Receipt of Classified Material"	Upon receipt or discovery of any classified material that the contractor is not authorized to have	Letter	DIS Field Office
5-204	"Discrepancy Involving Classified Shipment"	Upon discovery of a difference between the actual contents of a shipment and the contents as shown on the receipt	Fastest means, with follow-up letter	Sender
5-204	"Lack of Receipt for SECRET Shipment"	SECRET shipment arrives with no receipt for contents.	Fastest means, with follow-up letter	
5-408d	"Delay in Shipment"	More than 48 hours have elapsed since the expected time of arrival of SECRET material being shipped to your facility by commercial carrier.	Fastest means, with follow-up letter	

## LOGGING IN

Zelda's next task was "logging in," that is, entering information about the classified delivery in a record.

### INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Except in special cases, contractors no longer need to maintain a document accountability system for SECRET material. Instead they must have an information management system that permits the U.S. Government to retrieve or dispose of its classified material "in a reasonable period of time." So contractors must know where to find documents when they are called for, but they don't need to keep detailed accountability records for each SECRET document as they did before the NISPOM.

### RECEIPT AND DISPATCH: RECORDS

Contractors must, however, maintain a record of the following:

- Date of the material
- Date received or dispatched
- Classification
- Unclassified description
- Activity from which received or to which dispatched

Receipt and dispatch records must be retained *for 2 years* after the dispatch.

### RECORD-PER-DOCUMENT SYSTEM

Harold had decided to use a one-page form for each classified document possessed by EWC. His record looked like this.

# ELECTRIC WIDGET COMPANY

## Receipt and Dispatch Record

Security Classification: \_\_\_\_\_ Document's Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Unclassified Description: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Received from: \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_  
activity date

Dispatched to: \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_  
activity date

### Draft receipt and dispatch record

As you can see, it had places for all of the required entries.

Harold showed the form to Zelda and, since she would be its main user, asked her views on it. Zelda said the form was fine as far as it went. But she thought it could be improved. She suggested adding a line for EWC receipt information. This would help them keep track of their transmissions. Harold agreed. "And," Zelda concluded, "if we put 'Destroy this record on \_\_\_\_\_' in this corner, it will serve as a helpful reminder to us to destroy the record 2 years after dispatch under **NISPOM 5202**." Harold agreed.

Harold returned to his desk and incorporated Zelda's suggestions. The final draft of EWC's is shown across the page.

**ELECTRIC WIDGET COMPANY**  
**Receipt and Dispatch Record**

Security Classification: \_\_\_\_\_ Document's Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Unclassified Description: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Received from: \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_  
activity date

Dispatched to: \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_  
activity date

EWC receipt #: \_\_\_\_\_ Due back by: \_\_\_\_\_ Received on: \_\_\_\_\_

Destroy this record after \_\_\_\_\_  
date

**EWC's receipt and dispatch record**

She took up the SECRET material from ACME and took out a fresh record form for it. She filled in the top part of the record as follows:

**ELECTRIC WIDGET COMPANY**  
**Receipt and Dispatch Record**

Security Classification: SECRET Document's Date: 17 Oct 95

Unclassified Description: Report: "Laser Widget Guidance Device,"  
Copy #7

Received from: ACME Aeronautics on 29 Nov 95  
activity date

## CHECKING MARKINGS

Viva files by zodiac sign. she believes documents do have zodiac signs based on their date of generation.



"Definitely an Aquarius"

Zelda knew that all classified information possessed by EWC must be correctly marked, so she took a moment to inspect the markings on the ACME document. They were all correct. (We'll discuss marking in Lesson 4.)


## FILING AND STORING

Zelda turned next to filing and storing the ACME document. There is *no prescribed method of filing*; your method should serve your needs. You may decide to file materials by contract number, by subject, by sender, etc. For most documents, EWC files by contract number. For reference material, Zelda filed by sender. Zelda placed the ACME document in the labeled folder where she had put the postal receipt and the copy of the ACME receipt, and inserted the folder in the reference material section of her GSA-approved cabinet.

## MAKING DISTRIBUTION

Just as books in a library are not there solely to fill up shelves, so classified material is not meant merely to fill up files. (Of course, some classified document custodians, like some librarians, hold the other view.) So the next task is to get the information to the employees who need it. How do you do this?

Zelda Hobbs in Command!



## CHECK FOR AUTHORIZATION

The sender may have made it easy by putting an attention line in the address on the inner container (e.g., "ATTN: Bob Burdock"). Always determine that the intended recipient is an *authorized person* (i.e., is


cleared at the appropriate level and has a need-to know the information). You can check the *clearance level* by contacting the FSO's office, and the *need-to know* by contacting the employee's supervisor. Then notify the employee that the material has arrived (use the unclassified description to identify the material) and make arrangements for the intended recipient to have access to the information. If there is no attention line on the inner container, or if the individual is not available, look over the material and notify the *project manager* (in unclassified terms) of the new arrival.

The ACME material had been directed to Buzz Meyerhofsens, EWC's chief engineer. Zelda knew that Buzz had a TOP SECRET clearance and, since he was heading up the Laser Widget Project, definitely had a need-to-know for this document. She phoned Buzz, who said he would be there right away to pick up the ACME document.

## USE CHECK-OUT SYSTEM

Like a library, you should have a check-out system for classified material. Although not required, it is helpful in maintaining good security.

**Out Card System.** EWC uses an "out card" system; it works well for a small facility. Zelda makes a card for each classified document. The person checking out the document - Buzz, in this case - initials and dates the card. Then Zelda places the card in the file where the document is normally stored. When the document is returned, she puts it back in the file, removes the "out card" and places it in a card file for future use.



**Sign-Out Sheet.** Larger facilities often use a sign-out sheet with columns for control number, classification, unclassified description, user's initials, user's work elements (department, division, office, etc.), and time out and time in.

**Classified Reading Area.** Instead of having employees take classified materials to their work areas, many facilities set up a "classified document reading area."

**Shielding the Document,** The NISPOM states that "classified material may be transmitted within a facility without single or double-wrapping provided adequate measures are taken to protect the material against unauthorized disclosure" (5-407). Shield classified material whenever it is sent within the facility. Place it in an envelope or a file folder, or attach a classified document cover sheet on top of it. (EWC uses cover sheets, and Zelda put one on the ACME document before she gave it to Buzz.)

**Same-Day Return.** Finally, unless arrangements have been made to store the document elsewhere in an authorized security container, every document checked out must be returned for storage on *the same day it was checked out*.

## HANDLING VISITOR MATERIALS

When a visitor will need to use classified material from his or her facility during the visit, it is a good idea for the sending facility to *mail the material ahead* to your facility if there is enough time for it to arrive for the visit. When the package arrives, it is helpful if the sending facility has included a letter

between the outer and inner containers requesting you to hold the materials for the visitor - or a note on the inner container to the same effect. We recommend that you follow your *normal receiving procedures* and log the material in. When the visitor arrives, the *person visited* may then check out the materials and be responsible for its return to the document custodian the same day unless other suitable arrangements are made. After the visit, you would log out the materials and *mail them back* to the sending facility. (We'll go over how to do this in the lesson on transmission.)

If a visitor hand-carries classified material and will have custody of it throughout the visit, you would *not* make receipt of it for your facility. If, however, the visitor leaves classified material with your facility, then you need to formally receive it and if the material is SECRET issue the visitor a receipt for it.

## CHART

The following chart depicts most of the main points we've discussed in this lesson. The chart shows how certain deliveries may be handled to meet all NISPOM requirements. Procedures at your facility may be different. If you have questions, contact your I.S. Rep.


**1**



# RECEIPT & DISTRIBUTION

## SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

TRANSMITTED BY U.S. MAIL






**3**

# RECEIPT & DISTRIBUTION

## SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

### TRANSMITTED BY U.S. MAIL



## SUMMARY

Deliveries of classified material are made until with at least the inner container unopened to designated personnel. If other personnel are designated to initially receive messenger or mail deliveries that may contain classified information, they must be authorized and have appropriate clearances. They should be instructed to examine all containers for such deliveries for evidence of tampering before giving the inner container to designated personnel. Designated personnel should then check the inner container for tampering. If a delivery is in order, the receipt (required for SECRET) is signed and returned to the sender, who retains it for 2 years. A discrepancy between a receipt and the actual contents or the lack of a receipt for SECRET material must be reported to the sender, as must a delay in shipment by commercial carrier. Receipt of classified material that the contractor is not authorized to have must be reported to the Field Office. Information identifying the classified material is entered into an appropriate record. The material is then filed and stored in an authorized container. Arrangements are made for authorized persons to have access to the material. Material transmitted within the facility must be suitably protected against unauthorized disclosure. Material mailed ahead for a visit is received in the normal way and held for the visitor's use. Material hand carried by a visitor and remaining in the visitor's custody is not received; however, any material left with your facility is received and, for SECRET material, a receipt is issued.

# 2 Review Exercises

**Complete the following exercises for review and practice.**  
*Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

- 1 . Downunder Widgets has two classified projects: the Wombat Widget Project (for the Army) and the Wallaby Widget Project (for the Air Force). Jessica Fixture, the classified document custodian at DW, has just received a package with several CONFIDENTIAL documents, and none of them has anything to do with either project. There are no specific safeguarding and disposition instructions for the documents. What should Jessica do? What should the FSO do?

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2. An employee authorized to sign for U.S. Certified Mail must have a SECRET clearance.  
 True                       False

3. How does a dedicated mailing address for classified material work?

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4. The sender must provide a receipt for every classified shipment.  
 True.                       False

5. For a shipment received by an approved mailing method or by messenger, what two types of problems must be reported to the sender?

a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

6. If a delivery is in order, what must the receiver put on the receipt before returning it to the sender?

\_\_\_\_\_

7. Colonial Widgets has been notified that it is being sent a sealed SECRET shipment by commercial carrier. What could happen that would require Colonial's FSO to make a report to (notify) the sender?

\_\_\_\_\_

8. Which of the following types of information are required to be entered in a receipt and dispatch record for SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material?

- a. Control No.
- b. Date Received/Dispatched
- c. How Received
- d. Activity Received From/Dispatched to
- e. Contract /Job No.
- f. Classification
- g. Unclassified Description
- h. Downgrade on/Declassify on
- i. Date of Material
- j. Disposition
- k. Date of Disposition
- l. Date Page May Be Destroyed

9. After classified material has been logged in, it should be f\_\_\_\_\_ and  
s\_\_\_\_\_.
10. Before releasing a classified delivery that was directed to the attention of an employee to that employee, you must ensure that he or she is an authorized person. What two factors make for an authorized person?  
a. \_\_\_\_\_  
b. \_\_\_\_\_
11. If a delivery is not addressed to an employee, or if the employee is unavailable, it is usually best to notify the appropriate p\_\_\_\_\_  
m\_\_\_\_\_ of the delivery.
12. Classified material checked out from the document custodian must be returned on the s\_\_\_\_\_  
d\_\_\_\_\_, unless arrangements have been made to store it properly  
somewhere else within the facility.
13. Classified material being sent within the facility must be protected against unauthorized disclosure. For example, it may be shielded from view by means of an e\_\_\_\_\_, f\_\_\_\_\_, f\_\_\_\_\_, or  
c\_\_\_\_\_ d\_\_\_\_\_ c\_\_\_\_\_ s\_\_\_\_\_.
14. Normal receiving procedures are followed for classified material mailed to your facility for a visitor.  
 True  False
15. When a visitor leaves classified material with your facility, it is formally received and, for SECRET material, a receipt is issued.  
 True  False

1. Jessica notified her FSO right away. He contacted the U.S. Navy element shown on the documents as the originator, and they told him to send the documents to them. Then he wrote a report, Unauthorized Receipt of Classified Material, and sent it to the Field Office. (p. 2-10) **(NISPOM, 1-3021)**
2. False. (p. 2-4) **(NISPOM, 5-204)**
3. Your explanation should be similar to the one on p. 2-5.
4. False. (p. 2-8) **(NISPOM, 5-204)**
5. a. any difference between the contents of the delivery and the contents shown on the receipt  
b. the absence of a receipt for SECRET material (pp. 2-8, 10) **(NISPOM, 5-204)**
6. Receiver's signature (pp. 2-8, 9) **(NISPOM, 5-204)**
7. Shipment delayed more than 48 hours after expected time of arrival. (p. 2-10) **(NISPOM, 5-408d)**
8. b. Date Received/ Dispatched  
d. Activity Received From/ Dispatched To  
f. Classification  
g. Unclassified Description  
i. Date of Material (p. 2-11) **(NISPOM, 5-202)**
9. filed, stored (p.2-14) **(NISPOM, 5-100)**

10. a. Appropriate clearance
  - b. Need-to-know (p. 2-19) (**NISPOM, Appendix C**)
11. Project manager (p. 2-15)
12. same day (p.2-21) (**NISPOM, 5-303,304**)
13. envelope, file folder, classified document cover sheet (p. 2-16) (**NISPOM, 5-407**)
14. True. (p. 2-21) (**NISPOM, 5-200**)
15. True. (p. 2-21) (**NISPOM, 5-401a**)


## LESSON 3

### Controls During Use

**C**lassified documents are, of course, most vulnerable to unauthorized access when they are out of their storage containers. In this lesson, we'll consider the protection of classified documents while they are being used. We'll discuss the suitability of work areas, get into employee monitoring of documents, go over security checks, and wind up with control of visitors.

#### OBJECTIVES

When you have completed this lesson, you should be able to do the following:



**"CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ARE, OF COURSE, MOST VULNERABLE TO UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS WHEN THEY ARE OUT OF THEIR STORAGE CONTAINERS".**

- Ensure that areas where personnel work with classified documents are suitable.
- Apply the rules for safeguarding classified material during use.
- Make security checks.
- Ensure that arrangements for classified visits to your facility are properly made and that the visits are properly conducted.

## CLASSIFIED WORK AREAS



Edwin "Buzz" Meyerhofsen  
Chief Engineer



Bascom Lightfoot  
Engineer




Kate Cogbill-Lightfoot  
Engineer


You will need to decide on the places in your facility where authorized personnel can use classified material. Your layout may already lend itself to such use, or it may be necessary to shift office assignments. In some cases, partitions and doors may have to be introduced. In considering whether an area is suitable, ask two basic questions:

- Can the area be *closed off* (by partitions, doors, window coverings, etc.) so that unauthorized persons cannot see the classified material while it is being used or overhear classified discussions?
- Are all persons assigned to the *area-authorized persons*? That is, are they all appropriately cleared and do they all have a need-to-know?

Your Field Office and especially your I.S. Rep will help you to make specific determinations for your facility.

Nowadays at EWC, all classified work is conducted on the third floor in three adjoining offices. There's Zelda's windowless corner office. Next door is Buzz's office, and adjoining it is the office shared by engineers Bascom Lightfoot and his wife, Kate Cogbill-Lightfoot, both of whom have SECRET clearances and a need-to-know for the Laser Widget Project.






Buzz took the ACME reference material to his office and closed the door to the hallway behind him. There was a tall building across the street, and Buzz looked out his window to see if "friendly Fred," whose window was directly across from his, was looking out. Sure enough, there he was, waving his arm off at Buzz. Buzz gave a brief wave in return, and then dropped the blinds.

## MONITORING THE MATERIAL


### 1. CONSTANT SURVEILLANCE



### 2. COVERED IN PRESENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS



### 3. RETURNED TO STORAGE CONTAINERS




Buzz began to read the ACME material. He knew that under **NISPOM, 5-100**, "individuals are responsible for safeguarding classified information entrusted to them" and that "the extent of protection afforded classified information shall be sufficient to reasonably foreclose the possibility of its loss or compromise."

At EWC, Harold had drawn up three rules to implement this provision of the NISPOM. During use at EWC, classified material is to be

- Kept under the constant surveillance of an authorized person who is in a physical position to exercise direct security controls over the material.
- Covered, turned face down, placed in storage containers, or otherwise protected when unauthorized persons are present.
- Returned to storage containers as soon as practical when not in use.

Let's see how this works. As Buzz was reading, there was a knock at his door. He opened it to find Eloise Jiggets, the assembly line supervisor for EWC's main product, the unclassified QZ-12 electric widget. Eloise said that the redesigned widget stuffer was squashing the widgets. Buzz asked her in and immediately turned the ACME material face down since Eloise was not an authorized person. After a brief discussion of the stuffer problem, Buzz realized that he would have to go to the assembly line area to observe the squashing. He called




Eloise Jiggets  
Assembly line  
supervisor

in Kate Cogbill-Lightfoot and asked her to look after the ACME material while he went with Eloise. Since Kate is an authorized person (properly cleared with a need-to-know), it was perfectly all right for Buzz to pass on the surveillance responsibility for the ACME material to her.

## SECURITY CHECKS

The **NISPOM, 5-102** requires that you make end of day security checks to ensure 1) that all classified material has been properly stored, and 2) that the security container (or area) has been secured.



"HAROLD HUXTABLE THRIVED ON  
SECURITY CHECKS"

We recommend that you consider making room or area checks during normal working hours as well to ensure that employees are keeping classified material *under surveillance* or *storing* it properly. Though not required, such checks foster good security habits. So circulate. Get out of your office. Drop in. Look around.


Harold Huxtable thrived on security checks. When he learned from Zelda that Buzz had checked out the ACME material, he went straight to Buzz's Office. Without knocking he opened the door. There was no one in the office! He went to Buzz's desk and saw some papers turned face down. He turned them over and saw the cover sheet. But before he could say, "Aha!" Kate Cogbill-Lightfoot snatched the papers from his hand. "What's going on?" asked Harold. "Where's Buzz?" Kate explained Buzz's absence. Then she said that she had become so excited reading the ACME material, that she had gone to her office to discuss some fine points of thermo-coupled inertial guidance with Bascom. "But," she said, I didn't take my eyes off the ACME material for a moment." Harold argued that since Kate was in the next room she was not in a physical position to

exercise *direct* security controls over the material. "Ha!" said Kate, holding the ACME material at arm's length overhead. "I got it before you could read it, didn't I?" Harold conceded the point, but said that in the future it would be best to take the material with her when she went next door. "If it's with you," he said, "you'll be able to concentrate on your discussion with Bascom." Kate was mollified. "All right," she said. "I will."

## PERIMETER CONTROLS


We're only going to mention perimeter controls, because they need to be carefully tailored to the circumstances of each facility. The gist of the requirement (see **NISPOM, 5103**) is that you must have a system to keep employees and visitors from bringing classified material into or taking it from your facility without proper authority. Your I.S. Rep can help you set up a system that suits your situation.

## CONTROL OF VISITORS



The measures you establish to control visitors to your facility should ensure that visitors who are authorized access to classified information are not needlessly delayed and that other visitors are effectively denied such access.


Before getting into visitor control, let's briefly review how contract related and non-contract related visits are arranged. (These are discussed in detail in our subcourse **Essentials of Industrial Security Management**.) With a *contract related* visit there is a contractual or prospective contractual relationship between the facility proposing to send the visitor and the facility to be visited. The FSO of the sending facility sends a visit authorization letter to the receiving facility, and the latter determines that the sending facility has



an appropriate FCL. If the receiving facility does not object, the sending facility sends the visitor.

With a *non-contract related* visit, there is no contractual relationship between the facilities. The facility that will be disclosing classified information must obtain approval from the User Agency having jurisdiction over the information. The FSO of the facility to be visited then verifies the FCL level of the sending facility with the DIS-CVA. If the receiving facility does not object, the sending facility sends the visitor.

Let's go through a non-contract related visit to EWC. Both EWC and ACME Aeronautics are working on a new weapon system, the Laser Widget Project for the Navy. EWC's contract with the Navy is for research and development (R & D) of the widget. ACME has a separate contract with the Navy to develop a guidance system for the widget. There is no classified contractual relationship between EWC and ACME; therefore, although their separate efforts have been closely coordinated from the outset of the project, visits between them are non-contract related.




As a part of this close coordination, ACME had planned to send Linwood Crigger, ACME's chief engineer, on a classified visit to EWC to meet with EWC's engineers (Buzz, Bascom, and Kate). In seeking the approval of the Navy GCA, both Harold and ACME's FSO had pointed out to the Navy GCA that classified information held by each company for the Laser Widget Project was to be disclosed. The Navy GCA had given its approval. Harold also received the visit authorization letter from ACME. Harold verified ACME's FCL with the DIS-CVA. DIS-CVA told Harold that ACME's FCL was at the SECRET level as was its safeguarding capability. Harold made a record of the verification. Since EWC did not object to the visit, Harold made no reply to the visit authorization letter. (In the area of visits, the NISP's general rule is "silence means consent.") The date set for the visit in the authorization letter was today,

November 29, and Harold awaited Mr. Crigger's arrival. So did Buzz, Bascom, and Kate.

**Verify Visitor's Identity.** Before a visitor is allowed access to classified information, the visitor's identity must be verified. Acceptable identification contains both *name* and *photo*, such as the visitor's driver's license or company photo I.D. card. If there is any doubt about the visitor's identity, check with the contractor or UA activity that sent the visit authorization letter. When Mr. Crigger arrived for his visit, Becky Womble, EWC's receptionist, verified his identity. She then notified Harold, who came to the reception area and took Mr. Crigger to Zelda's office.

**Make a Record of the Visit.** Your facility must keep a record of the visit that includes the following:

- **Visitors full name,**
- **Name of the contractor or activity that the visitor represents, and**
- **Date of the visit.**




What sort of record should you keep? There are three main options: the *visit authorizations letter* itself, a *record for classified visits* only, or a *combined record* of both classified and unclassified visits.

- **Visit Authorization Letters.** This is the simplest way to meet the requirement. Since two *of* the required pieces *of* information (visitor's name and name *of* the contractor/activity that the visitor represents) are already on the visit authorization letter, all that must be added (e.g., on the back *of* the letter) is the date *of* the visit. (For the entire contents *of* a visit authorization letter, see **NISPOM, 6-103.**) This is the method EWC uses. Harold introduced Linwood to Zelda, and she wrote on the back of the visit authorization letter, "November 29, 1995."

- **Classified Visit Record.** Some facilities prefer to keep a separate record of all classified visits. If you have many classified visits, listing them in a separate register lets you tell at a glance what classified visits you have had. Be sure that the three required items are recorded for each entry (visit).
- **Combined Visit Record.** Still other facilities choose to keep a record of all visits, both classified and unclassified, indicating which visits were classified and which were not. Again, be sure that the three required items are also recorded for each **classified visit**.

(Note that, whatever type of record you make, the record does not have to show whether the visitor did or did not actually gain access to classified information during the visit.)



"MAKE YOUR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES CLEAR TO THE VISITOR"

**Brief the Visitor.** While at your facility, the visitor must comply with your SPP, if you have one. So go over the procedures that the visitor will be expected to follow. For example, if the visitor is from a facility that does not possess classified information (an "access elsewhere" facility), show the visitor how to protect classified documents during use. Will you permit the visitor to make a record of classified discussions? Will you allow photo-taking in areas where classified information might be recorded on the film? Make your policies and

procedures, which must accord with the NISPOM, clear to the visitor.

Harold told Linwood that EWC did not allow visitors to make a record of classified discussions and that photo taking was not permitted.

**Control the Visitor's Movements.** You must provide an escort for the visitor when in areas where classified information may be subject to unauthorized disclosure. When needed, the escort must be an appropriately cleared employee who has been informed of the access limitations or restrictions on the visitor's movements. Otherwise, the rule is that you must control the movement of visitors so that they "are only afforded access to classified information consistent with the authorized purpose of the visit" (**NISPOM, 6-106**). This requirement holds true for all contract related and non-contract related visits. For example, if the visitor only needs to see certain classified documents, you could provide access to them in your classified reading area (if you have set up one) or at a desk in a suitable office area. If the visitor is there to see a specific employee, then that employee can be made responsible for monitoring the visitor's access. That's what Harold did. He took Linwood to Buzz's office and introduced him to Buzz. (Buzz had fixed the stuffer.) Harold reminded Buzz of the purpose of Linwood's visit and of the areas of the project that were to be discussed. Then Harold left.

Buzz called in Bascom and Kate, introduced them, and then the four engineers set to work in the closed-off office. As part of EWC's performance on its R & D contract, EWC was developing an unclassified prototype of the laser widget. Although the prototype was unclassified, certain test results for it were classified SECRET. During the discussions, it became clear that



ACME would need the test results in order to calibrate its guidance equipment. It was decided that EWC would prepare a report, classified SECRET, and send a copy of the report to ACME. After discussing several other matters of mutual concern, the engineers said goodbye. Then Buzz took Linwood to the front door, wished him a safe trip, and said they must all do this again some time.


**Recover All Classified Material.** Make sure that all classified material is recovered from **the visitor when the purpose** of the visit has been accomplished or, for visits of more than one day, at the close of business each day.

**Visits by I.S. Reps.** I.S. Reps and representatives of certain other federal investigative and security agencies are authorized to visit your facility without having given you advance notice of their intent to visit (*see NISPOM, 6102*). When the representative presents proper credentials, you would grant the representative access to classified information to the minimum required. If you have doubts about the representative's identity, level of clearance, or need-to-know, contact the agency or activity concerned and verify these matters.

## SUMMARY

Care must be taken to ensure that work areas deter unauthorized access to classified information. While in use, classified information must be kept under proper surveillance, protected from the view of unauthorized persons, and returned to storage after use. End-of-day security checks must be made to ensure that classified material has been properly stored and that the security container has been secured. For classified visits, the visitor's identity is verified, a record is made, the visitor is briefed, the visitor's movement is controlled, and all classified material in the possession of the visited facility

is recovered. I.S. Reps and certain other representatives of the federal government are granted access to classified material to the minimum required upon presentation of proper credentials. Such credentials must be verified if there is doubt as to the visitor's identity, clearance level, or need-to-know.



**WORK AREAS SHOULD DETER UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.**

# 3 Review Exercises

Complete the following exercises for review and practice. *Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

1. What are the two basic considerations (questions to be asked) in determining whether an area is suitable for classified work?

a. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

2. Correct this statement: "During use, classified material at EWC will be

- Kept under the occasional surveillance of an appropriately cleared person who is in a psychological state to exercise implicit security controls over the material,
- Reversed, turned sideways, placed on nearby chairs, or otherwise jumbled when uncleared persons are present, and
- Replaced in desk drawers as soon as possible after use."

3. End-of-day security checks must be conducted at the close of each workday to ensure that:
- a. all classified material has been properly secured.
  - b. the sensitive information has been secured.
4. Before a visitor can be permitted access to classified information, the visitor's identification must be verified.
5. Check the three types of information that any record of a visit must contain.
- a. Job title/position of visitor.
  - b. Visitor's full name.
  - c. Date and place of birth of visitor.
  - d. Date of the visit.
  - e. Name and title of person(s) visited.
  - f. Visitor's clearance level.
  - g. Name of the contractor or activity that the visitor represents.
  - h. Whether or not the visitor accessed classified information.
6. The visited contractor determines whether to allow a visitor to make a record of classified discussions and whether to permit a visitor to take photographs in areas where classified information might be recorded on the film.
- True                                       False
7. Visitors' movements must be controlled so that the visitors are only afforded access consistent with the authorized purpose of the visit.

8. One day a man came to EWC and presented credentials indicating that he was a representative of the Naval Investigative Service. Harold had never met the man before, and EWC had not received a visit authorization letter for his visit. The man said he wanted to inspect certain SECRET documents pertaining to the Laser Widget Project. What should Harold have done?

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1. a. Can the area be closed off so that unauthorized persons cannot see the material while it is being used?  
b. Are all persons assigned to the area authorized persons?

(p. 3-2)

2. During use, classified material at EWC will be

- Kept under the ~~occasional~~ <sup>constant</sup> surveillance of an ~~appropriately cleared~~ <sup>authorized</sup> person who is in a ~~psychological state~~ <sup>physical position</sup> to exercise ~~implicit~~ <sup>direct</sup> security controls over the material,

- ~~Reversed, turned sideways, placed on nearby chairs, or otherwise jumbled~~ <sup>Covered face down in storage containers protected</sup> when ~~uncleared~~ <sup>unauthorized</sup> persons are present, and

- ~~Replaced in desk drawers~~ <sup>Returned to storage containers practical</sup> as soon as ~~possible~~ <sup>practical</sup> after use.  
(p. 3-3) (NISPOM, 5-102)

3. working day, properly stored, security container. (p. 3-4) (NISPOM, 5-104)

4. identity, verified. (p. 3-6, 7) (NISPOM, 6-108)

5. b, d, and (p. 3-7) (NISPOM, 6-110)

6. True. (p. 3-8) (NISPOM, 6-106)

7. purpose. (p. 3-10) (NISPOM, 6-106)

8. Harold contacted the Naval Investigative Service and verified the representative's credentials, clearance level, and need-to-know for the Laser Widget Project. He then permitted the representative access to the SECRET information. Since EWC normally annotates visit authorization letters for use as visit records, and since there was no such authorization letter for this visit, Harold simply recorded the three essential items of information on a sheet of paper and filed it with the other visit records.

(p. 3-10) (NISPOM, 6-102)

# LESSON 4

## Generation

**M**any DoD contractors come to possess classified documents solely by receiving them, as discussed in Lesson 2. Other contractors, however, are also authorized to "generate" (produce) classified documents. With generation the key questions are of a different sort than they were with receiving. With receiving we wanted to be sure that nothing improper happened to the classified information on its way from the sender to you and that the transaction was duly recorded. With generation the first question often is, "Has generation occurred? Have we produced something - a sentence or a chart, an equation or a blueprint - something that should be classified?" If so, the next question is, "What *level of classification is* to be assigned?" These questions are routinely resolved by referring to the classification guidance provided to the contractor, but in many instances the answers are not clear-cut and experience and judgment are called for.



The *decision to classify* and the *level assigned* always prescribe both a price and a risk. Classifying information needlessly or assigning too high a classification will mean not only that safeguards will be squandered, but also that the information will be locked away from personnel, unclassified or with too low a clearance, who might well have made good use of it. Not classifying information that should be classified or assigning too low a classification may well lead to damage to the national security.

In this lesson we'll go over the basic policies and procedures that govern the generation of classified information within the NISP. Along the way, we'll cover certain matters of interest to all possessing contractors whether or not they generate classified information, such as rules about the DD Form 254, and when and how to downgrade and declassify documents. We'll also see how EWC generated a working paper and a finished report. Again, don't be put off by the rather long list of objectives. The process should become clear as we go along. For the record, nothing in this lesson is actually classified information. All the security markings are for illustration and training purposes only.

## OBJECTIVES

- When you have completed this lesson, you should be able to do the following.
- Define "classification."
- Distinguish between original classification and derivative classification.
- Identify key features of Executive Order 12958.
- Identify key features regarding the development, issuance, and use of DD Form 254, "Department of Defense Contract Security Classification Specification."
- Differentiate the requirements for personnel who assign classifications using a classification guide and requirements for personnel who perform other kinds of derivative classification (copying, extracting, reproducing, translating, and the like).

- Apply procedures for resolving problems regarding classification.
- Implement requirements for classified or likely classifiable documents originated other than in performance of a UA contract or program (e.g., unsolicited proposals).
- List the main purposes of marking classified information.
- Apply basic markings to SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents generated in-house.
- Downgrade/declassify documents as appropriate.
- Apply basic procedures for using a classification guide in developing a classified document.
- Apply procedures for identifying and safeguarding classified waste and safeguarding typewriter ribbons used in producing classified documents.

## WHAT IS CLASSIFICATION?

Let's start at the top. From one point of view, the reason there is classified information is that presidents of the United States have said so. That is, information is classified under a series of presidential executive orders. The most recent of these is Executive Order 12958, signed by President Clinton on April 17, 1995, and taking effect on *October 14, 1995*. (This is a date you should know, since certain marking procedures are different for material classified under previous executive orders.) E.O. 12958 sets up a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information, that is, information relating to national defense or foreign relations. So classification is *the act of imposing an executive order's protection requirements on national security information*.

## ORIGINAL AND DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION

Information becomes classified information by either of two processes: *original classification* and *derivative classification*. Original classification is performed by designated government officials only. Derivative classification is performed by other government officials and by contractor personnel in carrying out their authorized functions.

### ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION



Original classification is an *initial determination* (decision) that information is to be afforded the protection of an executive order. This determination can be made only by an "original classification authority," that is, an official of the Executive Branch who has been designated in writing to make such determinations. There are about 6,500 of these officials. Original classifiers base their *decisions to classify information* on three criteria:

1 The information must be national security information.

★ **National Security Information** ★

1. Military plans, weapon systems, or operations
2. Foreign government information
3. Intelligence activities, sources or methods, or cryptology
4. Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, including confidential sources
5. Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security
6. United States government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities
7. Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the the national security

■ 2 The United States Government must own, have a proprietary interest in, or control the information.


3 It must be determined that unauthorized disclosure of the information would cause damage to the national security.

If the information would cause damage to the national security. If the information in question meets these three criteria, then the original classifier determines *at which level* to classify the information, according to the *extent of damage* to the national security that unauthorized disclosure of the information would cause that the original classifier can identify or describe:



- Damage – CONFIDENTIAL
  - Serious Damage - SECRET
  - Exceptionally Grave Damage - TOP SECRET

- **Prohibitions.** E.O. 12958 prohibits classifying to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error; prevent embarrassment to a person, organization, or agency; restrain competition; prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.
- **Declassification.** E.O. 12958 provides for the original classifier to set a specific *date* (e.g., 25 July 2002) or *event* (e.g., upon completion of tests) on which the information is to be declassified, since it will no longer require protection. If no date or event can be set, a date 10 years from the date of original classification may be assigned. If the classified information falls within one of the categories identified in E.O. 12958 as exempt from automatic declassification, the document is marked with an X (for exempt) and the number of the exemption category.



DD FORM 254

## DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION

If your facility is authorized to *generate classified information*, then designated cleared personnel there will be performing *derivative classification*. Derivative classification is the process of determining that information you're creating is classified based on guidance from an original classification authority, then marking the material you are generating to make sure people know it's classified. If you're extracting material from a *classified document*, the markings on that document can tell you all about classification of the information. Or you may use *classification guidance* furnished to you by a User Agency.

## DD FORM 254

For DoD contractors the classification guidance for a contract, project, or program is cited in *item 13* of the DD Form 254, "Department of Defense Contract Security Classification Specification," issued by the contracting

officer or the designated representative of the User Agency concerned. This classification guidance is prepared under the direction of an original classification authority of the issuing User Agency. We'll have more to say about item 13, but first let's go over a few other aspects of the DD Form 254.

## CONTRACTOR'S ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE



CDR Alvin Eckles

Contractors are required to advise and assist in developing the original DD Form 254 and the security specification guide, to the extent practicable, so that their technical expertise may be used. For the Laser Widget Project, Buzz, Bascom, Kate, and Harold all worked with CDR Alvin Eckles of the Navy, the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR), to develop the classification guidance for the project. Their efforts ensured that EWC had a clear understanding of the guidance, so that they could fulfill EWC's responsibility to apply all aspects of it. Since the contract was to be a firm fixed price (FFP) contract, i.e., a contract with a specified sum to be paid for the goods/services delivered by the contractor, Harold also studied the Statement of Work (SOW) and the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) to determine the costs of all security measures for the contract in preparing EWC's proposal. He made sure that no undetected requirement would cut into EWC's fair profit for its performance.

**GCA Responsibility.** Although EWC's contribution to developing the classification guidance had been considerable, Harold and EWC's engineers were well aware that the guidance was the *exclusive* responsibility of the Navy's GCA and that final determination of the appropriate classification rested with the Navy's GCA.

**Notifying Originator.** Harold and Buzz were also aware that EWC could *notify the originator of* the DD Form 254 *if* they acquired information that suggested the instructions in the form needed to be changed.

Issuance. Harold knew that the DD Form 254 was a *contractual specification* necessary for performance on any classified contract, and that if EWC ever received a classified contract without a DD Form 254, he would have to inform the UA GCA concerned. He knew that DD Form 254 was issued according to the following schedule.

 <b>DD FORM 254</b>	
TYPE	WHEN ISSUED
<b>Original</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ With an IFB, RFP, RFQ, or other solicitation.</li> <li>■ With other User Agency classified programs or projects.</li> <li>■ With the award of a classified contract.</li> </ul>
<b>Revised</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ When a change occurs to the existing guidance.</li> <li>■ When the contractor needs additional security classification guidance.</li> </ul>
<b>Final</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>■ When, after an initial 2-year retention period, the User Agency determines that a contractor requesting retention authority has a continuing need for classified material associated with the contract.</li> </ul>

The original DD Form 254 that EWC received when it was awarded the contract for the Laser Widget Project looked like this.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SPECIFICATION <i>(The requirements of the DoD Industrial Security Manual apply to all security aspects of this effort.)</i>				1. CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING		
				a. FACILITY CLEARANCE REQUIRED <b>SECRET</b>		
				b. LEVEL OF SAFEGUARDING REQUIRED <b>SECRET</b>		
2. THIS SPECIFICATION IS FOR: <i>(X and complete as applicable)</i>			3. THIS SPECIFICATION IS: <i>(X and complete as applicable)</i>			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	a. PRIME CONTRACT NUMBER N00021-95-C-7834		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	a. ORIGINAL <i>(Complete date in all cases)</i>	DATE (YYYYMMDD) 010606	
	b. SUBCONTRACT NUMBER			b. REVISED <i>(Supersedes all previous specs)</i>	REVISION NO. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	
	c. SOLICITATION OR OTHER NUMBER	DUE DATE (YYYYMMDD)		c. FINAL <i>(Complete Item 5 in all cases)</i>	DATE (YYYYMMDD)	
4. IS THIS A FOLLOW-ON CONTRACT? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO. If Yes, complete the following: Classified material received or generated under _____ <i>(Preceding Contract Number)</i> is transferred to this follow-on contract.						
5. IS THIS A FINAL DD FORM 254? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO. If Yes, complete the following: In response to the contractor's request dated _____, retention of the classified material is authorized for the period of _____						
6. CONTRACTOR <i>(Include Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) Code)</i>						
a. NAME, ADDRESS, AND ZIP CODE Electric Widget Company 232 Widget Way Corinth, NY 12822			b. CAGE CODE 61725	c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE <i>(Name, Address, and Zip Code)</i> Defense Security Service Dir., 938 Elkridge Landing Road, Suite 300 Linthicum, MD 21090		
7. SUBCONTRACTOR						
a. NAME, ADDRESS, AND ZIP CODE			b. CAGE CODE	c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE <i>(Name, Address, and Zip Code)</i>		
8. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE						
a. LOCATION			b. CAGE CODE	c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE <i>(Name, Address, and Zip Code)</i>		
9. GENERAL IDENTIFICATION OF THIS PROCUREMENT						
10. CONTRACTOR WILL REQUIRE ACCESS TO:						
	YES	NO	11. IN PERFORMING THIS CONTRACT, THE CONTRACTOR WILL:		YES	NO
a. COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY (COMSEC) INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	a. HAVE ACCESS TO DECLASSIFIED INFORMATION ONLY AT ANOTHER CONTRACTOR'S FACILITY OR A GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
b. RESTRICTED DATA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	b. RECEIVE CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ONLY			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
c. CRITICAL NUCLEAR WEAPON DESIGN INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	c. RECEIVE AND GENERATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
d. FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	d. FABRICATE, MODIFY, OR STORE CLASSIFIED HARDWARE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
e. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	e. PERFORM SERVICES ONLY			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(1) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	f. HAVE ACCESS TO U.S. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OUTSIDE THE U.S., PUERTO RICO, U.S. POSSESSIONS AND TRUST TERRITORIES			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
(2) Non-SCI		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	g. BE AUTHORIZED TO USE THE SERVICES OF DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER (DTIC) OR OTHER SECONDARY DISTRIBUTION CENTER		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	
f. SPECIAL ACCESS INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	h. REQUIRE A COMSEC ACCOUNT			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
g. NATO INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	i. HAVE TEMPEST REQUIREMENTS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
h. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	j. HAVE OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC) REQUIREMENTS			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
i. LIMITED DISSEMINATION INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	k. BE AUTHORIZED TO USE THE DEFENSE COURIER SERVICE			<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
j. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	l. OTHER <i>(Specify)</i>			
k. OTHER <i>(Specify)</i>						

DD FORM 254, DEC 1999

PREVIOUS EDITION IS OBSOLETE.

Reset

12. PUBLIC RELEASE. Any information (classified or unclassified) pertaining to this contract shall not be released for public dissemination except as provided by the Industrial Security Manual or unless it has been approved for public release by appropriate U.S. Government authority. Proposed public releases shall be submitted for approval prior to release  Direct  Through (Specify)

NESEC, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301 ATTN: NELEX-OOL

to the Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)\* for review.  
 \*In the case of non-DoD User Agencies, requests for disclosure shall be submitted to that agency.

13. SECURITY GUIDANCE. The security classification guidance needed for this classified effort is identified below. If any difficulty is encountered in applying this guidance or if any other contributing factor indicates a need for changes in this guidance, the contractor is authorized and encouraged to provide recommended changes; to challenge the guidance or the classification assigned to any information or material furnished or generated under this contract; and to submit any questions for interpretation of this guidance to the official identified below. Pending final decision, the information involved shall be handled and protected at the highest level of classification assigned or recommended. (Fill in as appropriate for the classified effort. Attach, or forward under separate correspondence, any documents/guides/extracts referenced herein. Add additional pages as needed to provide complete guidance.)

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE:

- |                                  |   |
|----------------------------------|---|
| 1. Minimum operational Accuracy  | -C Declassify 1 Oct 2002                              |
| 2. Maximum operational Accuracy  | -S Downgrade to C 3 Jan 1998<br>Declassify 4 Aug 2002 |
| 3. Electronic Design             | -U  |
| 4. Physical Design               | -U  |
| 5. End Item                      | -U  |
| 6. Static Range Information      | -C Declassify 1 Oct 2002                              |
| 7. Operational Range Information | -S Downgrade to C 3 Jan 1998<br>Declassify 4 Aug 2002 |
| 8. Specific Frequency            | -C Declassify 4 Aug 2002                              |
| 9. Countermeasure Vulnerability: |   |
| a. Electro-Optical               | -S Declassify 14 Oct 2003                             |
| b. Directed Energy               | -S Declassify 14 Oct 2003                             |

14. ADDITIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. Requirements, in addition to ISM requirements, are established for this contract.  Yes  No  
 (If Yes, identify the pertinent contractual clauses in the contract document itself, or provide an appropriate statement which identifies the additional requirements. Provide a copy of the requirements to the cognizant security office. Use Item 13 if additional space is needed.)

15. INSPECTIONS. Elements of this contract are outside the inspection responsibility of the cognizant security office.  Yes  No  
 (If Yes, explain and identify specific areas or elements carved out and the activity responsible for inspections. Use Item 13 if additional space is needed.)

16. CERTIFICATION AND SIGNATURE. Security requirements stated herein are complete and adequate for safeguarding the classified information to be released or generated under this classified effort. All questions shall be referred to the official named below.

a. TYPED NAME OF CERTIFYING OFFICIAL Ellen A. Travers	b. TITLE Contracting Officer	c. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (202) 963-0368
--	---------------------------------	--

d. ADDRESS (Include Zip Code) NELEX-02 The Pentagon Washington, D.C.	17. REQUIRED DISTRIBUTION	
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	a. CONTRACTOR
e. SIGNATURE <i>Ellen A. Travers</i>	<input type="checkbox"/>	b. SUBCONTRACTOR
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	c. COGNIZANT SECURITY OFFICE FOR PRIME AND SUBCONTRACTOR
	<input type="checkbox"/>	d. U.S. ACTIVITY RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEAS SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	e. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTRACTING OFFICER
	<input type="checkbox"/>	f. OTHERS AS NECESSARY

## CHARTS

The charts on the following pages depict NISPOM requirements for performing various derivative classification actions.

### The *first chart*:

- Presents the general rule for applying security classifications to developed material.
- Indicates who marks a new document derived from an already marked source document.
- Shows who determines the markings to be applied to a new document derived by using a DD Form 254 or other classification guidance.
- Shows when classification and marking of a new document is deferred pending further guidance.

4-12



The *second chart* shows procedures for resolving problems regarding classification.

4-13




The *third chart* shows what to do with information that is originated other than in performance of a UA contract or program.

4-14



# DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION


## SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS



# 2

## DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION

### RESOLVING ISSUES





# 3



## DERIVATIVE CLASSIFICATION

### UNSOLICITED PROPOSALS





**4a** **Review Exercises**

**Complete the following exercises for review and practice.**

*Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

1. Classification is the act of i\_\_\_\_\_ an e\_\_\_\_\_  
o\_\_\_\_\_ protection requirements on n\_\_\_\_\_  
s\_\_\_\_\_ i\_\_\_\_\_.
  
2. For the following items write OC if the item applies to original classification and DC if the item applies to derivative classification.
  - \_\_\_\_\_a. performed by about 6,500 officials of the Executive Branch.
  
  - \_\_\_\_\_b. incorporating, paraphrasing, restating, or generating in a new form.
  
  - \_\_\_\_\_c. applying security categories to a new document based on those shown on a source document or on those to be assigned according to a classification guide.
  
  - \_\_\_\_\_d. determination that information is national security information, that it is owned or controlled by the U.S. Government, and that some degree of damage would result from its unauthorized disclosure.
  
  - \_\_\_\_\_e. performed by federal officials and authorized DoD contractors.
  
  - \_\_\_\_\_f. deciding how much protection (level of classification) and for what period of time protection is required (duration) for particular national security information.

3. Executive Order 12958

- a. prohibits use of classification to prevent or delay the release of information that does not require protection in the interest of national security.
- b. took effect on October 14, 1995.
- c. invalidated all previous executive orders.
- d. prohibits use of classification to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or, administrative error.
- e. set up a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information.
- f. provides that a date 10 years from the date of the original classification may be assigned, if no specific date or event can be set.
- g. provides that certain categories of information may be exempted from automatic declassification.

4. Which of the following are true of DD Form 254, Department of Defense Contract Security Classification Specification?

- a. Contractors must advise and assist developing the original DD Form 254 to the extent practical.
- b. DD Forms 254 are issued by the contracting officer or UA designee.
- c. When a contractor is to generate classified information, the classification guidance is stated in item 13 or is incorporated by reference in item 13.
- d. The classification guidance provided is the shared responsibility of the User Agency GCA and the contractor.
- e. The contractor is responsible for applying all aspects of the classification guidance contained in the DD Form 254.

5. For each of the following, indicate the type of DD Form 254 issued, as follows: 0 for Original DD Form 254, R for Revised DD Form 254, and F for Final DD Form 254.

\_\_\_\_\_a. When, after and initial 2-year retention period, the User Agency determines that a contractor requesting retention authority has a continuing need for classified material associated with the contract.

\_\_\_\_\_b. With the award of a classified contract,

\_\_\_\_\_c. Whenever a change or additional guidance is necessary.

\_\_\_\_\_d. With an IFB, RFP, RFQ, other solicitation, other User Agency classified program or project.

6. Security classifications are applied to information developed by the contractor based on

a. UA-provided c\_\_\_\_\_ g\_\_\_\_\_ .

7. Alvin Jacobs, the FSO at Diversified Data (DD), believes that certain classified information generated by DD that the classification guidance says should be CONFIDENTIAL should actually be classified SECRET. He has safeguarded the information at the SECRET level and has discussed the matter with the Air Force as the UA involved. The Air Force affirmed that CONFIDENTIAL is the proper classification, but Alvin still believes that the information should be classified SECRET. What is Alvin required to do now?

\_\_\_\_\_

What must the contents of the paperwork include?

a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

c. \_\_\_\_\_

8. Match the personnel with the NISPOM requirements that apply to them.

**Personnel**

\_\_\_\_\_employee who copies classified information from source document

\_\_\_\_\_employee who reproduces whole classified document

\_\_\_\_\_employee who extracts classified information from source document

\_\_\_\_\_manager or supervisor whose signature or other approval is required before the document may be issued, transmitted, or referred outside the facility

\_\_\_\_\_employee who translates whole classified document

**NISPOM Requirements**

a. marks new document with same classification as source document

b. determines necessity, currency, and accuracy of classification applied to the document

c. determines proper markings for the new document based on the classification of the information taken from the source document

9. Melissa Lenox, the FSO at Beneficial Bearings, Inc.(BBI), has an unsolicited proposal developed by BBI. She looked it over and did not find any classified information in it, but it does contain information that she thinks should be classified CONFIDENTIAL. Pending a UA classification determination, what should Melissa do concerning the proposal?


a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_



8. c. employee who copies classified information from source document.
  - a. employee who reproduces whole classified document.
  - c. employee who extracts classified information from source document.
  - b. manager or supervisor whose signature/approval is required before the document may be issued, transmitted, or referred outside the facility.
    - a. employee who translates whole classified document.
- (p. 4-12) (NISPOM, 4-102)
9. a. Mark "Classification determination pending. Protect as though classified CONFIDENTIAL."
  - b. Handle and protect as though classified at CONFIDENTIAL level.  
(p. 4-14) (NISPOM, 4-105)

## PURPOSES OF MARKING



Let's turn now to marking. Though marking can be a rather tedious chore, it serves several purposes that justify the attention given to it. Its main purposes are


- To warn the holder of the degree of protection required.
- To indicate to the holder which portions of the document contain or reveal classified information and which do not.
- To promote timely downgrading and declassification.

## BASIC MARKING: THE 'INSIDE -OUT' METHOD

In this section we will talk you through the steps in derivatively classifying a written document and applying basic markings to it.



**1. Mark the Subject or Title.** First select the subject or title of the document. If possible, select one that does not require classification. A short document, such as a letter or memorandum, usually gives the subject on the first page, while a longer document, such as a proposal, will often have a separate front cover and/or title page giving the title. Mark the subject or title by placing its classification *symbol* - (C) for CONFIDENTIAL or (S) for SECRET - or the symbol (U) for UNCLASSIFIED *immediately after and to the right of the item.*




**2. Mark Portions,** The next step in marking a document is to identify and mark the classification level of *each portion* it contains. Unclassified portions are also marked. Portions are typically small segments of information, and documents consist of a series of portions. The portions to be marked include:

- Paragraphs.
- Subparagraphs (when marking is needed for clarity).
- Illustrative material, such as graphs, tables, charts, and figures.
- Captions.


If you are deriving your document from one or more already-marked source documents, follow the markings for the classified information *in the source document*.

If you are deriving Your document from the classification guidance given in a *DD Form 254* (i.e., the narrative in item 13) or from one or more *Security Classification Guides (SCG)* incorporated by reference in item 13 of the DD Form 254, then you must decide, for each portion, if the portion contains or reveals classified information and, if so, assign the classification level prescribed in the guidance. Then mark the portions accordingly.




For **paragraphs** and **subparagraphs**, place the appropriate classification *symbol* - (C) for CONFIDENTIAL, or (S) for SECRET - or (U) for UNCLASSIFIED *immediately after the letter or number of the paragraph or subparagraph*, (If you are not lettering or numbering these items, place the symbol immediately before the item.)

If you include *illustrations, photographs, figures, graphs, charts,* or the like in your document, place the *unabbreviated* classification - CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET - or UNCLASSIFIED *within* or *contiguous to* (i.e., touching or nearly touching) the item.



*Captions* for such material are classified and marked based on the *content of the caption* (not on the content of the graphic material). Place the appropriate classification *symbol* - (C) or (S) - or (U) *immediately preceding* the caption.

**3. Mark Interior Pages.** If your document has more than one page, mark the *top* and *bottom* of page 2 and each following page with the *highest classification* level of information *on that page* (CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET) or UNCLASSIFIED if all portions on the page *are* unclassified *Do not abbreviate*



**4. Mark Overall Classification.** The next step is to determine and mark the overall classification of the document. The overall classification of the document is the *highest classification of any part of it*. Conspicuously mark or stamp the overall classification at the *top* and *bottom* on the outside of the front cover (if any) on the title page (if any), or, if no front cover or title page, on the first page, and on the outside of the back cover (if any). *Do not abbreviate* the overall classification (i.e., CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET).

**5. Mark with Facilities Identification/Date..** Mark the *name* and *address* of your facility and the *date* of the document's preparation on the face of the document, or follow written instructions provided by your customer if, for example, they wish to have their own name and address as the activity responsible for its preparation.

## 6. Mark with Source of Classification, Downgrading

**Instruction (if any), and Declassification Instruction.** Enter these on the front cover, title page, first page, or in a similarly prominent place on the document. Use this block:

DERIVED FROM \_\_\_\_\_  
[Required]

DOWNGRADE TO \_\_\_\_\_ ON \_\_\_\_\_ [As  
Applicable]

DECLASSIFY ON \_\_\_\_\_  
[Required]

- *The "Derived from" Line.* In completing the "Derived from" line, identify the applicable DD Form 254, other classification guide(s), or source document(s), as follows:

-*DD Form 254.* If the only source for the derivative classification instructions is the DD Form 254, include (1) the date of the DD Form 254, and (2) the specific contract number for which the DD Form 254 was issued:

Derived from DD Form 254 Aug 97, N03147-97-C-2981

-*Classification Guide.* In identifying the guide include the guide's title or number, the issuing agency, and date.

DERIVED FROM Security Classification Guide, "Intermediate Missiles,"  
US Air Force, 9 Sep 96.

-*Source Document.* If you are carrying forward information from a source document, enter enough information to identify it.

DERIVED FROM SECRET- Report, "Ballistic Characteristics of the RJ 905 Intermediate  
Missile, (U) " 9-Sep 96.

-*Multiple Sources.* If you are following two or more sources, enter "Multiple Sources":

DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources.

When "Multiple Sources" is used, keep a record to support your application of the classification marking for the duration of the contract or program under which the document was created (e.g., add to your file copy a bibliography listing the classification sources or include the bibliography in the document.) When practical, include the bibliography with all copies of the document.

- **The "Downgrade to" Line.** In completing the "Downgrade to" line, insert CONFIDENTIAL and an effective *date* or *event* as indicated in the DD Form 254, referenced guide, or source document. *Omit* the line when *no information* is provided.

**DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL ON COMPLETION OF FIELD TESTS.**

- **The "Declassify on" Line.** In completing the "Declassify on" line, use the information in the DD Form 254, referenced guide, or source document. Enter the *date*, *event*, or *'X' code*, as provided. Do *not* use a "Declassify on" line if the new document contains Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data.

**DECLASSIFY ON October 11, 2000**

*-Source of Classification: Before October 14, 1995. If* you are marking a new document that derives its classification from material classified or issued *before October 14, 1995* (i.e., before E.O. 12958 was issued), mark it as follows:

-If the DD Form 254 or source material bears a date or event for declassification, enter that *date or event*.

-If the DD Form 254 or source material bears *no* date or event for declassification *and* is marked "Originating Agency's Determination Required" or "OADR," enter "Source marked OADR, Date of Source (INITNI/DD/YYYY on the "Declassify on" line.

-*Multiple Sources: Most Restrictive Marking.* Whenever a new document is classified based on "Multiple Sources," enter the *longest duration of any of its sources.* If any source shows "OADR," enter "Source marked OADR" and the date of the *most recent* document.

**7. Mark with Applicable Warning Notices.** Conspicuously mark applicable warning notices (e.g., **INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS** notation or **DISSEMINATION AND REPRODUCTION** notices) on the *outside of the front cover* or on the *first page* if there is no front cover.


**8. Mark Components, if any.** Major components of complex documents are likely to be used separately, so each major component is marked as a *separate document* (Steps L-7.). Examples include:

-Each annex, appendix, or similar component of a plan, program, or project description.

-Attachments and appendices to a letter.

-Each major part of a report.

If an entire major component is UNCLASSIFIED, mark the top and bottom of the first page of the component "UNCLASSIFIED," and include a statement, such as, "All portions of this (annex, appendix, etc.) are UNCLASSIFIED." When so marked, no further markings are needed on the component.



## DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

We'll see how Buzz generated a document (working paper) in a moment. But since we've just been

discussing downgrading and declassification instructions, let's turn briefly to how downgrading and declassification are in fact accomplished.

- **Contractor Responsibility.** Each DoD contractor who possesses classified information is responsible for taking proper and timely action to downgrade and/or declassify it. This downgrading/declassification is a derivative action, i.e., an implementation of a direction rather than an exercise of authority for deciding the change or cancellation of a classification. In other words, it was an original classification authority who decided when the information would be downgraded/declassified, not the contractor.
- **When to Downgrade/Declassify.** If the document was classified and marked *after October 14, 1995* (i.e., after E.O. 12958 was issued), you simply downgrade or declassify it according to the *date* or *event* shown. If the document shows no automatic downgrading or declassification markings, it must stay classified until authority is obtained from the originating agency to downgrade or declassify it. Mark any information extracted from the document for use in a new document as described in this lesson.

If the document was classified and marked *before October 14, 1995* (i.e., under a previous executive order), then you do the following:

If the document is marked for automatic downgrading or declassification on a specified date or event, then downgrade/declassify it according to the *date* or *event*.

If the document *is not* marked for automatic downgrading or declassification on a specified date or event, do not downgrade/declassify it without authorization of the originating agency. In other words, *consider the document marked "OADR."* (You need not actually re-mark the document).

**Canceling and Re-Marking.** To downgrade/declassify a document, simply *cancel* all old classification markings and *substitute* the new markings. After canceling the old markings, as a minimum place the marking CONFIDENTIAL (if downgrading) or UNCLASSIFIED (if declassifying) on the outside of the front cover (if any), the title page (if any), the first page, and the outside of the back cover (if any).

## GENERATING A WORKING PAPER AT EWC

You will recall that during Linwood Crigger's visit to EWC, Buzz had promised to send Linwood a copy of a report of some test results. ACME needed the test results in order to calibrate its guidance system for the laser widget.

On the Friday before Linwood's visit, Buzz had made a classified visit to a Naval installation in New York (referred to as Site B) to observe field tests conducted on a prototype laser widget propulsion system. Buzz had been granted permission to take unclassified notes of the field tests, so that he could share the data immediately with his colleagues (Kate and Bascom) when he returned to EWC. He had done so. Now his task was to use his phenomenal memory of the classified information he had learned in converting his notes into a classified working paper, which would in turn serve as the rough draft for a finished classified report.

Buzz closed his door and went to the window. He lowered the blinds and closed them. He took out his notes and his copy of EWC's DD Form 254 for the Laser Widget Project. He turned it over to refer to item 13 as he worked.

**13. SECURITY GUIDANCE.** The security classification guidance needed for this classified effort is identified below. If any difficulty is encountered in applying this guidance or if any other contributing factor indicates a need for changes in this guidance, the contractor is authorized and encouraged to provide recommended changes; to challenge the guidance or the classification assigned to any information or material furnished or generated under this contract; and to submit any questions for interpretation of this guidance to the official identified below. Pending final decision, the information involved shall be handled and protected at the highest level of classification assigned or recommended. (Fill in as appropriate for the classified effort. Attach, or forward under separate correspondence, any documents/guides/extracts referenced herein. Add additional pages as needed to provide complete guidance.)

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE:

- |                                  |    |   |
|----------------------------------|----|---|
| 1. Minimum Operational Accuracy  | -C | Declassify 1 Oct 2002                                     |
| 2. Maximum Operational Accuracy  | -S | Downgrade to <u>C</u> 3 Jan 2001<br>Declassify 4 Aug 2002 |
| 3. Electronic Design             | -U |   |
| 4. Physical Design               | -U |   |
| 5. End Item                      | -U |   |
| 6. Static Range Information      | -C | Declassify 1 Oct 2002                                     |
| 7. Operational Range Information | -S | Downgrade to <u>C</u> 3 Jan 2001<br>Declassify 4 Aug 2002 |
| 8. Specific Frequency            | -C | Declassify 4 Aug 2002                                     |
| 9. Countermeasure Vulnerability: |    |   |
| a. Electro-Optical               | -S | Declassify 14 Oct 2003                                    |
| b. Directed Energy               | -S | Declassify 14 Oct 2003                                    |

Besides Harold, Buzz was the only person at EWC who was authorized to determine the necessity, currency, and accuracy of classifications applied to documents.

## REQUIRED MARKINGS

Buzz knew that working papers and material, such as notes, drafts, and drawings that were accumulated or

created in preparing a finished document, had to be

- Dated when created
- Marked with *overall classification*
- Annotated “**Working Papers**”
- Destroyed when no longer needed

Also, working papers must be marked as though they were finished documents when they are 1) transmitted outside the facility or 2) retained for more than 180 days from their creation (**NISPOM 5-205b**).

Since his working paper would be the rough draft for a finished report, and since the report would have to be thoroughly marked, Buzz decided to go ahead and thoroughly mark his working paper.

Since the finished report would be brief, he decided there would be no cover or title page. That meant he would have to leave room on the first page for various markings. He decided on an unclassified subject and entered it and the date, as follows:

Working Papers

[EWC letterhead] November 30, 1995

~~Subject~~ SUBJECT: Laser Widget Field Tests (U)


The first thing he had to say was not classified:

1. (U) Field tests conducted on November 25, 1995 at Site B confirm thrust feasibility of laser widget propulsion system. ~~Top~~

The next portion had to do with static range information, which was to be classified and marked CONFIDENTIAL under item 6. of the guide. But since the portion did not actually contain or reveal specific information, Buzz marked it (U):

a. (U) Figure 1 indicates thrust exerted at varying angles of incidence.

The next item (portion) was the figure. It was actual static range information, so he marked it CONFIDENTIAL 900



Then came the caption for the figure. He decided on "Static Range Data." Again, since the term itself was not classified, he marked it (U).

Figure 1. (U) Static Range Data

The next portion was UNCLASSIFIED under item 4. of the guide:

b. (U) Thrusts were achieved ~~was achieved~~ by employing multiple widgets in the octagonal design configuration (Mode C).


The next portion was CONFIDENTIAL under item 8. of the guide:

c. (C) Specific frequency was 120 megahertz.

The next subparagraph was not SECRET under item 7., since it contained no actual operational range information:

d. (U) Figure 2 shows projected maximum (unguided) operational ranges derived by using a simulated payload of 100 kg at varying thrusts.

Then came the figure, marked SECRET under item 7.



Its UNCLASSIFIED caption followed:

## Figure 2. (U) Projected Maximum Operational Ranges

Buzz decided to conclude with some data and recommendations for ACME. He referred to item 9. of the guide for the two subparagraphs:

2. (U) Recommend that guidance system be calibrated so as to offset propulsion counter-measures vulnerabilities noted during the tests, as follows:

a. (S) Electro-optical susceptibility was noted at  $43^{\circ}$ - $67^{\circ}$  angle of incidence with corresponding range reduction of ~~at~~  $20$ - $30$  km (projected).

b. (S) Directed energy susceptibility was noted at  $23^{\circ}$ - $36^{\circ}$  ~~at~~ angle of incidence with corresponding range reduction of  $10$ - $15$  km (projected).

Buzz's paper came to two pages. Since the second page contained SECRET portions, he marked it SECRET at the top and bottom. Since this was also the overall classification, he marked the first page the same way, even though it did not contain or reveal SECRET information. EWC's identification (name and address) would appear on the letterhead stationery used for the finished report. He had entered the date. That left the classification, downgrading, and declassification information to be entered. He placed this information on the first page as follows:

DERIVED FROM DD Form 254 for N00021-95-C-7834 dated 6 Jan 95  
DECLASSIFY ON 14 Oct 2003

He used "14 Oct 2003" since this was the duration shown for item 9, and "14 Oct 2003" was the most restrictive notation among those given for the classifications he had assigned in following the guide. There was no applicable downgrading instruction. There were no applicable warning notices to be applied. And there were no components to be marked.

### **CLASSIFIED WASTE**

The actual composing of the working paper had not gone as smoothly as we have presented. In fact, there were several false starts, corrections, and re-workings of the figures. Since EWC uses a shredder to destroy its classified waste, Buzz placed the rejected sheets in a file folder and marked it "SECRET WASTE." He placed the working paper in another folder and took both folders to Zelda's office.



### **PREPARING A FINISHED DOCUMENT**

EWC had submitted the forms to have one of its typists cleared at the SECRET level. In the meantime Zelda had agreed to type whatever classified documents EWC generated. EWC had several word processors, one of which was to be used for classified work, but the AIS SPP that Harold had submitted to the Field Office had not yet been approved. So Zelda uncovered her electric typewriter, closed the door after Buzz left, and set to work. First she took out of her GSA-approved cabinet the single-use carbon ribbon that she had begun to use in typing an earlier SECRET document. She had labeled the ribbon SECRET, though labeling is not required. She removed the unclassified ribbon from the typewriter and inserted the SECRET ribbon. Before long, the finished report was prepared and properly marked, ready for Buzz's signature. It looked like this.



SECRET

Electric Widget Company  
232 Widget Way  
Corinth, New York 12822

November 30, 1995

SUBJECT: Laser Widget Field Tests (U)

1. (U) Field tests conducted on November 25, 1995 at Site B confirm thrust feasibility of laser widget propulsion system.

a. (U) Figure 1 indicates thrust exerted at varying angles of incidence.




Figure 1. (U) Static Range Data

b. (U) Thrusts were achieved by employing multiple widgets in the octagonal design configuration (Mode C).

DERIVED FROM: DD Form 254 for N00021-95-C-7834 of 6 Jan 95  
DECLASSIFY ON: 14 Oct 2003

SECRET

SECRET

- c. (C) Specific frequency was 120 megahertz.
- d. (U) Figure 2 shows projected maximum (unguided) operational ranges derived by using a simulated payload of 100 kg at varying thrusts.




Figure 2. (U) Projected Maximum Operational Ranges

2. (U) Recommend that guidance system be calibrated so as to offset propulsion countermeasure vulnerabilities noted during the tests as follows:

- a. (S) Electrooptical susceptibility was noted at 43°-67° angle of incidence with corresponding range reduction of 20 - 30 km (projected).
- b. (S) Directed energy susceptibility was noted at 23° - 36° angle of incidence with corresponding range reduction of 10 - 15 km (projected).

Edwin L. Meyerhofsien  
Chief Engineer

SECRET

## **MORE CLASSIFIED WASTE**

Zelda had mistyped one paragraph the first time through, and she placed the bad page and Buzz's working paper with his rejected sheets in the classified waste folder that Buzz had given her. (Buzz had not wanted to retain his working paper after it had served its purpose as a rough draft.) Zelda placed the classified waste folder in her GSA-approved cabinet for storage pending destruction.

## **SAFEGUARDING RIBBONS**

Since the ribbon with the SECRET information on it had not been used up, she put it back in her GSA-approved cabinet. If she had used it up, however, it would have been SECRET waste to be properly destroyed.

## **SUMMARY**

Information is classified under E.O. 12958 and previous executive orders. Original classification authorities that must first decide that the information meets three criteria classify information initially. If so, an appropriate classification level and duration of classification are assigned. DoD contractors who generate classified information perform derivative classification by carrying forward the original classification decision to documents they produce. User Agencies convey classification guidance to the contractor by means of DD Form 254. Classified documents must be properly marked. Contractors must take timely action to downgrade/declassify-classified documents in their possession. Receptacles for classified waste must be identified and properly safeguarded pending destruction. Typewriter ribbons used in producing a classified document must be safeguarded according to the highest classification of the information they contain then destroyed as classified waste.

Complete the following exercises for review and practice.  
*Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

1. The main purposes of marking classified information are

a. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

c. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

2. Number the following steps so that they are in order for the "inside-out" marking process:

\_\_\_\_\_ a. Mark interior pages.

\_\_\_\_\_ b. Mark facility's identification and date.

\_\_\_\_\_ c. Mark portions.

\_\_\_\_\_ d. Mark overall classification.

\_\_\_\_\_ e. Mark subject or title.

\_\_\_\_\_ f. Mark with applicable warning notices.

\_\_\_\_\_ g. Mark with source of classification, downgrading instructions (if any), and declassification instructions.

\_\_\_\_\_ h. Mark components, if any.


3. For a document classified and marked after October 14, 1995, you declassify/downgrade according to the d\_\_\_\_\_ or e\_\_\_\_\_ shown or, if the document is marked "Declassify on\_\_\_\_\_", when you are authorized to declassify the document by the o\_\_\_\_\_ a\_\_\_\_\_ .
4. For a document classified and marked *before* October 14, 1995, you declassify/downgrade according to the d\_\_\_\_\_ or e\_\_\_\_\_ shown, or consider the document marked \_\_\_\_\_.
5. After canceling the old markings, as a minimum place the marking \_\_\_\_\_ (if downgrading) or \_\_\_\_\_ (if declassifying) on the outside of the f\_\_\_\_\_ c\_\_\_\_\_ (if any), the t\_\_\_\_\_ p\_\_\_\_\_ (if any), the f\_\_\_\_\_ p\_\_\_\_\_, and the outside of the b\_\_\_\_\_ c\_\_\_\_\_ (if any).
6. Working papers must be
- a. d\_\_\_\_\_ when created,
  - b. marked with the o \_\_\_\_\_ c \_\_\_\_\_, and
  - c. annotated "W\_\_\_\_\_ P\_\_\_\_\_".
  - d. D\_\_\_\_\_ when no longer needed
  - e. Marked like finished documents when they are t \_\_\_\_\_ o \_\_\_\_\_ the f\_\_\_\_\_ or retained for more than \_\_\_\_\_ days.
7. Classified waste must be
- ( ) a. placed in clearly identified receptacles.
  - ( ) b. safeguarded according to its classification, pending destruction.
  - ( ) c. destroyed by burning.
  - ( ) d. entered into an accountability record, if the waste is not promptly destroyed and if it contains SECRET information.
8. Typewriter ribbons used to prepare classified documents must be safeguarded according to the highest classification of the information they contain.
- ( ) True
  - ( ) False

9. For this exercise in applying classification guidance, your company (Observations Unlimited, 966 Thomas Jefferson ST., NW, Washington, D.C. 20007) has been awarded a classified contract by the Department of the Army to observe, analyze, and make recommendations regarding the defensive measures employed by a remarkable strain of *Sus scrofa*, designated *Sus scrofa (mirabilis)*.

These mammals have developed the power of speech and are quite dexterous for their kind. Though indigent, they are industrious, and the Army thinks that their construction skills will have important military applications. In the wild, however, they are menaced by predators, so it is imperative to their survival that the most suitable construction materials and other needed assistance be provided them, pending outright federal protection.

Your company has conducted unobtrusive field observations and on March 30, 1996, prepared a classified report. The classification guidance for the contract, DA275-96-C-17875, is contained in the original DD Form 254, dated January 15, 1996, and is given below.

Using this guidance, assign classifications to the report and thoroughly mark it.



13. SECURITY GUIDANCE. The security classification guidance needed for this classified effort is identified below. If any difficulty is encountered in applying this guidance or if any other contributing factor indicates a need for changes in this guidance, the contractor is authorized and encouraged to provide recommended changes; to challenge the guidance or the classification assigned to any information or material furnished or generated under this contract; and to submit any questions for interpretation of this guidance to the official identified below. Pending final decision, the information involved shall be handled and protected at the highest level of classification assigned or recommended. (Fill in as appropriate for the classified effort. Attach, or forward under separate correspondence, any documents/guides/extracts referenced herein. Add additional pages as needed to provide complete guidance.)

CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE:

1. Economic Status -U
2. Construction Materials:
  - a. Method of Obtaining -U
  - b. Types Utilized -C Declassify 4 Jan 2006
  - c. Relative Durability -S Downgrade to C 4 Jul 2003  
Declassify 7 May 2007
3. Other Vulnerabilities of Structures -S Downgrade to C 3 Jan 2003  
Declassify 7 May 2007
4. Countermeasures Other Than Structural Durability:
  - a. Types Utilized -C Declassify 4 Jan 2006
  - b. Effectiveness -S Downgrade to C 1 Aug 2002  
Declassify 4 Jan 2006
5. Recommendations Regarding Structural Durability/ Other Countermeasures -S Downgrade to C 1 Aug 2002  
Declassify 4 Jan 2006
6. Contractor-generated information is to be marked:

REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF  
ORIGINATOR OR HIGHER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY



SUBJECT: Field Observations of *Sus scrofa (mirabilis)*

1. Once upon a time there was an old sow with three little pigs. She had no money to keep them, so she sent them off to seek their fortune.

2. The first little pig met a man with a bundle of straw and said to him, "Please, man, give me that straw to build me a house." So the man did, and the little pig built his house with it.

a. Along came a wolf. He knocked at the door and said, "Little pig, little pig, let me come in." "No, no," said the little pig. "Not by the hair of my chinny chin chin."

b. "Then I'll huff and I'll puff, and I'll blow your house in," said the wolf. So the wolf huffed and he puffed, and he blew the house in. And he ate up the first little pig.

3. The second little pig met a man with a bundle of sticks and said, "Please, man, give me those sticks to build me a house." So the man did, and the little pig built his house with them.

a. Then along came the wolf and said, "Little pig, little pig, let me come in." "No, No! Not by the hair of my chinny chin chin," said the little pig.

b. "Then I'll huff and I'll puff, and I'll blow your house in," said the wolf. So he huffed and he puffed, and he huffed and he puffed, and at last he blew the house in. And he ate up the second little pig.

4. The third little pig met a man with a load of bricks and said, "Please, man, give me those bricks to build me a house." So the man did, and the little pig built his house with them.

a. Soon the wolf came along and said, "Little pig, little pig, let me come in." "No, No! Not by the hair of my chinny chin chin," said the little pig.

b. "Then I'll huff and I'll puff and I'll blow your house in," said the wolf. Well, he huffed and he puffed, and he huffed and he puffed, and he huffed and he puffed, but he could not blow the house in.


5. The wolf was very angry indeed. "I'm going to climb down your chimney and eat you up!" he said.

a. When the little pig heard the wolf on the roof, he hung a pot full of water in the fireplace. Then he built a blazing fire.

b. Just as the wolf was coming down, the little pig took the cover off the pot, and in fell the wolf.

c. The little pig quickly put on the cover again, boiled up the wolf, and ate him for supper.

6. Based on the foregoing, Figure 1 shows the relative resistance of the residences to predator-generated air currents.



**Figure 1. Relative resistance of construction materials**

7. Recommendations are as follows:

a. That each *Sus scrofa (mirabilis)* be provided one load of bricks.

b. That each *Sus scrofa (mirabilis)* be provided one large pot and a supply of firewood.



1. See the purposes given on p. 4-21.

2. 3 a.      4 d.      6 g.  
5 b.      1 e.      8 h.  
2 c.      7 f.

(pp. 4-21-26) (See NISPOM, Chapter 4, Section 2)

3. date, event, OADR, originating agency. (p. 4-27) (NISPOM, 4-208c)

4. date, event, OADR. (p. 4-27) (NISPOM, 4-211)

5. CONFIDENTIAL, UNCLASSIFIED, FRONT COVER, TITLE PAGE, FIRST PAGE, BACK COVER. (p. 4-28) (NISPOM, 4-410a)

6. a. dated

b. overall classification

c. **Working Papers**

d. Destroyed

e. transmitted outside the facility, 180 (p. 4-30) (NISPOM, 5-205b)

7. a and b (p. 4-34, 37) (NISPOM, 5-710)

8. True. (p. 4-34, 37) (NISPOM, 5-710)

9. See following pages.

**SECRET**

*Observations Unlimited*  
966 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW  
Washington, DC 20007

REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF  
ORIGINATOR OR HIGHER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY

March 30, 1996

SUBJECT: Field Observations of *Sus scrofa (mirabilis)* (U)

1. (U) Once upon a time there was an old sow with three little pigs. She had no money to keep them, so she sent them off to seek their fortune.

2. (C) The first little pig met a man with a bundle of straw and said to him, "Please, man, give me that straw to build me a house." So the man did, and the little pig built his house with it.

a. (U) Along came a wolf. He knocked at the door and said, "Little pig, little pig, let me come in." "No, no," said the little pig. "Not by the hair of my chinny chin chin."

b. (U) "Then I'll huff and I'll puff, and I'll blow your house in," said the wolf. So the wolf buffed and he puffed, and he blew the house in. And he ate up the first little pig.

DERIVED FROM: DD FORM 254 FOR DA275-96-C-17875, January 15, 1996  
DOWNGRADE TO CONFIDENTIAL ON July 4, 2003  
DECLASSIFY: May 7, 2007

**SECRET**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

3. (C) The second little pig met a man with a bundle of sticks and said, "Please, man, give me those sticks to build me a house." So the man did, and the little pig built his house with them.

a. (U) Then along came the wolf and said, "Little pig, little pig, let me come in." "No, No! Not by the hair of my chinny chin chin," said the little pig.

b. (U) "Then I'll huff and I'll puff, and I'll blow your house in," said the wolf. So he buffed and he puffed, and he buffed and he puffed, and at last he blew the house in. And he ate up the second little pig.

4. (C) The third little pig met a man with a load of bricks and said, "Please, man give me those bricks to build me a house." So the man did, and the little pig built his house with them.

a. (U) Soon the wolf came along and said, "Little pig, little pig, let me come in." "No, No! Not by the hair of my chinny chin chin," said the little pig.

b. (U) "Then I'll huff and I'll puff and I'll blow your house in," said the wolf. Well, he buffed and he puffed, and he buffed and he puffed, and he buffed and he puffed. But he could not blow the house in.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

5. (S) The wolf was very angry indeed. "I'm going to climb down your chimney and eat you up!" he said.

a. (C) When the little pig heard the wolf on the roof, he hung a pot full of water in the fireplace. Then he built a blazing fire.

b. (C) Just as the wolf was coming down, the little pig took the cover off the pot, and in fell the wolf.

c. (S) The little pig quickly put on the cover again, boiled up the wolf, and ate him for supper.

6. (U) Based on the foregoing, Figure 1 shows the relative resistance of the residences to predator-generated air currents.




Figure 1. (U) Relative resistance of construction materials

7. (U) Recommendations are as follows:

a. (S) That each *Sus scrofa (mirabilis)* be provided one load of bricks.

b. (S) That each *Sus scrofa (mirabilis)* be provided one large pot and a supply of firewood.

## RATIONALE

### Portions:

1. (U) Economic status is **UNCLASSIFIED** under item I of guidance.
2. (C) Type of construction material (straw) is **CONFIDENTIAL** under item 2b.
  - a. (U) Contains no information to be classified.
  - b. (U) Same, Does not reveal *relative* durability of structure.
3. (C) Type of construction material (sticks) is **CONFIDENTIAL** under item 2b.
  - a. (U) Contains no information to be classified.
  - b. (U) Same. Does not reveal *relative* durability of structure.
4. (C) Type of construction material (bricks) is **CONFIDENTIAL** under item 2b.
  - a. (U) Contains no information to be classified.
  - b. (U) Same. Does not reveal *relative* durability of structure.
5. (S) Reveals "other vulnerability" (chimney opening) to be classified **SECRET** under item 3.
  - a. (C) Reveals type of countermeasure, to be classified **CONFIDENTIAL** under item 4a.
  - b. (C) Same
  - c. (S) Reveals effectiveness of countermeasure, to be classified **SECRET** under item 4b.
6. (U) Contains no information to be classified.  
Figure I is classified **SECRET** under item 2c.  
Caption for Figure I is marked (U) since caption reveals no classified information.
7. (U) Contains no information to be classified.
  - a. (S) Contains recommendations to be classified **SECRET** under item 5.
  - b. (S) Same


### Page 1:

- Unclassified subject marked (U).
- Marked with overall classification (**SECRET**) top and bottom.
- Identity of preparer (name and address) entered (via letterhead).
- Date of preparation entered.
- Applicable warning notice entered.
- "Derived from" line shows DD Form 254, contract number, and date.
- "Downgrade to" line shows most restrictive downgrading date for information classified using guidance. Date appears in items 2c and 3.
- "Declassify on" line shows most restrictive declassification date for information classified using guidance. Date appears in items 2c and 3.

**Page 2:** Marked with highest classification appearing on page (**CONFIDENTIAL**) top and bottom.

**Page 3:** Marked with highest classification appearing on page (**SECRET**) top and bottom.

**EXHIBIT B : DIAGRAM FOUND IN PERSONAL EFFECTS OF WOLF .**



# LESSON 5

## Reproduction

Now we come to the third, and last, of the ways in which a facility may come to possess classified information: reproduction. To possess classified information in this way, you must, of course, already possess the information in an "original" that you have received or generated. But while reproduction is just making "more of the same," always remember that, like the original, copies must be properly marked, handled, and safeguarded. In this lesson, we'll see how a facility with a SECRET safeguarding capability (EWC) goes about reproducing a classified document (Buzz's report).

### OBJECTIVES

When you have completed this lesson, you should be able to do the following:

- Recognize when a proposed reproduction requires the prior authorization of the contracting officer or other government authority.
- Cite the three cases in which you may reproduce classified information without obtaining such authorization.
- Ensure that security procedures regarding the number of copies made, scheduling their destruction, and the use of reproduction equipment are followed.
- Ensure that marking requirements are met.



REPRODUCTION OF CLASSIFIED  
DOCUMENTS PRIOR TO THE  
AGE OF AUTOMATION

## REPRODUCTION REQUESTS



The NISPOM imposes requirements on the reproduction of classified documents (including *parts* of documents). To ensure that these requirements are met at your facility, you should consider introducing some prereproduction paperwork, namely, a request to reproduce classified information. The purpose of such requests is to ensure that all proposed reproduction is routed through you *before* any copies are made, thus avoiding unnecessary or improper reproduction. If you decide to use such requests, be sure to put an entry about it in your Standard Practice Procedures (SPP), if you have one.

## GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION

Whatever your procedure, you need to see whether the proposed reproduction requires the *prior authorization* of the contracting officer or some other government authority. This is spelled out in **NISPOM, 5-601b**.

The good news is that if, like most facilities in the DoD sector of the NISP, your facility does not possess TOP SECRET, accountable COMSEC, or DOE-originated material, then there is *only one case* in which you need to request authorization.

In this case your User Agency has determined that reproduction of the SECRET information is specifically prohibited. If your facility will be generating such material, your User Agency will have specified in the DD Form 254 or other classification guidance that such information is to be marked "REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF ORIGINATOR OR HIGHER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY" or the like. Documents sent to your facility that contain such



information should already have this marking on them. If, despite the prohibition, there is an overriding reason to reproduce the generated or received material, write up a request explaining the reason to the contracting officer. The contracting officer will either act on your request or forward it for action to a higher authority in the User Agency. Only if the contracting officer provides written authorization may you copy the material.

Apart from this case, no authorization is required for you to reproduce SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL information as follows:

1. Performance of a prime contract or a subcontract in furtherance of a prime contract.
2. Preparation of solicited or unsolicited bid, quotation, or proposal to a Federal agency or prospective subcontractor.
3. Preparation of patent applications to be filed in the U.S. Patent Office.

## NECESSARY COPIES ONLY



Next, look at how many copies are proposed. The NISPOM permits you to reproduce only "the minimum consistent with contractual and operational requirements." Obviously, then, you need to know, for each situation, what the contractual and operational requirements are. If it's a classified report that's going to be sent to those on a distribution list, how many are on the list? If it's a classified draft document for internal review, how many reviewers are involved? Does each of them need a copy or will one per office do? Pare down as much as is reasonable. Remember, the fewer copies made, the fewer you will have to keep track of!



All we mean by this rather ominous heading is that the NISPOM requires that you destroy the copies as soon as they have served their purposes (**NISPOM, 5-704.**) So try to pin down when the purposes will have been served. "ASAP" (as soon as possible), for instance, can usually be narrowed to, say, "upon completion of the review," which can probably be further fixed at a precise or approximate date, e.g., "o/a June 10." The date can be included in the reproduction request. Then jot down the date, even if it's approximate, on your calendar (or in a suspense file) as a reminder to follow up. (We'll be discussing destruction in Lesson 7.)

## REQUESTING REPRODUCTIONS AT EWC

When Zelda had finished preparing Buzz's report, she notified him that it was ready. Buzz planned to send the original to the Naval Electronic Systems Command (NESC) in Washington, D.C., to inform them of the test results. He also planned to make two copies: one for EWC's files, and one to send to ACME Aeronautics, as he had promised Linwood Crigger that he would do.

Buzz had to attend to some other business that day, but on the following day, December 1, Buzz went to Zelda's office, thanked her for typing the report, signed the report, signed out the report, obtained a reproduction request from Zelda, and returned to his office.

Before long he had filled out the request. The completed form looked like this:





# ELECTRIC WIDGET COMPANY

## REQUEST TO REPRODUCE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Contract Number N00021-95-C-7834 Security Classification SECRET

Unclassified Description (include date and number of pages) EWC Report: "Laser Widget Field Tests (U)," 30 Nov 95, 2 pp.

Extent of Reproduction:  Entire Document  
 Part of Document, page(s) \_\_\_\_\_

Number of copies: 2 To be reproduced on: 1 Dec 1995  
date

PURPOSE	PURPOSE SERVED (date or event)
EWC file copy	Completion of contract
Copy for ACME Aeronautics	Upon dispatch

Requested by \_\_\_\_\_ Approved by \_\_\_\_\_ / \_\_\_\_\_  
Job Title Chief Engineer / 1 Dec 95 Facility Security Officer/date  
date

Reproduced by \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ (date)

Buzz clipped the request to the cover sheet and report, and handcarried the materials to Harold's office. Harold first double-checked the report's markings, then turned to the request. The EWC file copy came under contract performance. Harold questioned Buzz a bit about the copy for ACME, then concluded that, since EWC and ACME were associate prime contractors, the copy was proper as "furtherance of the contract." No special government authorization was needed to make the copies.



Harold then asked Buzz when the copy for ACME would be going out. Buzz said, "Today." So Harold added "Dec 1, 95" to "Upon dispatch" on the request. Then Harold signed off on the form, and Buzz left to make the copies.

## DESIGNATED EQUIPMENT

Though not required, it is a good idea to reproduce classified information on equipment specifically designated for this purpose, if practical, and to post the rules for using the equipment conspicuously on or near it. (See reduced sample.)

**THIS MACHINE HAS BEEN DESIGNATED FOR  
REPRODUCTION OF  
CLASSIFIED  
MATERIAL  
RULES**

1. Make sure that only the number of copies scheduled are made. Do not make extra copies.
2. When the machine malfunctions, stay with it and send for help if needed. Correct the malfunction and verify that no classified pages remain inside the machine.
3. Ensure that all security markings on the original appear on all copies.
4. Account for all originals and copies before leaving the machine.
5. Ensure that no image remains on any image bearing part or surface of the machine. Make three blank copies and handle them as classified waste.
6. Do not leave waste at the copying machine. Take all classified waste with you for proper disposal.

## CAUTION



EWC has several copying machines, all but one used for unclassified reproduction. The NISPOM requires that 11 classified reproductions shall be accomplished by authorized employees knowledgeable of the procedures for classified reproduction" **NISPOM, 5-600**. Zelda and Buzz were among the few EWC employees so authorized and knowledgeable, but Zelda, as EWC's document custodian, usually made the copies. The classified copier was a long outmoded and wholly unreliable machine located in Zelda's (rather crowded) office. Buzz and Zelda called the machine "The Mangler," and in an effort to have it replaced they had sent a joint memo to Harold recommending that he designate it as destruction equipment. Harold had taken the hint, and a new copier was on order.



## MAKING THE COPIES AND CLEARING THE EQUIPMENT

Buzz returned to Zelda's office and gave her the approved request. Then Zelda, with great care and skill, ran the two copies of the report. Though it is not required, after making the copies, she made three copies of a blank sheet to ensure that no image of the classified information was retained by the copier.\* Then she completed the entries at the bottom of the request form and filed it.



EWC procedures also called for Zelda to check inside the copier to make sure that no classified material (usually mangled sheets and scraps) remained in its innards. This time there were none.

**\*NOTE: Some copiers are designed to store images of what they reproduce; if this is the case, all stored images of the classified material must be erased according to the manufacturer's instructions after each use of the copier for classified reproduction.**

Any botched copies of material retrieved from inside the machine are gathered up as classified waste and delivered to an appropriate place or person, such as the document custodian, for storage pending destruction. Zelda had just the three blank sheets, and she placed them in the classified waste folder that now contained Buzz's working paper rejects, the working paper itself, Zelda's mistyped page, and the three new sheets. She returned the folder to her cabinet.

The authorized copies may also be taken to the document custodian for marking as may be needed and for storage pending distribution.

## MARKING

The NISPOM requires that all reproductions bear the *same markings* as those on the *original document* (both classification markings and any additional markings). The easiest way to ensure this is, of course, to check that the original is completely marked before reproduction. If the original is a partially marked working paper and is being reproduced for internal purposes (e.g., in-house review), be sure it is marked thoroughly. Ensure that an employee authorized to do so assigns the rest of the required markings. If stamps are used to mark an original, the ink on the pad is usually red or black, and both reproduce well. But if for some reason the original was not thoroughly marked before the copies were made, or if the equipment did not reproduce the markings, then the omitted markings must be added right away, often by the document custodian. (Zelda had thoroughly marked the report before reproduction and the markings were clear on the copies, so no further marking was needed.)

## RECEIPT AND DISPATCH RECORDS


One more thing. You don't need to make any kind of **record for** a reproduction (copy) of SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL material (except accountable COMSEC) unless and until it is *sent outside your facility*. (See Lesson 6.)

## SUMMARY

One way to ensure that NISPOM requirements are met is to route all proposed reproduction of classified information through the FSO. In any case, the material to be reproduced should be checked to see whether prior Government authorization is required. If not, the information may be reproduced as follows: performance of a prime contract or a subcontract in furtherance of a prime contract; preparation of solicited or unsolicited bid, quotation, or proposal to a Federal agency or prospective subcontractor; and preparation of patent applications to be filed in the U.S. Patent Office. Only necessary copies may be made, and they must be destroyed when no longer required. Only authorized, knowledgeable persons may perform the reproduction. All reproductions must conspicuously show the markings of the original.

## CHART


The following chart depicts most of the main points we've discussed in this lesson. The chart shows how reproduction may be conducted at a facility authorized to possess SECRET information, so as to meet all NISPOM requirements. Procedures at your facility may be different; check your SPP, if you have one. If you have questions, contact your I.S. Rep.



# 2

## REPRODUCTION

### SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS




# 5 Review Exercises


Complete the following exercises for review and practice. Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.

1. To avoid unnecessary or improper reproduction of classified information, it is useful to have employees complete a r\_\_\_\_\_ to r\_\_\_\_\_  
c\_\_\_\_\_ i\_\_\_\_\_ .
  
2. For most facilities with SECRET storage capability, there is only one case in which the written authorization of the contracting officer or other government authority must be obtained before reproduction, as follows:  
  
\_\_\_\_\_  
  
\_\_\_\_\_
  
3. Otherwise, classified information may be reproduced as follows:
  - a. p\_\_\_\_\_ of a p\_\_\_\_\_ contract or a subcontract in furtherance of a p\_\_\_\_\_ contract.
  
  - b. p\_\_\_\_\_ of a s\_\_\_\_\_ or u\_\_\_\_\_ bid, quotation, or proposal to a F\_\_\_\_\_ agency or p\_\_\_\_\_ subcontractor.
  
  - c. P\_\_\_\_\_ of p\_\_\_\_\_ a\_\_\_\_\_ to be filed in the U.S. P\_\_\_\_\_ O\_\_\_\_\_ .
  
4. NISP contractors must ensure that reproduction of classified material is held to the m\_\_\_\_\_ consistent with c\_\_\_\_\_ and o\_\_\_\_\_ requirements.
  
5. Copies must be destroyed when they have s\_\_\_\_\_ their p\_\_\_\_\_ .

6. An a \_\_\_\_\_ and k \_\_\_\_\_ employee must perform the reproduction.
7. Any c \_\_\_\_\_ w \_\_\_\_\_ associated with the reproduction must be gathered and properly s \_\_\_\_\_, pending d \_\_\_\_\_.
8. All reproductions must bear the same markings as those on the o \_\_\_\_\_ d \_\_\_\_\_.



6. An a \_\_\_\_\_ and k \_\_\_\_\_ employee must perform the reproduction.
7. Any c \_\_\_\_\_ w \_\_\_\_\_ associated with the reproduction must be gathered and properly s \_\_\_\_\_, pending d \_\_\_\_\_.
8. All reproductions must bear the same markings as those on the o \_\_\_\_\_ d \_\_\_\_\_.





1. request to reproduce classified information (p. 5-2)
2. SECRET material, reproduction specifically prohibited.  
Material is marked, "REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF  
ORIGINATOR OR HIGHER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY." (pp. 5-2-3)
3.
  - a. performance, prime, prime.
  - b. preparation, solicited, unsolicited, Federal, prospective.
  - c. preparation, patent application, Patent Office.  
(p. 5-3) (NISPOM, 5-601b)
4. minimum, contractual, operational requirements (p. 5-3) (NISPOM, 5-600)
5. served, purposes. (p. 5-4) (NISPOM, 5-704)
6. authorized, knowledgeable. (p. 5-7) (NISPOM, 5-600)
7. classified waste, stored, destruction. (p. 5-8) (NISPOM, 5-708)
8. original document (p. 5-8) (NISPOM, 5-602)

# LESSON 6

## Transmission and Release

**B**ack in Lesson 2, we covered one type of transmission, transmission within the facility, under the heading "Distribution." In this lesson we'll look at the other type of transmission, sending classified material outside the facility. In many ways transmission is "receiving in reverse," so this lesson should remind you of what you learned in Lesson 2, and what you learned there should help you here. We'll go over general rules and procedures for *transmission* by U.S. Mail and employee courier, for *releasing* and conveying classified material needed for a visit, and for handcarrying classified material aboard commercial passenger aircraft. Then we'll see how the Electric Widget Company sent two documents.

### OBJECTIVES

When you have completed this lesson you should be able to do the following:

- Ensure that the contracting officer's approval is obtained before transmission or release, when the approval is required.
- Determine the suitability of a proposed recipient of a transmission.
- Ensure that transmissions are properly prepared.

- Maintain appropriate records of transmissions.
- Ensure that classified material is transmitted by an approved method and that the transmission is followed up as necessary.
- Ensure that classified material required at the host activity for an employee visit is properly prepared and transmitted or conveyed, and that the classified material is accounted for as appropriate.
- Ensure that rules and procedures governing the handcarrying of classified material aboard commercial passenger aircraft are followed.

## AUTHORIZATION

The general rule when you are planning to transmit or release SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL material is that you must obtain the contracting officer's approval before you send the material outside your facility, except when the transmission or release is

- Required by the specific terms of the contract,
- Required for performance of the contract,
- Necessary in connection with pre-contract negotiations with prospective subcontractors in furtherance of an existing classified contract,
- In prime contractor/subcontractor, MFO, and parent subsidiary relationships, or
- Otherwise authorized by the NISPOM.  
(See NISPOM 5-502,503, and 5og.)

The first two of these exceptions will apply to most of your transmissions and releases and will usually excuse you from having to obtain a specific approval.

## ENSURING RECIPIENT'S SUITABILITY

If the proposed recipient is another contractor, you (or your designee) must verify that the contractor has

- An FCL at the same or higher level than the material to be sent, and
- Adequate safeguarding capability.

Verify the contractor's FCL level and level of safeguarding capability by contacting the Defense Investigative Service - Central Verification Activity (DSS-CVA). The address and phone number are as follows:

Defense Security Service  
Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office  
Attn: Central Verification Activity  
P.O. Box 2499  
Columbus OH 43216-5006  
614-692-3688

You don't need to verify these matters for every transmission and release; once issued, a DSS-CVA verification is valid for that contractor for three years, unless you are notified otherwise. Keep a record of each such verification for the three-year period.

## PREPARATION OF A TRANSMISSION

Next, ensure the transmission or release is prepared correctly for sending. For a *transmission*, do the following.

**1. Prepare a Receipt for SECRET Documents.** If you are sending a SECRET document, prepare a receipt that identifies the

TITLE (U)  
CLASSIFICATION:  
TO:  
FROM:

### BASIC RECEIPT

- SECRET document. Do not use a classified description. Instead, if necessary, use a short title or abbreviation that is unclassified such as "Armored Vehicle Data (U)."
- Name and address of sending facility.
- Name and address of receiving activity.

This is the "bare bones" information, the only information required. Most facilities, however, choose to include additional information (e.g., control no., copy no., method of transmission, date transmitted, instructions to recipient, a block for the receiver's signature and name and date received).

It's a good idea to prepare the receipt in triplicate, though only an original is required. That way you can send the original (to be returned to you) and one copy (for the recipient's records) to the recipient, and keep the third copy as the copy required at your facility for follow-up as may be needed. You *must retain the signed, returned receipt for 2 years*.

**2. Prepare a Transmittal Document (Optional).** Transmittal documents (e.g., a letter of transmittal) provide a means of telling the recipient why you are sending the attached document (e.g., in accordance with a specified contract requirement).

Most transmittal documents do not contain classified information and need only be marked as follows:

- Conspicuously mark the highest classification level of the information transmitted by it (e.g., SECRET) at the top and bottom of the transmittal document.
- Enter (e.g., near the bottom of the page) "**Unclassified when Separated from Classified Enclosures.**"

For cases in which the transmittal document itself contains classified information, refer to the **NISPOM, 4-211**.

**3. Attach a Cover Sheet (Optional).** The NISPOM does not require it, but it's a good practice to attach a cover sheet, marked at the top and bottom with the highest classification of the document(s) it covers (i.e., the transmittal document, if classified; the main document; or a major component of the document) to the front of the document(s).

**4. Log Out the Document.** In many cases there will already be an entry for the document in your receipt and dispatch record. If so, complete the entry by adding

- Activity to which dispatched.
- Date dispatched.

If the document was generated by your facility, make a complete entry for it, to include: - Document's date. - Date of dispatch. - Classification. - Unclassified description. - Activity to which dispatched.

*You must retain the record for 2 years.*

**5. Prepare the Inner Envelope.** The document must be double wrapped. To prepare the inner envelope:


Place the document (with its transmittal document/cover sheet, if used) and, if a SECRET document, the receipt (at least original; original and copy recommended) in the inner envelope. The envelope must be opaque.

Plainly mark the envelope with the highest classification level of the information it contains - It's best to stamp this marking on *both* sides of the envelope - and any appropriate warning notices.

Address the envelope. Enter the name and classified mailing address of the contractor facility or UA activity that is to receive the document. If you wish, add an attention line to the address, stating the office code or designation of the recipient (e.g., "ATTN: Research Dept" or "ATTN: UV-A-GTIC") or stating the name of the authorized person to receive the document (e.g., "ATTN: George Stevens"). Enter your facility's name and classified mailing address as the return address.

Seal the envelope. Glue seal the envelope. You may want to seal along the flap with tape for additional protection.

**PREPARATION FOR TRANSMISSION:**



## **6. Prepare the Outer Envelope.** To prepare the outer envelope:

Place the inner envelope in the outer envelope. The outer envelope must be opaque.

Address the envelope. Enter the name and classified mailing address of the contractor facility or UA activity to receive the shipment. If you use an attention line, it must not show the name of an individual; it can, however, show other designations (e.g., "ATTN: Security Officer"). If the package is going to a one person facility, specify on the outer envelope, "TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY. Postmaster - Do Not Forward. If undeliverable to addressee, Return to Sender." Enter your facility's name and classified mailing address as the return address.

Seal the envelope. Glue seals the envelope. If you wish to do so, seal along the flap with tape, (Be sure the type of tape is acceptable to the Post Office, such as Kraft tape or nylon sensitive tape.) **Never place any markings or notations on the outer envelope that would indicate that the contents are classified.**

**NOTE:** If a briefcase is used to handcarry classified material the briefcase may serve as the outer container. The briefcase does not require an address and shall contain no markings to indicate that the contents are classified.

# TRANSMISSION METHODS

SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material thus marked and packaged may be transmitted by U.S. Registered Mail or U.S. Express Mail (CONFIDENTIAL material may also be sent by U.S. Certified Mail), or by a specially briefed employee courier cleared to the level of the classified information being sent and with a need-to know. These methods are by and large the only methods of transmission you are likely to use. However, for convenience we are including here a smaller version of the chart given in Lesson 2.


## UNAUTHORIZED METHODS



Carrier pigeon



Your Cousin Rollo who happens to be going that way on vacation



1<sup>st</sup> Class Mail

## SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL TRANSMISSION

### OUTSIDE THE FACILITY

Within and between U.S., Puerto Rico, or U.S. possession or trust territory

#### SECRET

◆ Means approved for TOP SECRET:

—Defense Courier Service (requires special approval and instructions from the contracting activity)

—TOP SECRET cleared, specifically designated courier, escort, or handcarrier (may use U.S. Gov't employee or contractor employee)

—Approved COMSEC circuits

◆ U.S. Express Mail!  
U.S. Registered Mail

◆ Cleared commercial carriers (only when other methods impractical)

◆ Commercial messenger service (has SECRET FCL, local service, same day delivery)

◆ Commercial delivery company (DoD approved, has nation-wide, overnight service with computer tracing and reporting. May be uncleared.)

◆ Other methods directed by the User Agency

#### CONFIDENTIAL

◆ Means approved for SECRET

◆ U.S. Certified Mail\*

◆ Commercial carrier (only when other methods impractical)

\*Use U.S. Registered Mail between CONUS, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, U.S. possession or trust territory.

When mailing classified material, ensure that a cleared designated employee enters the shipment into the U.S. Postal System. Stress that the employee must *never* place the package into an Express Mail outdoor (street side) collection box. Also, to make sure that U.S. Express Mail won't be left on the addressee's doorstep, stress that the employee must *never* execute (sign) the "Waiver of Signature and Indemnity" block on the U.S. Postal Service Express Mail label 11-B. Although not required, a postal receipt should be obtained and kept on file for follow-up actions as outlined below.

## TRANSMISSION BY EMPLOYEE COURIER

Transmitting classified material by an employee courier is a much less desirable method than mailing the material. The courier must have a PCL at or above the classification level of the material to be conveyed. Then the courier will have to be briefed on his or her responsibilities to safeguard classified information. The courier must have an identification card or badge with at least the name and photograph of the courier and the contractor's name. No VAL is sent for a courier. (However, if the courier is going to pick up classified material, then a VAL must be sent.) Then, too, the courier must keep the classified material in his/her possession at all times. (Looking after a package at a crowded lunch counter or in a packed restroom can be nerve-racking!)




Trips that entail an overnight stopover are especially troublesome. Here you will have to arrange before the trip for the material to be stored overnight at a U.S. Government installation or at a cleared contractor facility that has appropriate storage capability. The courier should be sure to obtain a receipt for the sealed package at each overnight stop; the receipt should *not* identify the classified contents. Making such arrangements is usually inconvenient all around, and such trips should be avoided whenever possible.

## FOLLOW-UP FOR SECRET TRANSMISSIONS

It is good practice to keep a copy of the receipt for a SECRET transmission in a suspense file until the signed receipt is returned. Set a suspense date (normally not more than 30 days from the date sent), and follow up if you do not receive the signed receipt within this period. Keep signed receipts for classified material *for 2 years*. If the signed receipt has not been returned to you after follow-up action, or if the addressee indicates that the shipment was not received, or reports to you the absence of a receipt for a SECRET shipment or a discrepancy between the contents and the receipt, then you must conduct an inquiry as prescribed in **NISPOM. 1-303**.

## VISITS AND MEETINGS: ROUTINE METHODS VS. HANDCARRYING



Classified material, properly marked and packaged (see "ROUTINE METHODS" and "PREPARATION" below) may be *released*, when necessary to a "handcarrier," that is, an employee handcarrying classified material to achieve the purpose of the employee's classified visit or attendance at a classified meeting. And, when necessary, the material may be left with the host activity. Although such a transaction constitutes a transmission, it is not a transmission method listed in **NISPOM, 5-403** and **404** it should not be used routinely to convey classified material.

**ROUTINE METHODS.** When you need to send a classified document so that an employee can fulfill the purpose of a classified visit, if there is enough time it is best to transmit it by one of the authorized transmission methods listed in **NISPOM, 5-403** and **404** (see chart, p. 6-8) to the host activity to be held there for the visitor or attainer. The document is prepared as described above, except that the inner envelope is addressed to the visitor at the address of the host activity. It is a good idea also to notify the host activity (for example, by including a


note or letter between the inner and outer envelopes) that the material is being transmitted for the visit or meeting. The material may then be transmitted by U.S. Mail, as described above, or by another method listed in **NISPOM, 5-403** and 404. After the visit, the host activity would return the material to your facility by a routine method.

**HANDCARRYING.** Designated cleared employees may handcarry classified material to a classified meeting or on a visit provided that the classified material can be properly handled and safeguarded during the transmission.

When classified material is to be *released* for handcarrying by an employee for a classified visit, do the following.

- **Check Employee Clearance.** Ensure that the handcarrier is cleared to the level of the classified material involved.
- **Check Identification.** The handcarrier must have an identification card or badge with at least the handcarrier's name and photograph and the contractor's name.
- **Brief the Employee.** Brief the handcarrier on his or her responsibilities in safeguarding the classified information.
- **Make an Inventory.** Ensure that an inventory is made of all documents to be handcarried before the handcarrier departs for the visit, and that the handcarrier carries a copy of the inventory along on the visit. You keep the original. When the handcarrier returns, check the material returned against the original of the inventory.

- Prepare Package. The document is prepared for *release* outside the facility as described above except that



- No receipt is prepared,
  - No transmittal letter is prepared,
  - The material is not logged out as a dispatch,
  - The inner envelope is addressed to the visitor at the address of the host activity, and
  - The outer envelope is addressed to the host activity (UA activity or contractor facility).
- **Ensure Protection En Route.** As with a courier transmission, the handcarrier must keep the material in his/her possession at all times. For an overnight trip, arrange for storage of the classified material at a U.S. Government installation or at a cleared contractor facility that has an appropriate storage capability. As with a courier, the handcarrier should obtain a receipt for the sealed package.
  - **Ensure Receipt Obtained.** When the handcarrier retains custody of the material throughout the visit or meeting, the material is not logged into the host activity's document control system. However, if it is necessary to leave SECRET material at the host activity, the handcarrier must obtain a signed receipt for the material. If CONFIDENTIAL material must be left at the host activity, no receipt is necessary.
  - **Of Post Records.** When the handcarrier has left SECRET material with the host facility, the handcarrier delivers the signed receipt to the facility when he or she returns from the visit. The transaction is recorded as a "dispatch" in the sending facility's receipt and **dispatch record (and as a "receipt" in the host activity's record)**. The sending facility retains the receipt *for 2 years*. When the handcarrier has left CONFIDENTIAL

material the transaction is recorded as a "dispatch" in the receipt and dispatch record. The transaction is recorded as a "receipt" in the record of the host facility.

## HANDCARRYING ABOARD COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT

Handcarrying classified documents aboard commercial passenger aircraft - whether the material is handcarried by an *employee courier* or by an *employee handcarrier* - requires the approval of the FSO. Before giving your approval, ensure that the packaged documents may be carried on the travelers person or otherwise qualify as carry-on baggage.



If you have approved the handcarrying, you need to do

- **Prepare written Authorization.** A letter of authorization is required for the traveler (*see NISPOM, 5411 c*).

The letter must:

- Provide the full name, date of birth, height, weight, and signature of the traveler, and state that he or she is authorized to transmit classified material.
- Describe the type of identification the traveler will present on request.
- Describe the material being handcarried and request that it be exempt from opening.
- Identify the points of departure, destination, and known transfer points.
- Include the name, telephone number, and signature of the FSO, and the location and telephone number of the Field Office.



DIFFICULTIES MAY ARISE WHEN  
HANDCARRYING CLASSIFIED  
MATERIAL ABOARD AIRCRAFT.

- **Ensure Proper Packaging.** The classified documents may be packaged as follows:

- Use the double envelope method. If there are many documents, make several packages, so that the personnel at the aircraft screening station can inspect each package easily by flexing, feeling, weighing, or other handling without opening the envelopes,
- Make sure that the envelopes do not contain metal clips, binders, or other metal that might cue a response from detection devices at the airport, and
- Use caution when film is to be carried since detection devices will damage certain films.

- **Brief the Traveler.** Before the departure, brief the traveler (*courier* or *handcarrier*) on his or her overall responsibility to safeguard classified information and on the contents of NISPOM, 5-411. Stress that under no circumstances is the traveler to open or authorize the opening of the classified package. Instead, the traveler is to abandon attempts to board the flight and call you to make other arrangements for conveying the documents. If opening does occur, the traveler is to report the matter to you, and you then make a report to your Field Office.



## TRANSMISSION AND RELEASE AT EWC

December I was a hectic day at EWC. After signing off on Buzz's reproduction request, Harold started thinking about sending the copy of the report to ACME, the purpose Buzz had given in his request. Harold had verified ACME's safeguarding capability by a phone call to DIS-CVA; it was at the SECRET level, and he had made a record of the verification. But the transmission wasn't required by EWC's contract, and it wasn't required by EWC's performance on the contract. None of the other three exceptions seemed to apply either.



Ellen Travers  
Contracting  
Officer

So Harold decided to call Ellen Travers, the contracting officer. He phoned her at the Pentagon and went over the situation with her. Then she said, "Excuse me for a moment."

When she came back on the line, she said that CDR Eckles (the Navy's project manager and COTR for the Laser Widget Project) happened to be in her office discussing the project. They had just conferred about EWC's sending ACME the report and had concluded that the transmission was justified. Ms. Travers said that she would send EWC her approval via facsimile and that EWC should have the written approval well before noon. (EWC has a facsimile machine, but it is not approved for transmitting or receiving classified information.) She also said that CDR Eckles would like to speak with Harold.

"Harold, this is Al Eckles. It's good to talk with you. Say, what's this Ellen was telling me about sending test results to ACME? How come I haven't seen this report?"

Harold explained that Buzz had just written the report yesterday, and that EWC would be mailing the original to CDR Eckles (at NESC in the Pentagon) today.

"Well," said CDR Eckles, "I don't mind your sending a copy to ACME, but from what Ellen was saying, I want to look at these results right away. As a matter of fact I'm briefing the Captain tomorrow afternoon on Laser Widget, and I want you to send someone down here today with that report and to fill me in on the whole picture widget-wise."



Harold pointed out that there wasn't much time to get someone from Corinth to Washington, D.C. today. Then he said he'd do his best to put Buzz on a flight this afternoon. CDR Eckles was pleased and said he looked forward to seeing Buzz again.

Harold made a call to Corinth International Airport and reserved a seat on a 1 p.m. flight to Washington. Then he called CDR Eckles and gave him the flight number and arrival time, and CDR Eckles said that he would meet Buzz at National Airport.

Harold asked Zelda to prepare a transmittal letter for the copy of the report to be sent to ACME, and to prepare a one-item inventory for the original of the report, since Buzz would be handcarrying it for the visit to NESC. He also asked her to prepare the letter of authorization required for Buzz to take the classified material aboard a commercial airline.

Harold also prepared and sent to NESC by facsimile a visit authorization letter for Buzz, even though it was NESC that had in fact requested the visit.

Within just a few minutes, Ellen Travers' approval of the ACME transmission came in by facsimile and was brought to Zelda. Zelda set to work and before long had prepared the letter of transmittal. It looked like this.

**SECRET**

*Electric Widget Company  
232 Widget Way  
Corinth, New York 12822*

December 1 1995

ACME Aeronautics  
ATTN: Mr. Crigger  
8739 Gyro Lane  
Paterson, NJ 07512

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Test Results

The enclosed EWC report of field test results pertaining to the Laser Widget Project is forwarded for your use in the performance of N00021-95-C-7835. Written approval for this transmission has been provided to EWC by Ms. Ellen Travers contracting officer for N00021-95-C-7834.

Sincerely

Harold Huxtable  
Facility Security Officer

Enclosure

Unclassified when Separated from Classified Enclosure

**SECRET**

Zelda then prepared the *inventory* so that it would also serve as a record of Harold's approval to handcarry the

classified material aboard commercial passenger aircraft. The *inventory-approval* looked like this. Zelda made a copy for Buzz to carry with him on the visit.

**Electric Widget Company  
232 Widget Way  
Corinth, New York 12822**

Inventory of Hand-Carried Classified Material

The following classified material was released to the EWC employee whose signature appears below for **handcarrying** via commercial passenger aircraft to achieve **the purpose of the** employee's authorized classified visit to the Naval Electronics Systems Command, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.: Original of EWC report, Laser Widget Field Tests (U), dated November 30, 1995, 2 pages. Classification: SECRET.

I certify that I have received the classified material described above and that I have been briefed on my responsibility to safeguard classified information and on the contents of NISPOM, 5-410 and 411.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Employee's Signature

\_\_\_\_\_  
Employee's Name

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Facility Security Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Date

Zelda then prepared the *authorization letter* required for Buzz to handcarry the classified material aboard commercial passenger aircraft. She had his personal data on file, but she would have to have him put his name

on the letter. The letter looked like this. Zelda made a copy for EWC's records.

*Electric Widget Company  
232 Widget Way  
Corinth, New York 12822*

**December 1, 1995**

TO: Whom It May Concern

SUBJECT: Authorization to Convey Classified material

The employee whose description and signature appear below is authorized to convey one sealed envelope, approximately 9" x 11 1/2", via commercial passenger aircraft from Corinth, New York to Washington, D.C.

Request that in the interest of national security the envelope be exempt from opening.

The employee's description is as follows:

Name: Irwin L. Meyerhofsen Date of birth: September 6, 1951 Height: 6' VWeight: 180 lbs.

The employee's signature is as follows:

---

Upon request, Mr. Meyerhofsen will present an identification card that bears his name and photo and was issued to him by Electric Widget Services.

If you require further information, contact me at (716) 555-0001. The field office of the Defense Investigative Service in Troy, New York may be contacted at (716)993-0000.

Sincerely,

While Harold was briefing Buzz, Zelda continued her preparations. She prepared the receipt for the ACME shipment in triplicate (an original for signature and return, a copy for ACME's records, and a copy to be kept at EWC for follow-up, if necessary). The receipt looked like this.

000157	
<b>CLASSIFIED MATERIAL RECEIPT</b>	
TO: ACME Aeronautics 8733 Gyro Lane Palmdale, CA 93512	FROM: Electric Widget Company 232 Widget Way Corinth, NY 12822
DATE SENT: <u>Dec. 1, 1995</u>	SENT BY: <u>U.S. Express Mail</u>
UNCLASSIFIED TITLE/DESCRIPTION: <u>Copy of EWC report, Laser Widget Field Tests (U), dated 30 Nov 95, 2 pp. Classification: SECRET</u>	
RECIPIENT: Notify EWC at once of any discrepancy between the contents as described and the actual contents of this package. Please complete and return the original of this receipt promptly. A copy is provided for your records.	
I acknowledge receipt of the classified material described above.	
_____ Signature	_____ Printed, stamped, or typed name
_____ Date	

She did not prepare a receipt for the report for the NESC visit, since taking the document to NESC for the visit was a *release*, not a *transmission*.

Zelda then attached the transmittal letter to the report copy going to ACME, and on top of the letter she attached a cover sheet. She attached only a cover sheet to the report for the NESC visit.

She knew Buzz would be taking the visit package through airport security, so she was careful not to use a metal clamp or the like to hold all the papers together.

She placed the inventory-approval on top of the report for the NESC visit for Buzz and Harold to sign, then she logged out the document for ACME (but not the one for the NESC visit). The annotated record looked like this.

<b>ELECTRIC WIDGET COMPANY</b>	
<b>Receipt and Dispatch Record</b>	
Security Classification: _____	SECRET _____
Document's Date: _____	30 Nov 95 _____
Unclassified Description: _____	
Copy of EWC report, Laser Widget	
Field Tests (U), 2 pp.	
Received from: _____	on _____
activity	date
Dispatched to: _____	on _____
ACME Aeronautics, Paterson, NJ	12/1/95
activity	date
EWC receipt #: _____	Due back by: _____
000157	12/31/95
Received on: _____	
Destroy this record after _____	
date	

...**"ZELDA GRABBED HER  
FIRST AID KIT"**.




While Zelda was waiting for Harold to wind up his briefing session with Buzz and come and sign the transmittal letter (and for Harold and Buzz to sign the inventory-approval and authorization letter), she addressed the inner and outer envelopes for both packages. She addressed the inner envelope of the NESC package to Buzz at NESC's address, and added "ATTN: Mr. Crigger" to the ACME address on the other inner envelope. She stamped both envelopes **SECRET**. The briefing seemed to be taking quite a while, she thought.

She had just completed the addressing and stamping when her door burst open and in rushed Eloise Jiggetts.

"Zelda! Come quick! It's Buzz! An accident!"


Her mind whirling, Zelda told Eloise to get Kate. Eloise ran down the hall, while Zelda threw open a drawer and grabbed her first aid kit. Eloise came back, half dragging Kate by the arm. Gesturing at the paperwork all over her desk, Zelda said, "Kate, look after this!" Zelda and Eloise rushed off.

Eloise took Zelda to the QZ-12 assembly line, where the line workers huddled around the stuffer station. Zelda plowed through them and found Buzz on the floor with a makeshift bandage bound around his right arm, which someone pressed and held upright to stop the bleeding. Zelda, who taught first aid classes in her spare time, removed the bandage, checked for broken bones and, finding no break, expertly applied an antiseptic and a sterile dressing then treated Buzz for shock. She heard Buzz murmur, "That's it! Must reconfigure the vertical release cam!" An ambulance arrived and took Buzz to the hospital.



**BUZZ DIDN'T GO TO THE  
AIRPORT, AFTER ALL.**

Zelda returned to her office, where Harold had gone when Buzz had been called away from his briefing to look at the re-malfunctioning stuffer. Harold, having been told by Kate that Zelda had gone off with Eloise, had signed off on the transmittal letter for ACME and had inserted all of the materials into their respective inner envelopes. Kate was busy sealing the inner envelopes, as Harold had asked, while Harold read over the inventory-approval and letter of authorization, then signed them.



**HAROLD GIVES BASCOM A BRIEFING.**

When Zelda told them about the accident, Harold called Buzz's wife and reassured her as well as he could. He said he would ask Kate to pick her up and drive her to the hospital.

When Kate had gone, Harold glanced at the inventory approval and authorization letter, He picked them up and flapped them. "Well," he said to Zelda, "I guess that's that. Poor Buzz!" It was nearly noon. "Maybe not," said Zelda, forcing her thoughts away from Buzz. "Why not send Bascom? Buzz has kept him up to date. He knows all about the field tests and the whole project." "That's right!" said Harold and, while Zelda sealed the outer envelopes, Harold went over the situation with Bascom, briefing him on his responsibilities and the procedures for his trip to Washington in place of the injured Buzz.

Time was running out. Bascom hastily signed the inventory-approval and authorization letter and Zelda made him a copy of the inventory-approval. Kate had taken the Lightfoots' car, so Zelda would drive Bascom to the airport. She left to bring her car, a sporty coupe, around to the front entrance. Harold was busy making a call to the Pentagon to notify NESC that Bascom would be substituting for Buzz. Bascom shoved the inventory-

approval, authorization letter, and packaged report into the leather case that Kate had given him as an early birthday present. It bore his initials, B.J.L., in gold.




The airport was just a few minutes drive, and Zelda delivered Bascom to the terminal building at 12:20. Bascom picked up the reservation for EWC and in record time was in the short line passing through the security screening. He placed the leather case on the conveyor belt, recalling that Harold had told him that sending a package through a screening device does not take it out of the personal control of the traveler. He walked through the screening portal without incident and watched as the case passed through the dark chamber midway along the belt. When the case emerged, he reached for it, but before he had it the guard attending the screening device grabbed it. "Please stand by," said the guard, stopping the belt and placing the case back inside the chamber. The guard studied his monitor screen for a moment, then said to Bascom, "Please come with me."

Bascom noticed that the guard kept his right hand on the holster of his revolver as they walked. They came to an office; the sign on the door read "R.J. Cramer, Director of Security." As they entered the office, Bascom tried hard to remember all the instructions Harold had given him during his last-minute briefing.

Mr. Cramer looked up from his desk and said, "Something the matter, Arthur?" "Yes, Mr. Cramer, I think so," said the guard. "I believe that this individual" - he nodded toward Bascom - "was attempting to convey an explosive device aboard flight 278." The guard placed Bascom's case on Mr. Cramer's desk.

Mr. Cramer rolled his chair back and stood up, his eyes riveted on the case. "What makes you think so?" "Well, sir, in that course you sent me to, 'X-Ray Recognition of Munitions,' we learned how to spot 'flat bombs,' and what's inside this" - he pointed to the case - "gives the image of an AMOK-43, a device widely used by certain Mid-East terrorist groups."



**BASCOM OPENED THE CASE .**

"Really," said Mr. Cramer. He looked at Bascom and said, "I'm afraid I'll have to ask you to open this case."

"All right," said Bascom, now numbed by what was happening. He opened the case and took out the envelope with the inventory and authorization letter on

"And what is in the envelope?" asked Mr. Cramer.

"It's U.S. Government classified information," said Bascom. "It ... it *cannot* be opened."

Arthur, thinking that Bascom's reply was the desperate ploy of a cornered terrorist, unsnapped the retaining strap of his holster. Mr. Cramer, cool as reffigerated steel, reached for the inventory and authorization sheets. "May IT'

"Yes, of course," blurted Bascom, aware that the inventory and authorization were not classified information. "You'll see I'm telling the truth."

Mr. Cramer read the inventory and the authorization. Then he looked at the address on the package. His eyebrows went up. "These papers say you're taking the package to NESc in Washing-ton, but the package is addressed to ACME Aeronautics in New Jersey."

Arthur eased his revolver from its holster.

Bascom's mind reeled. He had picked up the wrong package! But even so, why should there be anything but paper in the envelope?

He tried stalling. "Mr. Cramer, I am Bascom Lightfoot, a cleared employee of a defense contractor. I'm handcarrying classified material needed for my visit to the Navy at the Pentagon. Please refer to FAA Advisory Circular" - What was the number? - "Circular.. 108-3! I request special dispensation from the advance notification stipulation. Please phone Harold Huxtable, the facility security officer of the Electric Widget Company. He will verify my authorization to handcarry this material."

"Hal Huxtable?" said Mr. Cramer. "Is Hal in on this?"

Bascom sighed in relief. So they knew each other "Yes," said Bascom, and gave Mr. Cramer Harold's phone number.

"Hal, is that you? This is Bob Cramer at Corinth International Airport. There's a Bascom Lightfoot here in my office..."

At 12:45 Harold arrived at the airport with the NESC package, and at 12:53 a badly shaken Bascom boarded flight 278, escorted to the plane by Arthur Wilkes, who apologized for the inconvenience but asked Bascom to realize that he was just doing his job.

Just moments earlier in Mr. Cramer's office, Harold had carefully opened the package addressed to ACME and discovered not an AMOK-43, but a rather large and quite flat PCT-2000: a calculator designed specifically

for use by engineers. Harold told Bob Cramer that he had no idea of how the calculator came to be in the ACME package, but he would certainly find out. He apologized for the inconvenience the mishap had caused, and asked Bob what team he was bowling for these days.

Back at the office, Harold quizzed Zelda about the calculator, but she knew nothing about it.

Zelda rewrapped the shipment to ACME and gave the package to Milo Mertz to send by U.S. Registered Mail.

It was not until later that afternoon, when Kate returned from the hospital, that Harold found out the truth. Kate first announced that Buzz would be fine. At the hospital, the recovering Buzz had told Kate that while he was working on the stuffing machine (with the power off), the vertical release cam had disengaged, dropping the stuffer arm, which struck Buzz's forearm. Buzz was already redesigning the cam. The doctor said Buzz's wound should heal quickly, but that for some time his forearm would bear, imprinted in small scars, the nomenclature of the QZ-12 electric widget.

Harold then asked Kate if she knew about the calculator. "Oh," she said, "How do you know about that?" Harold related what happened at the airport. "My poor Bascom!" she said. "It's all my fault." She explained that when Linwood Crigger had made his recent visit, he had left behind his calculator and she found it. She had not got around to returning it to him, so when she saw the inner envelope addressed to ACME with "ATTN: Mr. Crigger" on it, she had slipped the calculator inside with the papers before she sealed it. She said she thought this would be a simple, fast, reliable way to get the calculator back to Mr. Crigger,

since the package would be going by U.S. Registered Mail.

"Kate's explanation was followed by a lengthy closed-door session with Harold in which he counseled her in detail about security practices and procedures at EWC and warned her that any further incident like this one would lead him to place an official reprimand in her personnel file. Kate, perhaps more impressed by the consequences of her ill-considered action on Bascom than by Harold's jawboning, vowed that from now on she would faithfully observe every security procedure there was at EWC.

\*\*\*

Despite its inauspicious beginning, the rest of Bascom's visit to NESC had gone smoothly. Bascom was able to answer all of CDR Eckles' questions about the project, and CDR Eckles was thereby enabled to answer all of his Captain's questions about the project. From the way things had gone, it appeared to Bascom that EWC was the front runner for the follow-on contract that would take the laser widget into full production.

Bascom was obliged to leave the SECRET report with CDR Eckles, who had seen that Bascom was issued an NESC receipt for it.

Kate met Bascom at the airport the next day. She told him about the calculator and the mix-up, and said she would make it up to him somehow.

Back at EWC, Bascom returned his copy of the inventory and gave Zelda the signed receipt from NESC. She filed the receipt and annotated the record for the report as follows:



**KATE RECEIVES A MORE THOROUGH BRIEFING THAN WAS GIVEN TO BASCOM.**

# ELECTRIC WIDGET COMPANY

## Receipt and Dispatch Record

Security Classification: SECRET Document's Date: 30 Nov 95

Unclassified Description: Copy of EWC report, Laser Widget  
Field Tests (U), 2 pp.

Received from: \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_  
activity date

Dispatched to: NESC, Pentagon, Washington, D.C on 12/1/95  
NESC activity date

EWG receipt #: 8033 Due back by: \_\_\_\_\_ Received on: 12/2/95

Destroy this record after 12/2/97  
date

## CHARTS

The charts on the following pages depict procedures for transmitting SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents outside the facility by U.S. Mail or by an employee courier. They also show procedures for releasing documents to be hand-carried by an employee making a classified visit. The last pages of the charts cover requirements given in NISPOM, 5-411 that apply to handcarrying SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents aboard commercial passenger aircraft. Again we stress that the charts show ways of transmitting documents, or releasing documents for visits, so as to meet applicable NISPOM requirements. Procedures at your facility may be different; check your SPP, if you have one.

**NOTE: Don't be daunted by the length of these charts. Yes, they run to ten pages! But for any particular case you will only be using a part of them. So the charts "shrink" considerably in actual use.**


1

# TRANSMISSION & RELEASE SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS



SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL document to be transmitted or released outside facility to UA activity or to another contractor.


**NOTE:** Requirements for transmitting or releasing accountable COMSEC (includes CRYPTO) documents are *not* included in these charts.



# TRANSMISSION

## SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

### U.S. MAIL OR EMPLOYEE COURIER



Prepare receipt to include:

- Unclassified identification of document.
- Name and address of sending facility
- Name and address of receiving facility

**★ TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENTS**


- Mark a transmittal document that does not itself contain classified information as follows:
  - Conspicuously mark the highest classification level of the information transmitted by it at the top and bottom of the document.
  - Enter **Unclassified when Separated from Classified Enclosures**.
- Mark a transmittal document that contains classified information as shown in Marking Supplement to NISPOM.


# 3

## TRANSMISSION

### SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

#### U.S. MAIL OR EMPLOYEE COURIER





**NOTE:** The handcarrying of classified material must not be authorized when there is doubt as to whether the material can be properly handled and protected.

#### \* COURIER

A cleared employee, designated by the contractor, whose principal duty is to transmit classified material to its destination. A courier must:


- Be cleared to the level of the information involved
- Be briefed on his/her responsibility to safeguard classified information by a responsible official who is delegated authority in such matters
- Possess an identification card or badge, issued by the contractor, which contains, as a minimum:
  - contractor's name
  - courier's name and photograph
- Retain the classified material in his/her personal possession at all times except for authorized overnight storage at a U.S. Government installation or at a cleared contractor's facility that has appropriate safeguarding capability

5

# TRANSMISSION

## SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS

### U.S. MAIL OR EMPLOYEE COURIER







# 7

## RELEASE FOR VISIT OR MEETING SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS


### HANDCARRIER




**HANDCARRYING ABOARD  
COMMERCIAL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT  
SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS**



# HANDCARRYING ABOARD COMMERCIAL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS



# HANDCARRYING ABOARD COMMERCIAL PASSENGER AIRCRAFT SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS



## AUTHORIZATION LETTER

Traveler must have written authorization which shall:


- Provide the full name, date of birth, height, weight, and signature of the traveler, and state that he or she is authorized to transmit classified material.
- Describe the type of identification the traveler will present on request (e.g., ABC Corporation picture badge, No. 1234).
- Describe the material being handcarried and request that it be exempt from opening (e.g., three sealed packages, 9<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> x 12<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> x 2").
- Identify the points of departure, destination, and known transfer points.
- Include the name, telephone number, and signature of the FSO, and the location and telephone number of the Field Office.

## IDENTIFICATION

The identification card or badge for the traveler must contain the

- Contractor's name.
- Name and a photograph of the employee.

## SUMMARY



**BUZZ'S SCHEDULED 1:00  
FLIGHT TO WASHINGTON**

When transmitting or releasing SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents outside your facility, you must obtain the contracting officer's authorization or determine that the transmission or release qualifies as an exception. If the recipient is a contractor, you must verify that the contractor has an FCL and safeguarding capability at or above the level of the material involved. For a transmission, a receipt is prepared for SECRET documents, a letter of transmittal and/or a cover sheet may be attached, and the document is logged out in the receipt and dispatch records. The inner envelope is addressed, return addressed, and marked with the highest classification level of the material and with any applicable warning notices. The document and receipt form (if required) are inserted in the envelope, which is then sealed. The outer envelope is addressed and return addressed and sealed. The outer envelope is not marked. A SECRET package can then be transmitted by U.S. Express Mail or U.S. Registered Mail, while a CONFIDENTIAL package can be transmitted by U.S. Express Mail, U.S. Registered Mail, or U.S. Certified Mail. Packages containing classified material may also be transmitted by a designated, briefed courier, who is cleared to the level of the material to be transmitted and carries a company identification card or badge. The courier must keep the material in his/her possession at all times during the trip. However, if the courier must make an overnight stopover, the FSO must arrange for storage of the material at a UA installation or a contractor facility with approved storage capability at or above the level of the material. Other approved transmission methods may also be used. Delivery of SECRET transmissions must be monitored and, if necessary, followed up. Signed receipts are kept for at least 2 years. The employee must carry a company identification card or badge and must be cleared to the

highest level of the documents involved and briefed on his/her security responsibilities. Such documents must be inventoried, properly packaged, and charged to the employee before he or she departs for the visit or meeting. The handcarrier must keep the material in his/her personal possession at all times during the trip. If, however, the handcarrier must make an overnight stopover, arrangements must be made as in the case of a courier for suitable storage. The handcarrier must obtain a receipt for any SECRET document left at the host facility. Upon the handcarrier's return, the material is checked against the original of the inventory and received, together with any receipt obtained. Handcarrying classified documents aboard commercial passenger aircraft requires the approval of the FSO. An authorization letter and identification for the traveler must be provided. Before departure, the traveler must be briefed on **NISPOM, 5-411**. Care should be taken in packaging the material for airport screening. Special procedures must be followed if the screening official requests to open the package containing the material, if the traveler is not permitted to board the aircraft, or if the aircraft is hijacked to a foreign country.

# 6 Review Exercises

**Complete the following exercises for review and practice.**

*Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

1. The general rule when SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material is to be transmitted or released is that the \_\_\_\_\_ approval must be obtained before the material is sent.
  
2. Which two of the following exceptions to the general rule usually permit a cleared contractor to transmit or release SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material without having to obtain prior approval?
  - a. The transmission or release is in regard to prime contractor/subcontractor, MFO, and parent-subsidiary relationships as authorized by the NISPOM.
  - b. The transmission or release is required for performance of the contract.
  - c. The transmission or release is required by the specific terms of the contract.
  - d. The transmission or release is in connection with pre-contract negotiations with prospective subcontractors in furtherance of an existing contract.
  - e. The transmission or release is otherwise authorized by the NISPOM.
  
3. When the proposed recipient is another contractor the facility transmitting or releasing the classified material must verify that the recipient has
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_

4. \_\_\_\_\_ - \_\_\_\_\_ issues the verification, which is valid for a period of \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ .
  
5. Complete the following procedures for preparing a document for transmission:
  - a. Prepare a r\_\_\_\_\_ for S\_\_\_\_\_ documents.
  - b. Prepare a t\_\_\_\_\_ d\_\_\_\_\_ (optional).
  - c. Attach a c\_\_\_\_\_ s\_\_\_\_\_ (optional).
  - d. L\_\_\_\_\_ o\_\_\_\_\_ the document.
  - e. Prepare the i\_\_\_\_\_ e\_\_\_\_\_ .
  - f. Prepare the o\_\_\_\_\_ e\_\_\_\_\_ .
  
6. The three items required on a receipt when it is sent are
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_
  
7. Only an o \_\_\_\_\_ receipt is required for SECRET transmissions.
  
8. How is a transmittal letter that does not itself contain classified information to be marked?
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_
  
9. For a document for which there is already a record of its receipt what two additional entries are made when the document is transmitted (dispatched)?
  - a. \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_

10. What information needs to be entered in a receipt and dispatch record when a SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL document generated by your facility (original or copy) is transmitted?

a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

c. \_\_\_\_\_

d. \_\_\_\_\_

e. \_\_\_\_\_

11. For each of the following steps in preparing a transmission or release, enter 1E for "Inner Envelope" and/or OE for "Outer Envelope."

a. \_\_\_\_\_ Mark with highest classification of information that it contains.

b. \_\_\_\_\_ Enter the name and address of the recipient activity or host activity.

c. \_\_\_\_\_ Seal envelope.

d. \_\_\_\_\_ If appropriate, specify **"TO BE OPENED BY ADDRESSEE ONLY. Postmaster - Do Not Forward. If undeliverable to addressee, Return to Sender."**

e. \_\_\_\_\_ Add any applicable markings.

f. \_\_\_\_\_ Add an attention line if desired, stating the office code or name of particular employee of the receiving facility or UA.

g. \_\_\_\_\_ name and address of sending facility.

h. \_\_\_\_\_ Enter name of visitor or attender recipient.

12. For each of the following methods of transmitting enter S if the method is authorized for SECRET documents, and/or C if the method is authorized for CONFIDENTIAL documents.

a. \_\_\_\_\_ Employee courier.

b. \_\_\_\_\_ U.S. Express Mail.

c. \_\_\_\_\_ U.S. Registered Mail.

d. \_\_\_\_\_ U.S. Certified Mail.

13. Which of the following apply to a receipt for SECRET material?

a. \_\_\_\_\_ It may contain classified information in certain cases.

b. \_\_\_\_\_ A duplicate copy of the receipt must be retained by the sending facility in a suspense file until the signed copy is returned.

c. \_\_\_\_\_ The sending facility have a suspense system to track transmitted documents until the signed receipt is returned.

d. \_\_\_\_\_ If the sending facility has followed up and a signed receipt is not returned or if the addressee indicates that the SECRET material was not received, or reports to you the absence of a receipt for the SECRET shipment or a discrepancy between the contents and the receipt, the sending facility must conduct an inquiry as prescribed in **NISPOM, 1-303**.

e. \_\_\_\_\_ A copy of the signed receipt must be retained at the sending facility's control station for at least 2 years.

14. For each of the following NISPOM requirements, enter EC if the requirement applies to an employee courier, and/or EH if the requirement applies to an employee handcarrying classified information for a classified visit or meeting.
- a. \_\_\_\_\_ Must have a clearance at or above the classification level of the material to be conveyed.
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_ Must be briefed on his/her responsibilities to safeguard classified information.
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_ Visit authorization letter for employee is sent to employee's destination.
  - d. \_\_\_\_\_ Must carry a copy of an inventory of the classified material being conveyed.
  - e. \_\_\_\_\_ For a daytime trip, must keep the material in his/her personal possession at all times.
  - f. \_\_\_\_\_ For a trip with an overnight stopover, must store the classified material overnight at a U.S. Government installation or at a cleared contractor facility with safeguarding capability at or above the level of the classified material.
  - g. \_\_\_\_\_ Classified material routinely left at destination.
  - h. \_\_\_\_\_ Classified material left at destination only when necessary.
  - i. \_\_\_\_\_ Classified material inventoried a second time when employee returns to sending facility.
  - j. \_\_\_\_\_ Must possess an identification card or badge that contains the contractor's name and the employee's name and photograph.

15. Which of the following apply when classified material is to be handcarried aboard a commercial passenger aircraft?
- a. \_\_\_\_\_ The packaged documents may be carried on the traveler's person or otherwise qualify as carry-on baggage.
  - b. \_\_\_\_\_ The traveler must carry written authorization and company identification.
  - c. \_\_\_\_\_ A record of approval must be retained for 2 years.
  - d. \_\_\_\_\_ The packaged classified material should lend itself to airport screening inspection without opening.
  - e. \_\_\_\_\_ The packaged classified material should not contain metal that might activate detection devices.
  - f. \_\_\_\_\_ Film must be shielded with lead foil.
  - g. \_\_\_\_\_ The traveler must be briefed on his/her overall responsibility to safeguard classified information and on the contents of **NISPOM, 5-411**.
  - h. \_\_\_\_\_ The traveler may open or authorize the opening of the package(s) as provided for in FAA Advisory Circular 108-3.



1. Contracting officer. (p. 6-3)(NISPOM, 5-502,503, and 50g)
2. b. and c. (p. 6-3)
3. a. an FCL at the same or higher level than the material to be sent.  
b. adequate safeguarding capability. (p. 6-3)(NISPOM, 5-400 and 509)
4. DIS-CVA, three years (p. 6-3)
5. a. receipt, SECRET; b. transmittal document; c. cover sheet; d. Log out; e. inner envelope; f, outer envelope. (p. 6-4-7)(NISPOM, 4-211; 5-202, 401, and 406)
6. a. Unclassified short title or abbreviation.  
b. Name and address of sending facility (addressor).  
c. Name and address of receiving facility (addressee).  
(pp. 6-4)(NISPOM, 5-202)
7. Original. (p. 6-4)(NISPOM, 5-401a.)
8. a. Conspicuously mark the highest classification level of the information transmitted by it at the top and bottom.  
b. Enter "**Unclassified when Separated from Classified Enclosures.**"  
(p. 6-5)(NISPOM, 4-211)
9. a. Activity to which dispatched.  
b. Date dispatched. (p. 6-5)(NISPOM, 5-202)

10. a. Document's date.  
 b. Date of dispatch.  
 c. Classification.  
 d. Unclassified description.  
 e. Activity to which dispatched. (p. 6-6)(NISPOM, 5-202)
11. a. IE            d. OE            g. IE, OE  
 b. IE, OE        e. IE            h. IE  
 c. IE, OE        f. IE  
 (p. 6-6-7, 12)(NISPOM, 5-406)
12. a. S,C; b.S,C; c.S,C; d.C. (p.6-8)(NISPOM,5-403)
13. c. d., and e.            (pp. 6-4, 10)(NISPOM, 1-3021 and 303; 5-401)
14. a. EC,EH        f. EC, EH  
 b. EC,EH        g. EC  
 c. EH            h. EH  
 d. EH            i. EH  
 e. EC, EH        j. EC, EH  
 (pp. 6-9-10, 11-13)(NISPOM, 5-400 and 401a)
15. a.,b.,d.,e.,g. (pp.6-13-14)(NISPOM,5-411)

# LESSON 7

## Destruction

**D**estroying classified documents should be one of your most pleasant chores, since every document destroyed is one less document to worry about. You'll never again have to store it, re-mark it, reproduce it, check it out, check it in, transmit it, or release it. Destroying classified waste should be nearly as pleasant. Of course, you can't just destroy classified material indiscriminately. You need to know why you have it to know *when* to destroy it. All in all, destruction is a requirement gladly met.

### OBJECTIVES

When you have completed this lesson, you should be able to do the following:

- Determine when particular classified material should be destroyed.
- Identify the most common methods used to destroy classified material and rules governing their use.
- Ensure that requirements for the destroyer are met.
- Ensure that classified waste is properly collected, safeguarded, and destroyed.

## RIDDANCE WHEN PURPOSE SERVED



The main point about destruction is that it is a positive, ongoing program. The goal of your destruction program is to ensure that you have on hand only those classified documents that are essential to your facility's operations. To accomplish this, you must destroy all classified documents as soon as *possible* after they have served the purpose for which

- **The Government released them,**
- **Your facility developed or prepared them, or**
- **Your facility retained them after completion or termination of the contract (discussed in Lesson 8).**

1

The first key word in all this is "purpose." Before destroying anything, ask yourself and others, "Why do we have this document? Do we still need it?" If you are satisfied that a document has served its purpose, destroy it (unless destroying it is specifically prohibited).

The second key word is "program." You should review your facility's classified holdings regularly with program managers and other key officials. Set up a schedule that suits your facility and stick with it.

## CLASSIFIED WASTE

In addition to classified documents that have served their purposes, classified waste must also be destroyed. (As waste, it has, of course, already served its purpose.) Classified waste is any waste material that contains classified information, such as preliminary drafts, carbon sheets, carbon ribbons, plates, stencils, masters stenographic notes, worksheets, and the like. You must destroy classified waste as soon as practical,



**Mark receptacles.** Paper bags or other receptacles used to accumulate classified waste must be clearly identified.

**Safeguard the material.** Until it is destroyed, classified waste must be safeguarded according to the highest classification of the waste in that receptacle. Since storing waste can clutter up your security container(s) in short order, it is best to destroy the classified waste not only "as soon as practical," but as soon as possible!

## DESTROYING SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL

**Select Destroyer.** To destroy SECRET and/or CONFIDENTIAL material, you only need *one person*. The destroyer must be an appropriately cleared employee. Ensure that the employee has been briefed in the destruction procedures and has a full understanding of his or her responsibilities.

**Record Not Required.** When SECRET and/or CONFIDENTIAL material only is destroyed, no record need be kept of the destruction, and no destruction certificate need be made.

## REMOVAL FROM FACILITY: SAME DAY DESTRUCTION

If classified material is not destroyed on the premises of your facility but is taken somewhere else for destruction, it must be destroyed on the *same day it is taken away*. We recommend that the material be placed in a sealed container that is marked with your facility's name and address and that your destruction personnel control it until destroyed.

## METHODS

Several methods of destruction (seven in all) are authorized in the NISPOM. Let's go over them.



"Now that we've reduced the ashes by physical disturbance, is there anything we should reprocess for destruction?"

**Burning.** At first glance, burning may seem to be your best bet. It requires no special equipment. However, if you intend to use public destruction facilities, such as a public incinerator, you will need your Field Office's approval, and you must follow the conditions the FO prescribes. There are drawbacks to burning, though, especially nowadays. For instance, if there is a lot of material to be destroyed, burning it is likely to be a time-consuming and grimy job. When the fire has died out, the ashes must be examined to ensure that no classified information can be reconstructed. If such information can be reconstructed from unburned material, the destroyer has to gather the sooty stuff and reprocess it for destruction. Then, too, there are environmental concerns. Most governmental jurisdictions discourage or prohibit the burning of refuse, and a good many companies simply choose on their own not to burn refuse, classified or not.



EARLY CROSSCUT SHREDDING TECHNIQUE

**Shredding.** What with the disadvantages of burning, it's not surprising that more and more facilities are choosing to destroy their excess classified material by shredding it. Shredding offers an effective, convenient alternative to burning. The tiny bits of material that result from shredding are usually biodegradable too. Just be sure that the shredder meets NISPOM requirements. For instance, the machine must be a "crosscut shredder"; the more common "strip shredder" is not authorized. The particle residue must be no larger than 1/32" wide (with a 1/64" tolerance) x 1/2" long to ensure that no classified information can be reconstructed. Inspect the shredder each time you use it to destroy classified material. And be sure that it is properly maintained; oiling, for instance, is usually quite important. About the only situation in which you would not opt for shredding would be if your facility were heavily involved with classified information on microform material (microfilm,

microfiche, etc.). Shredding is *not* an authorized method for destroying material other than paper products.

Other Methods. Pulping, melting, chemical decomposition (for example, dunking the classified material in acid to dissolve it), mutilation, and pulverizing are the remaining authorized destruction methods. The Field Office may also approved other methods. These methods are mainly used by quite large facilities or in exceptional situations. Remember: *Public destruction facilities may be used only with the approval of and under conditions prescribed by, the Field Office.*

## DESTRUCTION AT EWC

December 2 seemed to Zelda a good day for destruction. She wanted to get rid of the paperwork that would remind her of yesterday's unpleasant events. Besides the classified waste she had accumulated, there were also documents that had served their purposes and should be destroyed. Harold had long ago designated Zelda as the destroyer of EWC's excess classified (SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL) material and, although she could probably quote **NISPOM, Chapter 5, section 7** by heart, he had briefed her thoroughly on the appropriate requirements in it. He had also briefed her on EWC's destruction procedures, explaining to her in detail how EWC's shredder operated and how to perform routine maintenance on it. When Zelda told Harold that she was planning to destroy classified material, he got an idea. Harold decided that this would be a good opportunity for Kate to show that she had turned over a new leaf (under Zelda's watchful eye).

So he asked Kate to assist Zelda in the destruction. (Note that a *witness is not* required for the destruction of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material.)

Zelda showed Harold the material she planned to destroy. There was the folder of SECRET waste (Buzz's



working paper rejects, his working paper, her mistyped page, and the three blank copier sheets).



Zelda then showed Harold a list that Buzz had given her. It identified several documents that Buzz had said should be destroyed after the completion of the laser widget field tests. Harold went over the list. It was in Buzz's handwriting, so even though Buzz was at home on sick leave, Harold approved them for destruction.


Harold went to Kate's office and asked if she would assist Zelda. He stressed that she should observe each document as it was destroyed, then actually look at the bits the shredder made of them. Kate had never watched the shredder work and was eager to see it in action.

Kate went to Zelda's office. Zelda had already oiled the shredder, ran some unclassified paper through it, and checked to see that the residue was suitably shredded. Then, with Kate watching, she shredded the **SECRET** waste. The shredder gave a high-pitched whir as it took the paper. She turned to the documents Buzz had identified and fed them into the machine. Then Zelda and Kate inspected the residue; both agreed that the classified material was well beyond recognition, and no power on earth could reconstruct it.

"What do we do with this stuff now?" Kate asked, running her fingers through the residue. "Whatever you like," said Zelda. "It's nothing now." Kate thought a moment and said, "It would make a nice light mulch for my houseplants. May I have it?" "Sure," said Zelda, "Mulch away!"

## SUMMARY

Destruction is a means of ridding your facility of excess classified documents and classified waste. Classified documents must be destroyed as soon as possible after their purposes have been served. Burning, once the most common means of destruction, has fallen into disfavor and is being supplanted by shredding as the method of choice for most facilities. Other methods are mainly used by very large facilities or in unusual situations. Classified material removed from the facility for destruction must be destroyed the same day. SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material may be destroyed by one appropriately cleared employee of the contractor, who has a full understanding of his or her responsibilities. No destruction record or certificate is required for SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL material. Classified waste must be placed in marked receptacles, safeguarded as its classification requires until destroyed, and destroyed as soon as practical.



# 7 Review Exercises

Complete the following exercises for review and practice.

Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.

1. Classified documents must be destroyed as soon as possible after they have served the purpose for which

a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_, or

c. \_\_\_\_\_

d. \_\_\_\_\_

2. Jane Atkins, the FSO at United Behavioral Research (UBR) has designated Lou Johnson, an employee with a SECRET clearance, to destroy certain SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL microfiches by melting them. What does she need to do now regarding Mr. Johnson?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

3. Gerald is serving as the destroyer for some CONFIDENTIAL material. His company has the Field Office's approval to burn it at a public incinerator, but when he got there, there was a long line ahead of him. He wonders if he can just lock the material in his trunk and come back and burn it tomorrow. What should he do?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

4. What are the two most commonly used methods of destruction?

a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

5. Which of the following are true of burning as a method of destroying classified material?
- a. Field Office approval is required to use a public incinerator.
  - b. Approximately the same amount of physically similar material must be burned along with the classified material.
  - c. The ashes must be examined.
  - d. Any unburned material with classified information that can be reconstructed must be reprocessed for destruction.
6. Which of the following are true of shredding as a method of destroying classified material?
- a. A strip shredder may to be used for CONFIDENTIAL material.
  - b. The shredder should be inspected each time if is used to destroy classified material.
  - c. The particle size of the residue must not exceed 1/32"(±1/64") x 1/2".
  - d. Shredding is not authorized for destruction of microform material.

1. possible.
  - a. the Government released them.
  - b. your facility developed or prepared them, or
  - c. your facility retained them after completion or termination of the contract.(p. 7-2) (NISPOM, 5-704)
2. Jane must brief Mr. Johnson to ensure that he has a full understanding of his responsibilities in carrying out the destruction. (p. 7-3) (NISPOM, 5-502)
3. Gerald should either wait there and destroy the material or return the material to his company for storage pending destruction. (pp. 7-3) (NISPOM, 5.304 and 705b)
4.
  - a. burning.
  - b. shredding(pp. 7-4)
5. a., c., and d. (p. 7-8) (NISPOM, 5.705)
6. b., c., and d..... (pp. 7-8-9) (NISPOM, 5-705)

# LESSON 8

## Disposition

“**D**isposition” refers primarily to what is done with classified material at the opposite ends of the contracting process, that is, before a classified contract is awarded and when a classified contract is concluded (completed or terminated). In this context, “disposition” includes the following four actions:

- **Return** - dispatching classified material received back to the UA contracting officer,
- **Surrender** - dispatching classified material your firm developed to the UA contracting officer,
- **Destruction**, as discussed in Lesson 7,
- **Retention** - keeping classified material received or developed in connection with a completed contract at your facility for an authorized, specified period. Note that retention includes transfer - shifting the classified material associated with a completed contract to an active contract, such as a follow-on contract.

In this lesson, we'll discuss the nuts and bolts of each of these modes of disposition. We'll also discuss retention of classified material that does not relate to a contract, and what to do if the Security Agreement (DD Form 441) is terminated.

## OBJECTIVES

When you have completed this lesson, you should be able to do the following:

- Make proper disposition of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents received as part of a UA solicitation and/or produced in response to a UA solicitation, when your firm is not awarded the contract.
- Make proper disposition of SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents provided to your firm or produced by your firm in connection with a UA contract, when the contract is concluded (completed or terminated).
- Apply the rules for disposition of classified material not received under a specific contract, such as material obtained at a classified meeting.
- Make proper disposition of classified material possessed by your firm and of other documents and records when the Security Agreement is terminated.

## PROSPECTIVE CONTRACTING THE FOUR CASES

MEANWHILE, AT THE  
WALNETTO MODEL AIRPLANE  
COMPANY...



"ABOUT THAT AIR FORCE  
PROJECT... DO YOU THINK  
THEY'LD GO FOR AN 8" VERSION?"

If your firm contracts directly with a UA or plans to do so, it is likely that somewhere along the way it will receive a classified solicitation (Invitation for Bids, Request for Proposals, Request for Quotes) from a UA. A classified solicitation is one that entails access to classified information by the prospective contractor. As with any solicitation, there are four possible cases:

1. Your firm does not submit a response (bid, proposal, quote);
2. Your firm submits a response but later withdraws it;
3. Your firm submits a response but it is not accepted; or
4. Your firm submits a response and is awarded the contract.

Let's take each case and see how you may dispose of the classified information involved.

### CASE 1: NO RESPONSE SUBMITTED

There are any number of reasons why your firm may choose not to submit a response to a UA solicitation. Your firm may already be booked solid with other projects. Maybe management doesn't think the firm has enough resources or the right kinds of resources to be competitive. Proposed delivery schedules may seem too rigid. After considering your firm's situation and the options open to it, you must destroy or return/surrender the classified material *within* 180 days after *the opening date of bids, proposals, or quotes*. Actually, with an RFP, this means within 180 days of the closing date; proposals may be opened as soon as received by the contracting officer.

## **CASE 2: RESPONSE SUBMITTED BUT WITHDRAWN**


There are also many reasons why your firm's management may have second thoughts about a response once it has been submitted and may have decided to withdraw it. (Withdrawal is usually possible only with proposals, not bids or quotes.) Even though your firm withdraws its response, i.e., stops further consideration of it for the contract, the contracting officer will likely not return to your firm any classified documents that had been submitted. So all you will have on hand to dispose of will probably be the Request for Proposals (RFP) itself, whatever classified documents your firm may have developed in preparing its proposal, and a copy of the proposal itself. As with Case 1, you must destroy or return/surrender the classified material within *180 days after the opening date*.

## **CASE 3: RESPONSE NOT ACCEPTED**

In this case your firm prepared a response, submitted it, did not withdraw it, but was not awarded the contract. Here your firm will have a little more time to decide what it wants to do. It has *180 days after notification that its response was not accepted* to destroy or return/surrender classified material.

## **CASE 4: AWARDED THE CONTRACT**

In this case your firm's response (bid, proposal, or quote) was accepted. Here, disposition comes into play when the contract *is completed* (i.e., upon final delivery of goods and services) or *terminated* (as for the convenience of the Government or for default). A decision will have to be made as to which type of disposition, or combination of types, should be used. Or you may decide to retain the classified material. *Unless the contracting officer advises to the contrary, you may retain the classified material for up to two years after final*



*delivery of goods and services, or after completion or termination of the classified contract.*

## RETENTION FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS

There may be occasions when you have good reason to retain the documents for more than the two-year period instead of returning, surrendering, or destroying them.

**Requesting Retention Authority.** On such occasions, you need to request (and receive) written retention authority from the UA contracting officer. In your request you will need to do the following:

1. Identify the SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents by subject matter and approximate number of documents.
2. Justify the retention based on one or more of the following:
  - The material is necessary for the maintenance of the contractor's essential records.
  - The material is patentable or proprietary data to which the contractor has title.
  - The material will assist the contractor in independent research and development efforts.
  - The material will benefit the U.S. Government in the performance of other prospective or existing Government contracts.
  - The material is being retained in accordance with the "records retention clause" of the contract.
  - The material will benefit the U.S. Government in the performance of another active contract and will be transferred to that contract (specify contract).

**Final DD Form 254.** If the UA contracting officer decides that your firm has a continuing need for the material, the UA will issue a *final DD Form 254* for the classified contract. The UA will enter the *authorized retention period* in item 5 of the form. The UA will enter the *final disposition instructions* for the classified material in item 13.

## CLASSIFIED MATERIAL NOT RELATED TO A CONTRACT

Your firm must take action to dispose of classified material that does not relate to any of your contracts *within one year of receipt*. Usually this will be classified material obtained at a classified meeting or symposium or from a secondary distribution center. Such material must be duly entered into your receipt and dispatch records, properly stored, and so forth.

## TERMINATION OF THE SECURITY AGREEMENT



The Security Agreement (DD Form 441) can be terminated by either party (i.e., your firm or the Government) by giving the other party 30 days' notice. If this should occur, one of your last duties as your firm's FSO would be to dispose of your firm's classified documents. If termination occurs, and if no new Security agreement is executed, then, no matter what documents you may have been authorized to retain, your firm must either

- Return all classified material that it possesses to the UA concerned,

or

- Dispose of such material as instructed by the Field Office concerned.

You will also need to return your firm's copy of the Notification of Facility Security Clearance (DSS FL 381-R).

The following chart summarizes the disposition periods we have discussed:

<b>DISPOSITION SCHEDULE</b>	
<b>Situation:</b>	<b>Contractor must return, surrender, or, as authorized, destroy the classified material:</b>
Bid, proposal, or quote not submitted	Within 180 days of opening date
Bid, proposal, or quote withdrawn	Within 180 days of opening date
Bid, proposal, or quote not accepted	Within 180 days of notification
Awarded the contract	Two years from final delivery of goods and services, or completion or termination of the contract.
Material not received under contract	One year from receipt

## DISPOSITION AT EWC

Returning and surrendering classified material to the UA are both dispatching (transmission) actions, discussed in Lesson 6. In Lesson 7 we went over how EWC destroys classified material. That leaves retention. Let's see EWC might handle retention.

**Transfer to a follow-on contract.** A common type of retention is Transfer to Follow-On Contract. You will recall that EWC hopes to be awarded a follow-on contract by the Navy for the full-scale production of the laser widget. If this should occur, the documents that EWC developed under its current R & D contract would likely be transferred to the follow-on so that EWC could use them. If so, the transfer would be indicated in item 4 of the DD Form 254 for the follow-on contract. The top of the front of the DD Form 254 might look like this.



<b>DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE</b> <b>CONTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION SPECIFICATION</b> <i>(The requirements of the DoD Industrial Security Manual apply to all security aspects of this effort.)</i>		<b>1. CLEARANCE AND SAFEGUARDING</b> a. FACILITY CLEARANCE REQUIRED SECRET	
		b. LEVEL OF SAFEGUARDING REQUIRED SECRET	
<b>2. THIS SPECIFICATION IS FOR: (X and complete as applicable)</b>		<b>3. THIS SPECIFICATION IS: (X and complete as applicable)</b>	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> a. PRIME CONTRACT NUMBER N00147-97-C-8951	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> b. SUBCONTRACT NUMBER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> a. ORIGINAL (Complete date in all cases) Date (YYMMDD) 960419	<input type="checkbox"/> b. REVISED (Supersedes all previous specs) Revision No. Date (YYMMDD)
<input type="checkbox"/> c. SOLICITATION OR OTHER NUMBER Due Date (YYMMDD)	<input type="checkbox"/> c. FINAL (Complete Item 5 in all cases) Date (YYMMDD)		
<b>4. IS THIS A FOLLOW-ON CONTRACT?</b> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO. If Yes, complete the following: Classified material received or generated under <u>N00021-95-C-7834</u> (Preceding Contract Number) is transferred to this follow-on contract.			
<b>5. IS THIS A FINAL DD FORM 2547</b> <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO. If Yes, complete the following: in response to the contractor's request dated _____ retention of the identified classified material is authorized for the period of _____			

Since the decision to transfer the classified material would have been made by the Navy, EWC would not need to justify and request the transfer. However, Zelda would change the title of the file folder containing the documents to reflect the number of the follow-on contract.

**Transfer to Another Active Contract.** Lets say that within two years after the completion of the Laser Widget Project with NESC, EWC is performing on a contract with the Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Let's further suppose that the CECOM contract is scheduled to conclude more than a year after the scheduled completion of the NESC contract. When the NESC contract concludes, Harold can write to NESC and CECOM notifying them that EWC is transferring the documents to the active contract with CECOM since the classified material associated with the NESC contract will benefit the U.S. Government in the performance of the CECOM contract (justification) and identifying the documents. If neither NESC nor CECOM disallows the transfer, EWC can then retain the classified documents for the duration of the CECOM contract, and for two years after its completion. As


before, Zelda would retitle the file folder for the materials.

**Further Retention.** Suppose, however, that EWC is not awarded the follow-on contract. Suppose also that EWC would like to retain Buzz's report and other documents that EWC developed under the R & D contract beyond the usual two-year period. In this case, within the two years after the R & D contract concludes, Harold would write a letter to Ellen Travers, the contracting officer for the R & D contract, justifying and requesting further retention of the documents EWC wishes to retain. In this case the justification would be that the retention would assist EWC and benefit the U.S. Government in the performance of future UA contracts. Harold would also indicate the period of time that retention is necessary. Finally, Harold would identify the documents by identifying the subject matter and approximate number of documents for the SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents. If Ellen Travers approved the further retention, she would issue a final DD Form

## CHART

The following chart depicts most of the main points covered in this lesson.

SECRET AND CONFIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS



**\*REQUEST**

- Identify SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL documents by subject matter and approximate number of documents.


Justify retention of material based on:

- Needed to maintain essential records
- Patentable or proprietary data; contractor has title
- Will help in independent research and development efforts
- Will benefit U.S. Gov't in performance of prospective/existing contracts
- Retained under records retention clause of contract
- Will benefit U.S. Gov't in performance of another contract (specify) and is being transferred to that contract

## SUMMARY

Classified documents received or developed in connection with a UA solicitation or contract must be disposed of properly. When no response is submitted to a solicitation or when a response is submitted and withdrawn, the documents must be destroyed or dispatched to the contracting officer within 180 days of the opening of bids, proposals or quotes. When a response is submitted but not accepted the documents must be destroyed or dispatched to the contracting officer within 180 days of the notification. The successful contractor may retain the classified documents associated with the contract for two years from its completion or termination unless the UA contracting officer notifies the contractor to the contrary. Further retention entails justifying and requesting retention authority and identifying the classified documents to be retained. If the documents will aid in performing on an active contract, they may be transferred to it. Classified material not received under a specific contract, such as material obtained at classified meetings or from a secondary distribution center, may be retained for one year. If the Security Agreement is terminated and a new one is not executed, all classified material is returned to the UA concerned or is disposed of as the FSO instructs.



The header features a large white number '8' on a black background to the left of a white line-art illustration of a hand holding a pen. To the right of the illustration, the words 'Review Exercises' are written in a bold, white, sans-serif font on a black background.

# 8 Review Exercises

**Complete the following exercises for review and practice.**  
*Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

1. Western Widgets received a classified Invitation for Bids (IFB) from the Air Force, but does not want to submit a bid. What two actions are open to the company regarding the classified documents it received?

a. \_\_\_\_\_

b. \_\_\_\_\_

How soon does the company have to make disposition?

\_\_\_\_\_

2. Coherent Communications has completed a classified contract with the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). The firm has been awarded a follow-on contract by the USIA. The DD Form 254 for the follow-on calls for the documents received and produced under the completed contract to be transferred to the follow-on. What should the company do to identify the documents when they are transferred?

\_\_\_\_\_

3. Bob's Biotech, Inc. (BBI) was performing on a classified contract with the National Science Foundation (NSF). Because of budget cutbacks, the NSF terminated the contract for the convenience of the Government. Under the terms of the contract, certain classified information that BBI developed is also proprietary data in which BBI has title. Is BBI authorized to request retention of the relevant documents for more than the standard two-year period? \_\_\_\_\_

4. Twenty-three months ago Harriet's Hydrodynamics made final delivery of goods and services under a classified contract with the Army. The company has just received a classified Invitation for Bids from the Navy. Harriett's management thinks that the documents for the Army contract would be of great value in performing on the Navy contract, if Harriet's Hydrodynamics is the successful bidder.

a. Is there anything that Harriet's Hydrodynamics can do to continue to retain the documents? If so, what?

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b. How soon would they need to do it? \_\_\_\_\_

c. Is there anything the Navy would need to do? If so, what? \_\_\_\_\_

---

d. Is there anything the Army would need to do? If so, what? \_\_\_\_\_

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5. Daniel Mumper is a cleared engineer with Marine Propulsion Systems (MPS). Ten months ago he attended the Navy's classified Subsurface Sound Suppression Seminar and received two classified documents from the Navy. Daniel has referred to the documents frequently for his work on a classified contract that MPS was awarded by the Army. Daniel would like MPS to retain the documents. Is he authorized to retain them longer than two more months? \_\_\_\_\_

6. Charlotte Giordano is the FSO at RCOM, Inc. RCOM's management has decided not to seek any more classified contracts and has given notice to its Field Office that it is terminating the Security Agreement. RCOM possesses several SECRET documents that it retained following completion of a classified contract a year ago. What does Charlotte need to do regarding the termination?

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1. a. Destroy the documents (and any copies).  
b. Return them to the contracting officer for the Air Force. Within 180 days after the opening date for bids. **(p. 8-3)(NISPOM, 5-701)**
  
2. Coherent Communications would note the transfer from the completed contract to the follow-on contract, e.g., by retitling the contract file. **(p. 8-8)**
  
3. Yes. Whether the contract was completed or terminated, BBI is entitled to request retention of the documents as provided for in **NISPOM, 5-702b(2)**.  
**(p. 8-5)((NISPOM, 5-702b(2))**
  
4. a. Harriet's Hydrodynamics needs to request retention authority from the Army-identifying the documents and justifying the retention on the basis that the continued retention will benefit the U.S. Government in the performance of the prospective contract with the Navy **(NISPOM, 5-702b(4))**. The request should indicate how much longer the company will need to retain the documents.  
  
b. Within one month, since the standard two-year retention period will expire in one month.  
  
c. No.  
  
d. Yes. Issue a final DD Form 254, indicating the final retention period and final disposition instructions.  
**(p. 8-5-6)(NISPOM, 5-702)**
  
5. No. **(pp. 8-6)(NISPOM, 5-701d)**
  
6. Charlotte will need to see that all of the classified documents that RCOM, Inc. possesses are either returned to the Army or disposed of as the Field Office instructs. She will also need to return RCOM's copy of the DSS FL 381-R to the Field Office. **(p. 8-6)(NISPOM, 5-703)**

# LESSON 9

## Self-Inspection

**I**n our course *Essentials of Industrial Security Management (EISM)*, we discussed the aperiodic government review of contractor facilities and went over how a self-inspection may be conducted at a facility that does not possess classified information. In this lesson we'll talk about self-inspection at a facility that possesses SECRET information, then see how Harold Huxtable conducts a self-inspection at EWC. Harold will not, however, be going over the elements that were addressed in *EISM*. Instead, he will focus on those elements we've been looking at in the lessons so far.

### OBJECTIVES

When you have finished this lesson, you should be able to do the following:

- State what determines when self-inspections of a facility should be conducted.
- Determine the elements that a self-inspection of a possessing facility might cover.
- Identify desirable features of a self-inspection.

## WHY SELF-INSPECTIONS?

Under the Security Agreement it's up to the contractor "to provide and maintain a system of security controls within the organization" that accord with the guidance in the NISPOM. In practice this comes down to you, as FSO, being on top of the security program at your facility. If, like many FSOs, your job includes handling other matters in addition to security, it's all too easy for these other matters to fill up your time. The required self-inspection is one means of assuring that you have the opportunity to take a good hard look at your *entire security program*. It is also an excellent opportunity to conduct one-on-one security education with your employees.

If your firm is performing on several classified contracts, you may want to conduct your self-inspection along *program specific* lines. This approach entails focusing on a single classified program and interviewing its key personnel. By taking an in-depth look at every relevant element of security in a single program you can gauge how well classified information is being safeguarded throughout your facility.

However you decide to proceed, remember that your goal is to ensure that classified information is properly protected at your facility by employees who know and carry out their security responsibilities.

This occasional scrutiny is no substitute for your ongoing day-to-day attention to security though, and handling security situations properly as they come up is the best way to ensure that all reviews of your facility's security program, whether made by you or by the DSS Field Office, confirm that the classified information entrusted to your facility is in good hands.

## USING THE SELF-INSPECTION HANDBOOK.

You must conduct your self-inspections "at intervals consistent with risk management principles." In determining when to conduct it, we suggest that you weigh the recency and results of past government reviews and your contacts with your I.S. Rep, as well as any significant changes or questionable events or circumstances regarding the security program that have come to your attention.

The Department of Defense Security Service (DSS) has provided contractors the Self-Inspection Handbook in Number 1-95 of the Security Awareness Bulletin. This issue is available from your Field Office. The Self-Inspection Handbook covers the entire range of contractor involvement in the DoD implementation of NISP and serves as a guide for conducting self-inspections.

It is unlikely that all of the elements of security listed in the handbook will apply to your facility. How do you know which ones to key in on? We suggest that you consider focusing on about a dozen elements. Sections A (Facility Clearance), B (Access Authorizations), and C (Security Education) would apply to any facility, possessing or non-possessing.

The core elements for a possessing facility would also include F (Visit Control), G (Classification), K (Classified Storage), M (Transmission), N (Classified Material Controls), P (Disposition), and Q (Reproduction). For a facility that generates classified information, Section L

(Markings) would also be an important element. Depending on the operations of the facility and the activities of its personnel, other elements, such as H (Employee Identification), I (Foreign Ownership, Control, and Influence), J (Public Release), or O (Controlled Access Areas), might also apply.

The best way to use the Self-Inspection Handbook is to go down the list and ask yourself those questions which apply to your situation as well as the logical follow-ups to those questions. And don't just go down the list at your desk; if the question concerns the Security Agreement, locate the agreement.

But like your I.S. Rep, you should do more than a mere paper check. It is the entire security system you are interested in, not just the related paperwork. Get out into the facility and observe how classified information is being handled and stored. Talk to the employees (you should be doing this on a regular basis anyway). This needn't be a formal interrogation - a friendly chat will suffice, if it gives you the information you're after.

## **ANALYZE AND CORRECT**

When you've finished your self-inspection, what then? Obviously, you should correct any problems you came across. And don't just leave it at that. Take a good look at *what caused the problem*. Was it a single, isolated incident or was it a symptom of a flaw in the security program itself? If you have an SPP and your analysis shows that procedures in it are inadequate or ineffective, revise them. If you need help, your I.S. Rep will be glad to assist you.

The whole idea of the self-inspection is to give you, the FSO, a chance to review your overall security program by examining its elements and aspects. Your review should ensure that your facility's overall security posture is adequate.

## AN EXAMPLE OF A SELF-INSPECTION

On the following pages we have provided an example of a self-inspection conducted by Harold Huxtable, EWC's FSO. It is not an all-inclusive self-inspection. As we join Harold, he has already gone through elements A through E of the Self-Inspection Handbook; we covered elements A through D in **EISM**, and element E does not apply to EWC since it does no subcontracting.

## SELF-INSPECTION AT EWC

Next came

### **F. Visit Control.**

#### **1. Can the contractor determine that all classified visits require access to or disclosure of classified information?**

Lin Crigger had been EWC's only classified visitor lately. One visitor was minimal in anybody's book. And the need for coordination between EWC and ACME Aeronautics justified the visit.

Harold moved on to

#### **2. Does notification of classified visits allow sufficient lead time for the receiver's timely approval?**

Since CDR Eckles had approved the visit before the VAL was sent, there was no question of sufficient lead time.

**3. Do VAL's include the required information and are they updated to reflect changes in the status of that information?**

Harold vividly recalled sending the VAL to NESC for Buzz's planned visit. He was about to ask Zelda for EWC's copy of the VAL. But when he looked up from the NISPOM, Zelda was handing the facsimile sheet up to him. "Looking for this?" she asked.

"Why, uh, yes, I was. How did ... Thanks."

Harold ensured that the VAL contained all of the required items of information.

Harold had notified CDR Eckles of the substitution of Bascom for Buzz, and, if need be, CDR Eckles would confirm the notification. Check.

**4. Are procedures established to ensure positive identification of visitors prior to disclosure of classified?**

Harold went downstairs to the reception area to see Becky Womble, EWC's receptionist. "When Mr. Crigger visited us a few days ago, what kind of identification did he show you, Becky?"

Becky thought for a moment and said, "His driver's license and his ACME photo I.D. His ACME photo was much more like him than the one on his license. All that license photo lacked was a long number under his chin!"



"Thanks, Becky."

**5. Are procedures established to ensure that visitors are only afforded classified information consistent with their visit?**

Though the NISPOM did not require it, Harold had taken Lin Crigger to Buzz and Buzz had taken him to the front door after the visit. From conversations with Buzz and Zelda the day after the visit, Harold was sure that Lin had not taken any of EWC's classified material with him.

On to

**6. Does the facility Visitor Record include the required information?**



Harold whisked down to Zelda's office. "Zelda, where's the record of Mr. Crigger's visit?" Harold had told Zelda yesterday that he was going to conduct a self-inspection today so she had already done her own "self-inspection" yesterday. She knew that her file drawers would get a workout.

"Here's the VAL with the date of his visit noted on the back. The Navy GCA's approval for the disclosure of its classified information is attached to the VAL."

"Thanks, Zelda."

**8. Has the contractor secured the approval of the relevant GCA prior to disclosure of classified during non-contract related visits?**

Zelda had just shown him the approval.

On to


## G. Classification.

### 1. Is all classification guidance adequate and is the *Contract Security Classification Specification* provided as required?

Harold thought the narrative on the DD Form 254 for the Laser Widget Project was adequate but decided to double-check with Buzz. It was nearly a week since Buzz's accident and he had been back at work for a few days now. He wore a sling for his right arm, but he had rigged up a device that allowed him to write and draw with some comfort.

"How's the arm, Buzz?"

"About as good as a pin-sweeper in a bowling alley. What's up?"



"Self-inspection. I'm on 'classification.' Are you having any problems using the DD Form 254?"

"Well, I have to read between the lines now and then, but no real problems," Buzz said.

How're the classification levels?"

"Fine. Fine. No problem."

"O.K. Say, when does the bandage come off?"

"Never, I hope. Old Man Wilbersnoot heard about what happened. Zelda said his eyes lit up when he heard about the scars. He's up to something. You can bet on it."

"Old Man Wilbersnoot" was J. Digby Wilbersnoot, Chairman of the Board and President of EWC. Harold reported directly to him.

"You have my sympathy," Harold told Buzz as he left.

Let's see now, thought Harold. Classification guidance is O.K.

**2. Does the GCA issue revised classification specifications as needed?**

None had been needed, as yet anyway.

**3. Does the contractor have adequate procedures for applying derivative classification to classified material being created, extracted or summarized?**

EWC's procedure was simple but effective. Harold reviewed the markings on everything Buzz generated to ensure that they were accurate and complete,

**4. Is improper or inadequate classification guidance challenged?**

EWC didn't need to challenge the guidance since it seemed fine.

**5. Upon completion of a classified contract does the contractor properly dispose of the relevant classified information?**

EWC had yet to complete its classified contract, but when they did Harold was confident that he could dispose of any classified information related to it in accordance with the NISPOM and GCA requirements.

**6. Is contractor-developed information appropriately classified, marked and protected?**


Harold's policy is that he must first approve any unsolicited proposal before it can be submitted to ensure that it is classified and marked according to the pertinent DD Form 254, Classification Guide, or source material. He would submit any information not previously classified to the appropriate GCA for a determination.

**7. Are downgrading and declassification actions accomplished as required?**

Harold considered. EWC had not failed to downgrade or declassify any document as required.

Element **H. Employee Identification** was for facilities that used I.D. cards and badges. EWC had too few cleared employees now to bother with either. And **1. Foreign Travel** did not apply either. No one at EWC had gone farther away than Buzz on his trip to Site B, well within New York State.

**J. Public Release** did not apply to EWC either. Harold had seen the EWC Annual Report and it had contained nothing about the Laser Widget Project except that EWC had been awarded the contract, that is was a negotiated contract, and the total dollar amount of the contract. Harley Sanders had told Harold it was alright to publish the information in the annual report.



On to

**K. Classified Storage.**

**1. Has the contractor established a system of security checks at the end of each working day to ensure that classified material is secured?**

Yes. Zelda always checked to see that all classified material was stored in the GSA-approved cabinet, then locked the cabinet. Harold double-checked that all classified material was secured.

**2. Does the contractor maintain a system of perimeter controls to deter or detect unauthorized introduction or removal of classified from the facility?**

Yes. Harley Sanders and Harold had established an excellent spot check system.

**3. Are procedures developed for the safeguarding of classified material during an emergency?**

Yes. Harold had worked with Harley to develop the procedures, which were recorded in EWC's Standard Practice Procedures.

**4. Is the number of persons possessing knowledge of the combinations to security containers minimized?**

Yes. Just two persons knew the combination. Zelda and he.

**5. Is a record of the names of persons having knowledge of the combinations to security containers maintained?**

Yes. The record in the container showed his and Zelda's names and, though not required, their home telephone numbers.

**6. Are security containers, vaults, cabinets, and other authorized storage containers kept locked when not under direct of an authorized person?**

Yes. Zelda always kept her GSA-approved cabinet locked when she wasn't looking after it.

**7. When combinations to security containers holding classified are placed in written form, are they marked and stored as required?**

EWC never wrote down the combination to its container. Its current unrecorded "code word" was "BAFFLE" (2233-53).

**8. Are combinations to security containers changed by authorized persons when required?**

Yes. Usually by Zelda. As needed.

Harold skipped items 9 through 21 since they did not apply to EWC's situation.


Next came

**L. Markings.**

**1. Is all classified material, regardless of its physical form, marked properly?**

EWC had no classified hardware now. But if it were awarded the follow-on contract that would all change. Harold was eager for the new responsibilities that

possessing classified hardware would bring. As for documents, Harold had personally checked the markings on each one at EWC. Check.



**2. Is all classified material marked to show the name and address of the facility responsible for its preparation and the date of preparation?**

Yes.

**3. Are overall markings conspicuously marked?**

Yes.

**4. Are portions of classified documents properly marked?**

Yes.

**5. Are all additional markings applied as required?**

Yes.

Items 6 and 7. did not apply. EWC had no special types of classified material or unclassified compilations.

**8. Are downgrading/declassification notations properly completed?**

Yes. Always.

Item 9, regarding the distribution of upgraded classified material, did not apply to EWC.

Harold's face reddened when he came to the next element. Shades of December V Would he ever not recall that day whenever he came to

### **M. Transmissions.**

#### **1. Is classified information properly prepared for transmission outside the facility?**

Harold had done a lot of soul-searching over the mix-up with the packages on December 1. What could he have done to prevent the incident at the airport with Bascom? Was there something wrong with the SPP? Obviously, with Kate's slipping the calculator in the ACME package, the transmission had not been "properly prepared." And then Bascom's picking up the wrong package! No. He did not think revising the SPP was the answer. For now, Harold would not change it. He had counseled Kate and she really did seem to be making an effort. And Bascom's ordeal had had a profound effect on him too. Harold decided that more emphasis on security education was probably the answer. He would do all he could to reinforce and nurture Kate's and Bascom's new sense of security awareness.



#### **2. Are receipts included when classified transmission requires?**

Yes.

#### **3. Is a suspense system established to track transmitted documents until the signed receipt is returned?**

"Zelda, has the receipt for the ACME transmission come in yet?"

"Not yet. But we just sent it out last week." She showed Harold EWC's copy of the receipt (not required) and the document record.

"O.K."

**4. Are procedures established for proper receipt and Inspection of classified transmittals and are returned receipts retained for two years?**

The team of Milo Mertz and Zelda Hobbs was unsurpassed, he thought, in their strict adherence to procedures for receiving classified material. He had dropped in on both of them many times and neither had ever missed a step. EWC retained returned receipts for two years.

**5. Are authorized methods used to transmit classified outside the facility?**

Yes. Usually U.S. Mail. EWC had a facsimile machine but it was not approved for classified transmission. Harold had posted a warning notice over the machine to that effect. Harley Sanders had said that EWC's other controls were adequate but the notice was a good idea too.

Harold had been reading about the STU-III, a secure telephone system developed by the National Security Agency for classified transmission. Lots of contractors were using it. He decided that if and when EWC were awarded the follow-on, he would try to get one.

**6. Is the facility clearance and safeguarding capability of the receiving facility determined prior to transmission of classified?**

Yes. He had checked on ACME before transmitting Buzz's report.

**7. Are Couriers, Handcarriers, and Escorts properly briefed?**

EWC did not use couriers or escorts, but Bascom had been thoroughly briefed as a handcarrier.

**8. Is handcarrying of classified material outside the facility properly authorized, inventoried, and safeguarded during transmission?**

Harold went back to Zelda's office.

"Zelda, may I see the rest of the paperwork for Bascom's visit?"

Zelda had the inventory-approval record, the receipt from NESC, and the document record for Buzz's report in a neat stack on her desk. She knew that Harold would be returning to see them. She wondered why he didn't make just one trip to see all of the paperwork he needed to check.

By Bascom's account he had placed the case with the report for NESC on his lap when he took his seat on the airplane and he kept it there all the way to Washington, D.C. He had held onto it with both hands. Constant, vise-like surveillance.

"Thanks, Zelda."

**9. Is handcarrying aboard commercial aircraft accomplished in accordance with required procedures?**



It seemed to Harold that the Handbook was nagging him about the calculator incident. Yes, they had followed procedures. And yes, despite the procedures, the slip-up had happened.

Items 10 through 12 covered classified shipments by commercial carrier. EWC had not used a commercial carrier in years, and no one had sent any classified material to EWC by commercial carrier for some time. Harold was glad to move on to

#### **N. Classified Material Controls.**

##### **1. Do contractor employees understand their safeguarding responsibilities?**

Certainly Zelda, Buzz, and Bascom did. And with Kate the challenge was not her lack of understanding, but getting her to adhere to the established procedures for carrying out her responsibilities.

##### **2. Is the contractor's information management system capable of facilitating the retrieval and disposition of classified material as required?**

EWC had so little classified information on hand, that locating a specific document almost immediately posed no problem.

##### **3. Are external receipt and dispatch records maintained as required?**


Harold asked Zelda for all of the classified document receipt and dispatch records. Then he compared them with the documents in the GSA-approved container. Everything agreed. EWC retained all of its classified document records for two years at least.

Items 4 and 5 concerned TOP SECRET information and EWC had none.

**6. Is all classified material received at the contractor facility and delivered directly to designated personnel?**

Yes. Milo received the material at EWC and took it to Zelda.

Item 7 concerned TOP SECRET information and did not apply to EWC.



**8. Does the contractor maintain a system of controls to deter or detect unauthorized introduction or removal of classified from the facility?**

As Harold had noted earlier, Harley Sanders had worked with Harold to set up an excellent spot-check system.

**9. Do contractor employees promptly report the loss, compromise, or suspected compromise of classified to the FSO?**

Harley Sanders had approved the reporting procedures long ago. EWC had never had anything unfortunate happen to its classified information, though it had been a close call on December 1. He had not written up Kate or anyone else for a security violation for that day's mishaps, but he had taken action and he was prepared to go further in the future, if necessary.

**10. Are procedures adequate to protect classified during emergencies?**

Yes. EWC's SPP, which Harold had decided to retain, covered emergencies thoroughly.

**11. Are security checks conducted at the end of each working day to ensure proper storage of classified materials?**

Yes. As Harold had noted earlier, Zelda always checked to see that all classified material was stored in the GSA approved cabinet, then locked the cabinet. Harold double-checked that all classified material was secured.

**O. Controlled Access Areas** did not apply, but probably would if EWC were awarded the follow-on contract. So Harold skipped to

**P. Disposition**

**1. Is a program established to review classified holdings on a recurring basis for the purpose of reduction?**

Harold checked with Buzz every two months to see whether any classified documents could be destroyed. And Harold checked each reproduction request to see that there was a date for destroying the copies, at least a tentative one.

**3. Is retention authority requested as required?**

EWC had not as yet begun, let alone come to the end of, a 2-year retention period. But in the past EWC had always requested retention authority when it was appropriate. Retention requests had always requested and justified retention authority, identified the classified documents, and indicated the period of time retention was necessary. EWC's requests had always been approved.

**4. Is classified material destroyed as soon as possible after it has served its purpose?**

Yes. Harold noted that the classified documents that Buzz had identified were destroyed promptly.

**5. Does the contractor employ an effective method of destruction?**

EWC destroys its classified material by shredding it. Harley Sanders had looked at EWC's well-oiled crosscut shredder during the past security review and said it was fine.

**6. Is classified material destroyed by appropriately cleared contractor employees?**

Zelda was appropriately cleared and so was Kate, who would serve as Zelda's back-up now that she knew how to operate the shredder.

Item 7 was about destruction records for TOP SECRET material and did not apply to EWC.

**8. Is classified waste properly safeguarded until its timely destruction?**

Yes.

Harold knew the end was in sight when he came to

**Q. Reproduction.**

**1. Does the facility's reproduction control system keep reproduction of classified material to a minimum?**

Harold's reproduction control system had several features, none of them specifically required by the NISPOM. Harold used reproduction request forms to keep the number of copies to a minimum. Also, all of EWC's "unclassified" copying machines had warning notices, and the soon-to-be-replaced machine used for classified reproduction was located in Zelda's office. Instructions for the copier's use were posted above it. All of the employees authorized to use it were properly cleared, authorized, and knowledgeable.

Zelda always closed her door when she or someone else (Harold, Buzz, Kate, or Bascom) was going to use the "classified copier." Three copies of a blank sheet were always made after classified copying. The insides of the machine were always checked. All classified waste was collected and stored in her GSA-cabinet until destroyed.

Item 2 was answered by his answer to item 1.

**3. Is reproduction authorization obtained as required?**

None of the SECRET material that EWC possessed was specifically prohibited for reproduction (marked "**REPRODUCTION REQUIRES APPROVAL OF ORIGINATING AGENCY OR HIGHER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY**"). So EWC never had to request reproduction authority.

**4. Are reproductions of classified material reviewed to ensure that the markings are proper and legible?**

Originals were always checked to see that they were thoroughly and accurately marked before reproduction, and copies were checked to see that all of the markings had been reproduced clearly.

**5. Is a record of reproduction maintained for accountable material and is it retained as required?**

EWC had no TOP SECRET, COSMIC TOP SECRET, or CRYPTO materials.

Harold skipped to

**R. Classified Meetings.**

There hadn't been any for a long, long time.

And the rest of the sections - **S. Consultants, T. Automated Information Systems, U. COMSEC/CRYPTO, V. International Operations, W. OPSEC, and X. Special Access Programs** - did not apply to EWC.

Harold went to his office and jotted down his findings. Apart from the calculator incident, he was pleased. EWC's security program worked well. He made an appointment to see J. Digby Wilbersnoot that afternoon.

"Come in, Hal. Come right on in," Mr. Wilbersnoot said, shaking Harold's hand and guiding him to a deep leather chair.

Mr. Wilbersnoot told some golf anecdotes, some stories about his grandchildren, discussed the likelihood of snow for Christmas, then said, "Well, Hal, how did the self-inspection go?"



"On the whole, just fine. Our paperwork is all there, and the whole system is working well, except for..." Harold paused.

"Some problem, Hal?"

"Just that package mix-up last week. The calculator incident."

"Oh, that." Everyone at EWC knew the story and Mr. Wilbersnoot had been one of the first to hear about it.

"Well, don't be too hard on yourself, Hal - or on anyone else for that matter. What happened isn't likely to ever happen again. I don't think even Harley Sanders will singe your toes for it."

Harold went over his notes in some detail with Mr. Wilbersnoot. He mentioned purchasing a STU-III if the follow-on contract came through, and Mr. Wilbersnoot agreed it would be a good idea.


Harold was about to leave when Mr. Wilbersnoot said, "By the way, Hal, I think I found a silver lining to one of those clouds of December 1. Maybe a gold lining even. I had Roger Puffer in marketing whip this up. I think it'll make a full-page ad that will pull in orders like solar gravity! "

Mr. Wilbersnoot held up a large, dramatic drawing of a muscular arm. The forearm had been cleverly detailed with the nomenclature of the QZ-12. The caption read "The QZ-12. Your Right Arm Widget."

Mr. Wilbersnoot grinned. "Won't Buzz be surprised!"

## SUMMARY

Required self-inspections allow the FSO to review the entire security program of the facility. Self-inspections are conducted in accordance with risk management principles. It is suggested that you weigh the results of past government reviews and your contacts with your I.S. Rep in determining what needs to be examined. The Self-Inspection Handbook provides a guide for conducting self-inspections.



# 9 Review Exercises

**Complete the following exercises for review and practice.**

*Multiple-choice questions may have one or more correct choices.*

1. The facility self-inspection for a facility that possesses SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL documents should be conducted
  - a. immediately preceding aperiodic government reviews.
  - b. once per month.
  - c. at intervals consistent with risk management principles.
  - d. every six months.
  
2. A self-inspection for a facility that possesses SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL information should cover
  - a. all elements listed in the Self-Inspection Handbook.
  - b. elements A through R of the Self-Inspection Handbook.
  - c. all elements listed in the Self-Inspection Handbook except those that refer solely to TOP SECRET information.
  - d. those elements that apply to the particular facility.
  
3. Desirable features of a facility self-inspection include:
  - a. locating and reviewing applicable documents, forms, correspondence and other paperwork.
  - b. talking to cleared personnel about any security problems you may have uncovered that relate to them and about any security difficulties they may be experiencing.
  - c. correcting any security problems you may have encounters.
  - d. analyzing the causes of the security problems that were identified and, where possible, eliminating the causes.

# 9 Solutions & References

1. c. (p. 9-3) (NISPOM, 1-207b)

2. d (p. 9-4)

3. a, b, c, and d. (pp. 9-2-5)

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The next best thing to knowing something is knowing where to find it.

- Samuel Johnson

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# Protecting Secret and Confidential Documents

IS003.08

## EXAM REFERENCE MATERIALS

*Print this document and use during examination as reference material.*

### Use with Online Test Questions 24 – 38

Using the classification guidance provided below, determine what markings to assign to the report. The report has blanks with numbers that correspond to the examination item numbers. For each numbered blank in the report, select the item response letter of the marking that should go in that blank. Record that letter for the item on your answer sheet. Items 24 – 38 follow the report.

**13. SECURITY GUIDANCE.** The security classification guidance needed for this classified effort is identified below. If any difficulty is encountered in applying this guidance or if any other contributing factor indicates a need for changes in this guidance, the contractor is authorized and encouraged to provide recommended changes; to challenge the guidance or the classification assigned to any information or material furnished or generated under this contract; and to submit any questions for interpretation of this guidance to the official identified below. Pending final decision, the information involved shall be handled and protected at the highest level of classification assigned or recommended. *(Fill in as appropriate for the classified effort. Attach, or forward under separate correspondence, any documents/guidance/extracts referenced herein. Add additional pages as needed to provide complete guidance.)*

#### CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE:

1. Sources	-U	
2. Unit Price	-U	
3. Frequency range (bandwidth)	-U	
4. Relative survivability		
a. Mobility	-C	Declassify 8 Jun 2009
b. Security	-C	“ “ “
c. Supportability	-S	“ “ “
d. Ease of Operation	-C	“ “ “
e. Adaptability	-C	“ “ “
f. Resistance to:		
1) Blackout	-S	Downgrade to <u>C</u> 1 Sep 2003 Declassify 7 Feb 2011
2) Gamma rays	-S	Downgrade to <u>C</u> 1 Apr 2002 Declassify 8 Jan 2010
3) Electromagnetic pulses	-S	Downgrade to <u>C</u> 1 Jun 2004 Declassify 1 Jun 2006
5. Overall ratings of units	-S	Downgrade to <u>C</u> 1 Oct 2005 Declassify 1 Aug 2012

*Communications Reports  
738 Bison Street  
Platte Rapids, Nebraska 68131*

March 18, 1996

SUBJECT: Evaluation of BLOS Boxes 25

1. 26 You don't have to spend a lot to get a decent beyond line-of-sight (BLOS) box. BLOS boxes operate in the HF frequency range (from 3 to 30 MHz/sec.) and VHF frequency range (from 30 to 300 MHz/sec.). BLOS boxes, with their reliable low-beamed transmissions, were once the mainstay of battlefield communication, but were phased out when ground-to-ground communication via satellite came in.

2. 27 BLOS boxes cost anywhere from \$37.50 to over \$18,000, but there are many good ones in the \$400-\$600 range.

3. 28 Frequencies begin at 5 MHz/sec. (five models) and reach to a high of 285 (for the Clancy P-T801). The average bandwidth of the models is 238; at 280, the bandwidth of the Clancy P-T801 has the widest spread.

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4. 31 Figure 1 summarizes and depicts the information provided in the reports received and shows the overall ratings assigned to the units.

32  
or  
32

Source and Model	Unit price (per 1,000 units)	Overall Rating	Mobility	Security	Versatility	Supportability	Ease of operation	Adaptability to existing systems	Resistance to blackouts	Resistance to gamma rays	Resistance to electromagnetic pulses	Frequency range (megahertz/second)	Comments
<b>Ridiculously Low-priced Models:</b>													
Matini R-9712	\$50	76	④	③	③	①	①	③	②	②	②	10-270	Has DILAP antenna. Has DC jack for tank adapter.
Danz FSC-32	37.50	75	④	②	②	③	③	②	②	②	②	15-260	According to the manufacturer, this model has been discontinued.
Abell M-6017	60	71	④	③	③	③	①	④	③	②	④	15-230	Has speaker OFF switch. Has gamma ray counter.
<b>Mid-priced models:</b>													
Clancy P-T801	480	83	②	②	②	③	①	②	②	②	③	5-285	Has graphic equalizer. Has carrying handle.
Schutumpf JX-H	630	82	②	②	③	③	①	②	②	②	①	10-275	Has extra bass boost. Has earphone jack.
Harned 45819	435	79	③	②	③	④	①	②	②	②	②	5-250	Has balance control. Has blackout indicator.
Weiner 3-9056	490	75	④	②	②	②	②	②	③	②	③	20-280	Has electromagnetic pulse gauge. Has VHF filter.
Hanky Z-37	505	71	④	③	③	③	①	④	③	②	③	10-215	Has Dolby Z noise reduction. Has HF/VHF band switch.
<b>Outrageously High-priced models:</b>													
Desta LRS-20	3,700	82	②	②	②	①	①	②	②	③	②	10-270	Has auto-record feature. Has gamma ray simulator.
Janulis KC-2853	9,540	80	③	②	③	②	②	③	②	③	②	5-260	Has ermine case, highly damped control knobs.
Maximov W-H6	7,220	80	③	③	②	②	③	②	③	②	②	5-250	Uses alkaline D-cell batteries. Has automatic shut-off.
Chappelle NRV-514	12,650	79	③	②	②	⑤	①	②	②	②	②	15-200	Has satellite communication feature. Has ARG-4 switch.
Sklar 27-89356	8,300	77	③	③	③	④	①	②	③	②	③	10-260	Has all platinum circuitry. Has weak signal amplifier.
Levy BJ-3681	1,280	75	③	③	②	⑤	②	②	④	②	②	5-280	Has lower beam than most. Has "hill-skip" feature.
Cheek ST-R974	18,279	73	④	②	③	③	①	②	③	②	③	15-230	Has nuclear device detonation detector. Has AFC.

Figure 1. 33 Comparison Rating of BLOS Boxes

5. **35** The overall ratings reflect the estimated survivability of the models and include both non-resistance and resistance categories.

a. **36** In the non-resistance categories, the Desta LRS-20 stood out with its unsurpassed ease of operation and supportability together with its above-average mobility, security, versatility, and systems adaptability.

b. **37** In the resistance categories (blackout, gamma rays, and electromagnetic pulses) the best performer was the Schutrumpf JX-11. With its overall rating of 82 and its mid-range price of \$630, the Schutrumpf model offers exceptional quality and is the best choice for vital communication operations.

c. **38** For less demanding applications, the Matini R-9712, despite its relatively poor mobility, offers excellent value at a mere \$50. A Best Buy!

Helga M. Hertz, Head  
Radio Evaluation Division